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With world wide trends in oil consumption, and a growing fear of its depletion, global 
energy investors are forced to enter into newly emerging and high-risk energy markets. 
One such market is the Russian Federation. Russia looms on the horizon as an immense 
opportunity for domestic and foreign investors. Despite Russia's willingness to welcome 
foreign  investment  capital  into  its  growing  economy,  foreign  investors  appear  to  be 
reluctant  to  accept  the  Russian  Federation as  a  reliable  business  partner.  This thesis 
outlines some of the major reasons for the current investor's concerns. It entails a survey 
of  the various investment protection mechanisms that are available to foreign investors in 
Russia under contract and public international law. To Elizaveta Contents 
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Xl Introduction 
The fonner Soviet Union was one of  the world's largest producers of  natural gas and oiL 1 
After the collapse of the Union, the Russian Federation inherited most of its oil and gas 
reserves. However, struggling with its new economy, Russia was unable to exploit these 
resources  successfully due  to  a lack of internal investment capital,  which led Russian 
decision-makers to turn to foreign investors to acquire the capital, management expertise 
and technology needed to revitalise domestic oil and gas production. 
2 
To date, the largest barrier for the attraction of foreign investment into Russia's oil and 
gas industry is its allegedly unstable legal regime, and in particular, the vaguely drafted 
laws  and  seemingly endless power of the Russian politicians (including the powers to 
unilaterally change or amend domestic legislation and, inter alia, the ability to nationalise 
or expropriate foreign property without reimbursing foreign investors for their losses). 
Hence, the purpose of this study is to explore the investment protection options that are 
presently  available  to  foreign  investors  who  have  already  engaged,  or  who  are 
contemplating  engaging,  their  capital  with  the  subsoil  recourses  and  reserves  of the 
Russian Federation. In particular, this thesis will offer a legal analysis of  when and how a 
foreign investor may potentially guarantee the returns and profits of its investment, and 
the steps available to such an investor in cases of  dispute. 
1  Coine,  G,  'Petroleum  Licensing:  Fonnulating an  Approach  for  the  New  Russia'  (1993)  15  Houston 
Journal o/International Law 317,319-20 
2 Stoleson, M, 'Investment at an impasse: Russia's Production Sharing Agreement Law and the Continuing 
Barriers to Petroleum Investment in Russia' (1997) 7 Duke Journal of Comparative &  International Law 
671,678 
1 This thesis is divided into three (3) parts, with each addressing distinct but interrelated 
issues. Part One is entitled "Global oil demand and obstacles for foreign investors in the 
Russian energy sector". This part consists of two chapters in which I have outlined the 
trends of the  global energy demands, the  role of the Russian Federation in the world 
energy market (chapter one), and the obstacles for foreign investors under the current 
legal regime in the Russian Federation (chapter two). The purpose of these chapters is 
not to offer solutions for the internal legal reform but to analyse the present legal regime 
and  highlight  the  possible  consequences  of such  a  regime  for  present  and  potential 
investors. This part begins with a review of  the global energy demand and the role of  the 
Russian  Federation in the  international  energy market.  It examines energy production 
data, as well as the potential of  the Russian oil and gas reserves. It then focuses on some 
of  the major obstacles for foreign investors who wish to secure their investment contracts 
with  the  government  of the  Russian  Federation  or  its  subsidiaries.  It  concludes  by 
suggesting that the peculiarities of the internal legal regime could well be remedied by 
the  relevant  provisions  of the  parties'  investment  contracts  as  well  as  applicable 
provisions of  public international law on investment protection. 
The investment protection options are reviewed in Part Two of my thesis.  This part is 
entitled "Investment protection mechanisms" and consists of  six interdependent chapters. 
Chapter three represents the discussion regarding the enforcement of State contracts as 
the primary mechanism of investment protection. By and large, this chapter represents a 
review  of the  various  contractual  clauses  that  need  to  be  considered  and  ultimately 
included  in  the  investment  contracts.  Chapter four deals  with  the  concept of State 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as  well as discusses a second remedy of 
investment protection commonly known as diplomatic protection. Chapter five analyses 
the core investment protection mechanisms offered to foreign investors by the relevant 
provisions of public international law, including treaty law and customary international 
law.  This chapter begins with an overview of the key investment protection provisions 
common to the treaty law and customary international law. In particular, it discusses the 
Host State's obligations to provide foreign investors with non-discriminatory and fair and 
2 equitable treatment, constant protection and security, and other obligations it has entered 
into on an international scale. 
Chapter  six  deals  exclusively  with  expropriation and  discusses  the  conditions  of its 
legality. It begins by introducing the meaning, nature and origin of the concept. It then 
focuses  on  various  forms  of expropriation,  and  finally  discusses  in  some  detail  the 
conditions of  legality that need to be complied with for such actions to be lawful. 
Chapters seven and eight revise investment protection mechanisms and dispute settlement 
remedies of the  1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). In essence, chapter seven analyses 
investment protection provisions of  the ECT. It specifically focuses on "national", "most-
favoured-nation" (MFN) and "fair and equitable" treatments of investment (embodied in 
the  various  provision  of Article  10  ECT),  "most  constant  protection  and  security" 
mechanism  (Article  10(1)  ECT),  the  requirement  for  the  parties  to  observe  their 
contractual and international law obligations (Article 10(1, last sentence), expropriation 
and measures having equivalent effect (Article 13 ECT), and the provisions regarding the 
transfer of  funds (Article 14 ECT). 
Dispute settlement remedies of the ECT are considered in chapter eight. This chapter 
deals primarily with the provisions of Article 26 ECT,  where three distinct resolution 
options  are  presented.  These  options  include  arbitration  under  the  ICSID  system, 
arbitration  under  the  rules  of the  Stockholm  Chamber  of Commerce,  and  ad  hoc 
arbitration  under the  UNCITRAL  Arbitration  Rules.  The  second part  of this  chapter 
reviews the mechanisms for the recognition and enforcement of  the ECT awards provided 
for by the Washington Convention
3 and the New York Convention.
4 Finally, this chapter 
concludes by providing a detailed examination of how foreign  arbitral  awards can be 
recognised and enforced against the Russian Federation, as the judgement debtor. 
3 Convention of  Settlement of  Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of  Other States, 1965 
<http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlbasicdoc-archive/9.htm> (20 August 2007) (Washington Convention or 
ICSID Convention) (entered into force on Oct 14 1966) 
4 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards,  1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.orglpdf/englishitexts/arbitrationlNY-convIXXIC  1_  e.pdf> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention) 
3 The  third  and  final  part of my thesis  is  entitled "Summaries  and  Conclusions",  and 
contains one chapter. It represents a summary of my thesis in the form of concluding 
remarks  regarding  each  of the  above  chapters.  It ultimately  draws  upon  an  overall 
conclusion  that  foreign  participation  in the  energy  sector of the  Russian  Federation 
should be expanded, and that investment protection mechanisms
5  available to investors 
(both  privately  and  publicly)  are  sufficient  to  eliminate  their  concerns  regarding  the 
alleged inefficiencies of  the Russian internal legal environment. 
5 Here a reference is made to contractual investment protection mechanism as well as mechanisms provided 
for underthe auspices of  public international law. 
4 Part I 
Global Oil Demand and Obstacles for 
Foreign Investors in the Russian Energy 
Sector 
5 Chapter One 
Global energy demands and Russia's role in the global energy 
market 
A. Introduction 
While the global energy demand continues to grow, the world's large and medium-sized 
energy enterprises are raising their efforts to  secure exploration and  production in the 
newly emerging and high-risk energy markets.  One such market is that of the Russian 
Federation. In this chapter I will provide a brief overview of the global energy trends, 
including the world's oil and gas demand. Subsequently, I will discuss Russia's role in 
the global energy market. Finally, I will conclude by suggesting that Russia's role in the 
world energy supply and trade will continue to increase, and that Russian subsoil reserves 
and  recourses  will  present  potentially  the  most  interesting  area  for  foreign  energy 
investment for many years to come. 
B. Global energy demand 
I.  General 
The development and evolution of the modem world largely depends on the extraction 
and utilisation of the world's natural resources that are vital for human activity. These 
resources primarily include fossil fuels such as crude oil and natural gas.  Both of these 
commodities, among other things, supply the vast majority of the world's merchandise 
transportation  equipment,  and  also  represent  the  primary  feedstock  for  many  of the 
6 chemicals that are essential to modem life.!  The earth's endowment of oil, however, is 
finite  and demand for  oil continues to  increase  with time? As  projected  by the 2005 
Global Energy Trends report,
3  world primary energy demand is expected to expand by 
more than half between 2003  and 2030, reaching  16.3  billion tonnes of oil equivalent 
(toe).  Oil,  natural gas and coal  will  account for  83  per cent of the  increase in world 
primary demand between 2003 -2030.
4 
II. Oil demand 
As far as  global oil demand is concerned, it is stipulated
5 that oil will remain the single 
largest fuel in the global primary energy mix, and its world demand is projected to grow 
by  1.3  per cent per year to  92 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2010 and 115  mb/d in 
2030.  The  statistical  data  presented  by  the  International  Energy  Agencl  further 
demonstrates that two-thirds of the total increase in oil use will come from the transport 
and power generation sectors, where oil will remain the main fuel. Industrial, commercial 
and residential demand for oil is also projected to increase with all of  the growth coming 
from the developing countries (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: World oil demand (million barrels per day) 
2004  2010  2020  2030  2004-2030* 
OEeD  47.6  50.5  53.2  55.1  0.60/0 
OEeD North America  24.0  26.9  29.1  30.6  0.8% 
OEeD Europe  14.5  15.0  15.4  15.7  0.3% 
OEeD Pacific  8.3  8.6  8.7  8.8  0.3% 
Transitional economies  4.4  4.9  5.6  6.2  1.3% 
Russia  2.6  2.9  3.3  3.5  1.2% 
I  Hirsch, R,  'Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation &  Risk Management', SAle, MISI, 
(February 2005) <http://www.pppl.gov/publications/pics/OiI]eaking_1205.pdf> page 8 (4 July 2007) 
2 Ibid 
3 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2005 (Paris: lEA Publications, 2005),80 
4 Ibid 
5 Id, 81 
6 International Energy Agency, above n 3 
7 Developing countries 
China 
India 
Other Asia 
Latin America 
Africa 
Middle East 
World 
*  Average annual growth rate. 
Source: lEA (2005).7 
2004 
27.0 
6.2 
2.6 
5.4 
4.7 
2.6 
5.4 
82.1 
III. Natural gas demand 
2010 
33.9 
8.7 
3.3 
6.6 
5.4 
3.3 
6.5 
92.5 
2020  2030  2004-2030* 
42.9  50.9  2.5%) 
11.2  13.1  2.9% 
4.3  5.2  2.8% 
8.3  9.9  2.3% 
6.5  7.5  1.9% 
4.5  5.7  3.0% 
8.1  9.4  2.2% 
104.9  115.4  1.3% 
The  consumption  of natural-gas  is,  likewise,  growing  across  all  economIC  sectors 
worldwide.  As  proposed  by  the  Global  Energy  Trends  report,8  primary  demand  for 
natural gas will grow by 2.1  per cent, meaning that gas will overtake coal by around 2020 
as the world's second-largest primary energy source (Table 1.2). Gas consumption will 
increase by three-quarters between 2003 and 2030, reaching 4 789 billion cubic meters 
(bcm). The share of gas in world energy demand is expected to rise to  24 per cent in 
2030, mostly at the expense of coal and nuclear energy. Power generation will account 
for most of  the increase in gas demand over the projection period because, in many parts 
of the  world,  gas  will  be  the preferred fuel  in new power stations for  economic and 
environmental reasons. In addition, a small but increasing share of  gas demand will come 
from gas-to-liquid plants and from the production of  hydrogen for fuel cells.
9 
7 International Energy Agency, above n 3,82 
8 International Energy Agency, above n 3,83 
9 International Energy Agency, above n 3,83 
8 Table 1.2: World natural gas demand (billion cubic meters) 
OECD 
OECD North America 
OECD Europe 
OECD Pacific 
Transitional economies 
Russia 
Developing countries 
China 
India 
Other Asia 
Latin America 
Africa 
Middle East 
World 
*  Average annual growth rate. 
Source: lEA (2005).10 
2003 
1436 
775 
141 
520 
637 
417 
636 
39 
28 
162 
107 
74 
226 
2709 
2010  2020 
1617  1872 
848  964 
176  217 
593  691 
705  815 
460  525 
893  1374 
60  106 
42  71 
215  305 
145  220 
107  165 
324  507 
3215  4061 
IV. Geography of  the world energy resources 
2030 
2061 
1039 
244 
778 
925 
591 
1803 
152 
98 
387 
318 
232 
615 
4789 
2003-2030* 
1.3% 
1.1% 
2.1% 
1.5% 
1.4% 
1.3% 
3.9% 
5.1% 
4.7% 
3.3% 
4.1% 
4.3% 
3.8% 
2.1% 
As outlined above (i.e. in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2), due to the rapidly accelerating growth 
of  their economies and population, more than two-thirds of  the increase in world primary 
energy  demand  between  2003  and  2030  will  come  from  the  developing  countries. 
Industrialisation,  urbanisation  and  the  shift  in  energy  use  from  traditional  non-
commercial biomass to commercial fuels will also boost demand. OECD countries 11  will 
account for almost a quarter of the global increase and the transition economies for the 
remaining 7 per cent.
12 It is anticipated
13  that nearly three-quarters, or 26 mb/d, of  the 36 
10 International Energy Agency, above n 3, 82 
11 List ofOECD member countries is available on OECD website: 
<http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en  33873108  33844430  1  1  1  1  1,00.html> (6 July 2007) 
12 International Energy Agency, above n 3,87- - - - - - -
13 International Energy Agency, above n 3,87 
9 mb/d increase in global oil demand between 2003 and 2030 will come from developing 
regions in Asia. For example, oil demand in China is  projected to increase almost 2.5 
times over the projection period, to 13.1  mb/d in 2030.
14  Likewise, natural gas demand 
will increase globally and the share in the primary fuel mix will increase in every region. 
The fastest rates of  growth will occur, again, in China and India, where gas consumption, 
at present, is relatively low.
IS 
While the world's economically exploitable energy resources are still adequate to meet 
the projected growth in energy demand, it is worth noting that there exists a geographical 
breakdown  of sources  of energy  production.  Oil  is  a  commodity  found  in  over  90 
countries,  whereas  it is consumed in all countries,  and traded on world markets.
I6  As 
shown below (Table 1.3), most of the world's proven oil and gas reserves are located in 
the Middle East, South America and the blocs of the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, 
these countries are projected to provide the majority of the growth in world oil and gas 
supply in the next few decades. 
Table 1.3: Greatest oil reserves (by country), 2006 
Rank and country  proved reserves, 
billion barrels 
1. Saudi Arabia  264.3 
2. Canada  178.8 
3. Iran  132.5 
4. Iraq  115.0 
5. Kuwait  101.5 
6. United Arab Emirates  97.8 
7. Venezuela  79.7 
8. Russia  60.0 
9. Libya  39.1 
10. Nigeria  35.9 
14 International Energy Agency, above n 3, 87 
15 International Energy Agency, above n 3,87 
16 Hirsch, above n I, 9 
10 Rank and country  proved reserves, 
billion barrels 
11. United States  21.4 
12. China  18.3 
13. Qatar  15.2 
14. Mexico  12.9 
15. Algeria  11.4 
16. Brazil  11.2 
17. Kazakhstan  9.0 
18. Norway  7.7 
19. Azerbaijan  7.0 
20 India  5.8 
Top 20 countries  1,224.5 
Rest of  world  68 
World total  1,292.5 
Source.  ot! & Gas Journal, Vol. 103, No. 47 (Dec. 19,2005). 
7 
v. Anticipated energy investment patterns 
The growing regional gap between demand and production of  energy resources will result 
in the major expansion of international trade and investment in oil and gas.  Such trade 
and investment activities will inevitably shift towards the resource-rich countries across 
the Middle East to the less explored fields located within the borders of the blocs of the 
former  Soviet Union,  and primarily the  Russian Federation.  In the  remainder of this 
Chapter I will outline the  significance of Russia's subsoil reserves as  the sites for the 
present and potential oil and gas developments of  international scale. And in particular, I 
will  highlight  the  potential  importance  of the  Russian  energy  market  to  the  world 
economy in general. This will be followed by the projected outline of  supply and demand 
of  Russian energy resources. Finally, this chapter will be concluded by assessing Russia's 
role in the global energy market. 
17 US.  U.S. Energy Infonnation Administration 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeuJinternational/petroleu.html> (1  August 2007) 
11 c. Russia's role in the global energy market 
I. Energy production outlook 
Russia is exceptionally well-endowed with energy resources, and the energy sector now 
plays a central role  in the  Russian economy.  Russia holds the world's largest proven 
natural  gas  reserves,  the  second-largest  coal  reserves,  and  the  seventh-largest  oil 
reserves.18  It is  also  the  world's largest exporter of natural  gas  (providing close to  a 
quarter  of Europe's  total  gas  needs)19  and  a  major  exporter  of oil  to  Europe  and, 
increasingly, Asia and the Pacific. 
Figure A: Oil and gas production areas 
Core production areas 
Source: IRS Inc. 2006
20 
West Siberia 
•  New projects 
Ikt1lalin 
ill  Refinery assets 
In particular, according to BP Statistical Review,2I at the beginning of 2004, total oil and 
gas  concentrate  reserves  on  Russia's  continental  shelf have  an  estimated  value  of 
18  Russian Federation. RF State Statistical Committee, Russian Statistical Yearbook,  The Russian Energy 
Strategy for the Period until 2020, (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2003), 360 
19 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004 (Paris: lEA Publications, 2004), 284 
20 Felder, T, 'Russia 2007: Can Russia remain prime oil and gas supplier?' (I8 April 2007), IRS Inc, 
London <http://energy.ihs.comINRirdonlyres/CF80ED6A-6F44-4268-B4F5-
E00768DC6909/0IFelderedited.pdf> (3 July 2007) 
21  RF State Statistical Committee, above n 18, 360 
12 approximately US$15  trillion (Figure  A)?2 With this  in mind,  it is  worth noting that 
production of oil decreased in the early 1990s as a result of the economic dislocation 
caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite this, the production has rebounded 
strongly since 1999 due to high world prices (Graph X).23 
Graph X' Russia's oil production outlook 2007* 
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By and large,  the share of oil  and gas production in the Russian economy has grown 
sharply in recent years,  and it now represents potentially the most appealing area for 
foreign investment in the energy sector (Table 1.4). 
22  The  proven crude reserves of the Russian Federation (including condensate) amounted to  9.5  billion 
tonnes.  Russia holds six per cent of total world oil reserves, ranking the country seventh in the world. At 
the same time, gas reserves amounted to 47 trillion cubic metres, ranking Russia first in the world in gas 
reserves  with  26.7  per cent of global  reserves.  According to  the  2004  Report of the Energy Charter 
Secretariat Russian crude oil production will reach 445 to 490 MMT A (Million tonnes per annum) by the 
year of  20 1  0, with a potential increase to 520 MMT  A by 2020  (Australia.  Australian Trade Commission, 
Oil  and Gas  to  Russia  (December  2005)  <http://www.austrade.gov.aulaustraliailayoutlO  .. 0_S2-1_-2_-
3]WBII0736758-4_-5_-6_-7-,00.html> (2 June 2007) 
23  International Energy Agency, above n 19, 284 
24 Ibid 
13 Table 1.4: Russian Energy Strategy projections to 2020 
2002  2020 
(high and low scenarios) 
Energy sector  619  794-881 
Primary energy demand (Mtoe) 
Oil sector 
Production (Mt)  383  450-520 
Exports of  crude and products (Mt)  248  305-350 
Gas sector 
Production (bcm)  584  680-730 
Exports (bcm)  169*  275-280 
Power sector 
Electricity generation (TWh)  889  1 215-1 365 
*Net exports. 
Source: Government of  the Russian Federation (2003i
5 
II. Particulars of  oil supply 
1.  Resources 
According to the 2004 Report of  the Energy Charter Secretariat,26 there are over 3,000 oil 
fields in the Russian Federation, which include around 34,000 oil wells, or 6 per cent of 
the world's total. Crude oil reserves have been recorded in 40 administrative subdivisions 
of the Russian Federation, of  which 35 are oil producing.
27 Over 70 per cent of Russian 
reserves and a similar share of current crude oil production are located in West Siberia. 
The rest of the country's reserves are in the Volga-Urals region (14 per cent), Timan-
25 RF State Statistical Committee, above n 18, 360-75 
26  Energy Charter Secretariat,  Official Report of  the Russian Federation on  the Investment Climate and 
Market Structure in the Energy Sector (Moscow, 2004), 104 
27 The Khanty-Mansy Autonomous District is of  the greatest significance with over 50 percent of  explored 
reserves  and 46 percent of preliminary estimated reserves.  Large  reserves  are  located  in the  Yamalo-
Nenetsky  Autonomous  District,  Nenetsky  Autonomous  District,  and  the  Republic  of Tatarstan.  The 
Republics of Komi,  Bachkortostan and Udmurtia, Perm, Orenburg and Tomsk Oblasts have less sizable 
reserves 
14 Pechora (7 per cent), East Siberia (4 per cent) and the Far East (3  per cent).28  Figure C 
shows the location of  these basins and pipelines. 
The  internationally audited proven reserves of the  six largest companies operating in 
Russia - Yukos, Lukoil, TNK-BP, Surgutneftegaz, Sibneft and Tatneft - amount to 62 
billion barrels?9 Ultimately, however, recoverable reserves are much larger. DeGoyler 
and MacNaughton,30 a leading auditor of  Russian oil reserves, estimates proven, probable 
and possible reserves at 150 billion barrels. A 2000 study by the US Geological Surve~l 
estimates  undiscovered  resources  of oil  and  natural  gas  that  are  expected  to  be 
economically recoverable at 115 billion barrels, or 12 per cent of the total of  the world's 
undiscovered  resources?2  IRS  Energy put Russia's resources  potential  at  140  billion 
barrels at the end of  2001.
33 
2.  Crude Oil Production 
The last ten years have seen a dramatic turnaround in Russian oil production.  Causes 
include  higher  prices,  the  1998  rouble  devaluation,  a  surge  in  investment  and  the 
adoption of more modem technology and  management practices.
34  Production almost 
halved between 1987 and  1996, reaching a low of 6.1  mb/d, largely as  a result of low 
investment by domestic companies after the break up of the Soviet Union.  Production 
began to recover in 1999, reaching an average of 8.5 mb/d in 2003, and over 9.3 mb/d in 
August  2004.
35  Much  of this  growth  has  come  from  rehabilitating  and  stimulating 
existing wells to enhance the recovery of  reserves. Yukos and Sibneft have relied mainly 
on  boosting  well  productivity  to  increase  output.  In  addition  to  this,  drilling  of 
development wells had also picked up.  The total number of wells in operation is now 
28 International Energy Agency, above n 19,301 
29 Ibid 
30 DeGoyler and MacNaughton, '20
th Century Petroleum Statistics (2005)',61 ed, 
<http://www.demac.com> (4 July 2007) 
31  United  States.  United  States  Geological  Survey,  World Petroleum Assessment,  (Washington:  USGS, 
2000) 
32 International Energy Agency, above n 19,301 
33 <http://energy.ihs.comlSolutions/Regions/CISI> (6 August 2007) 
34 International Energy Agency, above n 19, 303 
35 Ibid 
15 close to the number in 1990, despite a number of recent well closures, whereas average 
well productivity has rebounded, from 51  barrels per day in 1996 to 66b/d in mid-2003?6 
Figure B: Oil export routes 
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l:Il The introduction of  advanced production technologies and modem management practices 
have helped to raise productivity and boost output. Higher prices have led to strong cash 
flows, which have helped finance a surge in investment and made possible partnership 
with  international  oil  and  oil-service  companies.  At  US$7.7  billion,  total  capital 
expenditure in the upstream oil industry in 2003 was more than three times higher then in 
1999.
39 Most investment is going to West Siberia and much of  it into boosting output at 
already operating fields (Figure B). 
Production growth may slow in the next decade or so, as most low-cost opportunities to 
stimulate output have now been exploited. Capacity will increasingly need to come from 
new greenfield developments  in West  Siberia,  including  some  large  fields  that  were 
overlooked during the Soviet era because of poor technology. Later, attention may shift 
to less mature basins such as Timan-Pechora and to frontier areas such as East Siberia, 
the Pechora Sea, the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea and the Far East. Development 
and production  costs  for  these  projects are  likely  to  be  considerably higher then for 
existing brownfield projects in West Siberia, because of  a lack of infrastructure and more 
difficult geological and operating conditions. The average investment needed per barrel 
of capacity stands at around US$13 000, which is higher than in most other parts of the 
world.4o 
3.  Industry structure and the role of  the State 
There has been a profound shift in relations between the oil industry and the State since 
2003. The former president, Vladimir Putin, and his government were reasserting State 
control over the sector and taming the power and influence of  the oligarchs that emerged 
from  the  controversial  privatisation of the  1990s.  The government has  indicated that 
private crude oil pipelines will not be permitted and that it intends to keep Transneft, the 
pipeline monopoly, in State handsY 
39 International Energy Agency, above n 19,303 
40  International  Energy  Agency,  'World  Energy  Investment  Outlook:  2003  Insights' 
<http://www.iea.org/  Itextbase/nppdt7free/2003/weio. pdt> (15 August 2007) 
41 International Energy Agency, above n 19,307 
18 The  Yukos  affair  has  revived  fundamental  concerns  about  property  rights  and  the 
independence  of the  judicial  system,  harming  the  business  climate  and  increasing 
investment risk.  Yet,  foreign  interest in Russia's private oil  companies remains  high. 
Several  foreign  oil  companies have  expressed interest in  acquiring  stakes  in Russian 
companies, including Sibneft, Yukos and Lokoil (Figure D).42 
Figure D:  Foreign investment 
Source: IHS Inc. 2006
43  - CJ 
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Whilst the 2003  merger of Yukos and Sibneft is now being unravelled, consolidation is 
still the norm in the rest of the industry. Independent upstream companies continue to be 
absorbed by the vertically integrated Russian majors.
44  The share of small producers in 
total Russian crude oil output has fallen from around 9.5 per cent in 1998 to 6.5 per cent 
in 2003.
45 
42 Ibid 
43  Felder, above n 20 
44  The  top  ten  "Russian  majors"  include:  Yukos,  LUKoil,  Surgutneftegas,  Sibneft,  Tatneft,  Rosneft, 
Slavneft, Bashneft and Gasprom 
45 International Energy Agency, above n 19,307 
19 In  summary,  the  Russian  Federation  possesses  a  vast  number  of oil  reserves  of 
international significance. And despite the reported decline in the overall oil production 
(attributable mainly to the collapse of  the Soviet Union), the average production of oil in 
the territory of  the Russian Federation remains higher than that in most other parts of  the 
world. 
III. Particulars of  gas supply 
1.  Resources 
Russia's gas resources are colossal. It has 47 trillion cubic metres of proven natural gas 
reserves, which account for 26 per cent of  the world total.
46 Gazprom
47 holds the licences 
to fields holding 55 per cent of  these reserves; other producers hold 28 per cent, while the 
rest are  unallocated.
48  Three  quarters  of Russian  gas  reserves  and a  similar  share  of 
current production are located in West Siberia (Figure E). European Russia accounts for 
16 per cent and East Siberia and the Far East together for the remaining 9 per cent.
49 
Some 20 giant gas fields have been discovered to date, each with more than 500 bcm in 
reserve.  so  Only seven of these fields have been brought into production. As indicated in 
the 2004 World Energy Outlook report, Russian gas reserves are equivalent to about 81 
years  of production  at  current  rates.
51  In  addition  to  proven  reserves,  there  are  an 
estimated 33 tcm of  undiscovered gas resources.
52 
46  Cedigaz,  'Natural  Gas  in  the  World'  (Rueil  Malmaison:  Institute  Fran~ais  du  Petrole  2004) 
<www.cedigaz.org> (6 July 2007) 
47 Gazprom is the world largest gas company. It plays a central role in the Russian economy, providing up 
to  a quarter of federal  government  tax  revenues.  It accounts  for  almost 90  per cent of Russian  gas 
production  and  owns  and operates  the  national  network  of high-pressure  inter-regional  gas  pipelines, 
which,  at over 150  OOOkm,  is the  longest in the  world. It is also the  sole owner of gas storage sites in 
Russia, operating 22 underground facilities.  A majority of the shares in the company was sold to private 
investors  in  the  1990s.  However,  the  state  still  holds  38  per cent  directly  and  another  16.6  per cent 
indirectly, giving it majority control of  the board 
48 International Energy Agency, above n 19,309 
49 Energy Charter Secretariat, above n 26, 111 
50 International Energy Agency, above n 19,309 
51 Ibid 
52 The bulk of  Russian gas production comes from three super giant fields that have been in production for 
many years. These fields are Medvezhye, Yamburg and Urengoye. There also emerges a rising output from 
20 2.  Export prospects 
As it stands, Russia exports gas exclusively to other CIS countries and Europe. In 2003, 
Russia exported 119 bcm to  OECD Europe.
53  Gazexport, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Gazprom, is the sole exporter to Europe. Other non-Gazprom companies export Russian 
gas to other CIS countries (Figure F). 
Rising gas demand in Europe is expected to remain the primary driver of Russian gas 
exports at least until 2030, although Asia will also emerge as an important new market.
54 
In particular, exports to the European Union are expected to climb to  137 bcm in 2010 
and 155 bcm in 2030, whereas exports to Asia are expected to reach 30 bcm by 2030.
55 
Increased exports to  Europe  will  require  substantial additions to the existing pipeline 
capacity. The existing capacity is able to meet projected export needs only through to the 
end of the  current decade.  56  Completion of the Yamal-Europe pipeline  is expected to 
increase its  output through Belarus and Poland to  Germany;  however the plans for  its 
construction have been put on hold. 
a  forth  super giant field - Zapolyarnoye,  which  started producing in  2001.  (United  States Geological 
Survey, above n 31) 
53 International Energy Agency, above n 19,313 
54 International Energy Agency, above n 19,313 
55 International Energy Agency, above n 19,313 
56 Ibid 
21 Figure E: Major gas reserves and supply infrastructure in the Russian Federation 
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57 International Energy Agency, above n 19,310 
22 Figure F: Gas export routes 
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\.  In 2006, exports of Russian gas amounted to 17.6 Bcf/d 
(14.2 Bcf/d to Europe; 3.4 Befld to CIS) 
In addition, Gazprom is looking at the possibility of developing LNG exports based on 
reserves  on  the  Yarnal  peninsula  and  in  the  Barents  Sea.
59  However,  the  costs  are 
expected to be very high due to the extremely harsh climate conditions. For this reason, 
the  World Energy Outlook report estimates that no LNG project other than Sakhalin-2 
will proceed before 2030. 
Gas exports to Asia in the form of LNG from Sakhalin-2 were expected to start in 2007. 
The project, owned by a foreign consortium led by Shell, involved the development of  an 
offshore gas field and the construction of  a plant with a capacity of9.6 million tonnes per 
year. Gas is also known to come from an adjacent oil and associated-gas field. The total 
investment was estimated to reach approximately US$9 billion.
6o 
Pipeline exports to Asia are expected to begin sometime during the next decade. Russia 
Petroleum, owned by the TNKlBP joint venture, holds a license to develop gas reserves 
58 Felder, above n 20 
59 International Energy Agency, above n 19, 313 
60 Ibid 
23 at the Kovykta field near Irkutsk in East Siberia. It plans to develop the field and build a 
pipeline to export the gas to China and Korea, costing the region around US$12 billion 
and upstream development, another US$5 billion to US$6 billion.
61 
In short, Russia's colossal gas resources are expected to stimulate a continued increase in 
production, to meet steadily growing domestic demands and to provide increased exports 
to  Europe and new markets in the East. It is projected that the gas production will rise 
from an estimated 608  bcm in 2003, to 655  bcm in 2010 and 898  bcm in 2030.
62  Net 
exports  are  expected  to  rise  from  169  bcm  in  2002  to  182  bcm  in  2030.
63  Higher 
production  will,  however,  call  for  considerable  investment  in  greenfield  projects  to 
replace declining output from the old fields that have been in production for decades.  64 
D. Conclusion 
Today, Russia is the world's largest natural gas exporter. In the coming decades, Russia 
is  likely to play a central role in  global  energy supply and trade.  The  Russian energy 
sector has already undergone a dramatic transformation.  This transformation has been, 
and remains to be,  a principal driver of the country's economic recovery since the late 
1990s. 
Until 2010, net exports of oil and gas are likely to increase both in absolute terms and as 
a share of world inter-regional trade.
65  Much of the increase in Russian oil exports in 
short to medium terms will be available for export, and will go primarily to Europe, Asia 
and the Pacific regions. 
Gas exports are also likely to increase. Russia will remain the main supplier of natural 
gas  to Europe, and is also  likely to  emerge as an important supplier of gas to Asian 
61  Ibid 
62 International Energy Agency, above n 19, 308 
63 Id. 
64 International Energy Agency, 'World Energy Investment Outlook: 2003 Insights' 
<http://www.iea.org//textbase/nppd£'free/2003/weio.pdt> (15 August 2007), 214 
65  International Energy Agency, above n 19,323 
24 markets. Governments of importing countries in Europe and Asia may seek to improve 
their energy relations with Russia.
66 Russia may also seek to strengthen its strategic and 
commercial ties with buyer countries in order to secure long-term outlets for its gas and 
extract more value from the supply chain. 
In short, Russian oil and gas sectors represent potentially the most interesting area for 
foreign energy investment. Despite this, the Russian oil and gas industry is in great need 
of investment capital. Aside from the present economic slowdown, this paradox hides 
behind the uncertainties in the country's current legal regime.  In the next Chapter, the 
reader will  be presented with a  broad overview of the  relevant legislative framework 
covering foreign investment in the fuel and energy sectors of  the Russian Federation. 
66 International Energy Agency, above n 19, 325 
25 ChapterTwQ 
Obstacles for investors under the current legal regime in the 
Russian Federation 
A. Introduction 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  Russia  looms  on  the  horizon  as  an  mnnense 
opportunity for investors. The paradox, however, is that Russia is  still in great need of 
foreign investment flows. In this chapter I will examine some of  the potential reasons for 
such  a  conundrum,  and  provide  an  overview  of some  of the  major  issues  facing 
prospective investors in Russia's oil and gas industry today. In short, these reasons (or 
obstacles), as identified in this chapter, include, inter alia: first, the alleged inefficiencies 
of Russia's intemallegal regime; second, a much feared likelihood of expropriation or 
nationalisation of investors'  property rights;  third,  the  issue  related to  state immunity 
from  jurisdiction  of foreign  courts  and  arbitral  tribunals,  and  finally,  the  investors' 
alleged obligations to  resolve  all  present and  potential  disputes  within the  local court 
system of  the Russian Federation. Each of  these major obstacles shall now be examined. 
B. Inefficiencies of Russia's internal legal regime 
I.  General 
Presently, foreign investment in Russian subsoil reserves is regulated by a collection of 
federal and regional laws, including: the Constitution of  the Russian Federation of 1993, 
26 the RF Law on Foreign Investment of  1991,  the RF Law on Subsoil of  1992 and the RF 
Law on Production Sharing of  1995, among others. 
Despite the force and historical development of these laws, it remains questionable as to 
whether  Russia's  current  legal  environment  is  sufficiently  adequate  for  foreign 
participation. Some of the issues related to these laws seem to include: overlapping and 
conflicting  powers  of federal  and  local  authorities,  exposure  to  double  taxation  and 
exposure to changing and supervening legislation. In the following section I will provide 
an overview of Russian legislation relevant to the regulation of investment activities in 
the energy sector, and present the reader with an outline of the historical development 
and current implications of  Russian law in this area. 
II.  The Law on Foreign Investment of 1991 
1.  Overlapping legislative powers regulating foreign investment in subsoil 
Historically, all mineral resources of  the Russian Federation, including oil and gas, were 
assumed to fall under the jurisdiction of  regional authorities. In the 1930s, the ownership 
of  these resources shifted to the federal authorities, called the Supreme Soviet, under the 
theory  that state  government  had  consented to  delegate  their  authority  to  the  latter.  I 
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional authorities began to reassert 
ownership rights to the oil and gas in their respective territories? Unwilling to challenge 
these claims, federal superiors agreed to a system of  overlapping jurisdiction. 
Such agreement was  subsequently incorporated,  inter alia,  into  the  1991  RF Law  on 
Foreign Investment (Law on Foreign Investment), which was aimed at regulating all 
foreign investment activities within the territory of  the Russian Federation. The Preamble 
to  this  law states  specifically  that  all  matters  regarding  foreign  investments  shall  be 
subjected to this federal law. In particular, it stated that: 
I  Coine,  G,  'Petroleum  Licensing:  Formulating an  Approach  for  the  New Russia'  (1993)  15  Houston 
Journal o/International Law 317, 329 
2 Ibid 
27 The provisions of [this law] operate on the territory of  the Russian Federation with 
respect  to  all  foreign  investors  and  enterprises  with  foreign  investments.
3 
(Emphasis added). 
Bearing in mind the fact that the Law on Foreign Investment is the federal legislation, it 
may appear that this law was intended to prevail over any regional laws attempting to 
regulate the same subject matter. However, closer examination reveals that the drafters of 
the Law on Foreign Investment did not intend such a result.
4 In fact, the drafters left the 
system of overlapping authority firmly in place, which is evident from the wording of  its 
Article 38, where it was stated that: 
[Foreign  investment in  land or natural resources is  subject to this Law and]  other 
legislative  enactments  in  force  on  the  Territory  of the  Russian  Federation. 
5 
(Emphasis added). 
Since it can be argued that the phrase "other legislative enactments" is sufficiently broad 
to encompass the myriad laws, taxes, regulations and fees enacted by assertive regional 
or  state  governments,6  the  investor,  who  is  required  to  comply  with  all  federal 
regulations, must additionally comply with all regulatory power entrusted in the regional 
state authorities.
7 
The  conformation of the  existence  of a  system  of overlapping jurisdiction was  also 
reinstated in the  Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993.  Article  130(1) of the 
Constitution provided that the regional State governments of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation shall have powers to render independent decisions regarding "the ownership, 
use  and  disposal of its  municipal  property".8  All  mineral  resources  conveniently fell 
3 Law on Foreign Investment 1991 (Russian Federation), Preamble (Emphasis added) 
4 Stoleson, M, 'Investment at an impasse: Russia's Production Sharing Agreement Law and the Continuing 
Barriers to Petroleum Investment in Russia' (1997) 7 Duke Journal of Comparative &  International Law 
671,678 
5 Law on Foreign Investment 1991 (Russian Federation), Article 38 (Emphasis added) 
6 Stoleson, M, above n 4, 678 
7 Law on Foreign Investment 1991 (Russian Federation), Part IV.C.3 
8  Constitution  of the  Russian  Federation  1993,  Art  130.1  ("Local  self-government  in  the  Russian 
Federation shall  ensure  independent solution by the  population of local  issues,  the ownership,  use  and 
28 under the definition of  such "property". 
9 Furthennore, according to Article 72( 1  )(  c) of  the 
Constitution,  "possession,  use  and  disposal  of land,  subsoil,  water  and  other  natural 
resources", as well as management of  the subsurface, are subject to the joint authority of 
the Federation and its regions.  Therefore, the allocation of the use of the subsurface is 
based on joint decisions by federal and regional authorities.
1O 
Hence, a close examination of the Russian Law on Foreign Investment and the Russian 
Constitution  shows  that  both  federal  and  regional  state  authorities  had  conferred 
overlapping powers to regulate foreign investment within their respective territories. 
2.  Double taxation 
Another  obstacle  to  foreign  investment in the  Russian  Federation  is  the  Russian tax 
regime. The Law on Foreign Investment referred potential investors to the taxation laws 
"currently in force" 1  1 in the Russian Federation. Not surprisingly, these laws allow both 
federal  and  local  governments  to  subject foreign  investors to  their respective taxation 
regulations concurrently. This represents an obstacle for investors because bearing such a 
burden renders the whole investment process less profitable. 12 
3.  Exposure to supervening legislation 
Yet another major inefficiency of Russia's intemallegal regime is the fact that Russian 
legislation is  continuously subjected to  new changes  and  updates.  This means that an 
disposal of municipal property") <http://www.russianembassy.orgIRUSSIAlCONSTIT/chapter8.htm> (14 
December 2006) 
9 Constitution o/the Russian Federation 1993, Art 9 
10 This principle of  governance is specific to the Russian Federation, and is referred to as "two key" - a 
license allocated to a mining enterprise has to have not one, but two signatures, one of  them belonging to 
the governor of  the region (Kotov, V, Russia's Mineral Resources: Reconjiguration a/Institutional 
Framework, International Conference on Natural Resources, Conference Paper Series No.9, The 
Philippines, December 2002) 
II Law on Foreign Investment 1991 (Russian Federation), Article 3 
12  Imse,  A,  'American Know-How and Russian Oil'  The  New  York  Times,  7  March  1993,  28  (The 
investors can be expected to pay "local taxes often to 20 per cent, a tax on profit from which wages cannot 
be deducted, a 28 per cent VAT, a 40 per cent income tax, an oil export tax of  $5.50 a barrel, a mineral use 
tax, a mineral rehabilitation tax, an excise tax, tariffs on imported goods and port usage taxes. In addition to 
that, if  profit is still being realized, an investor may be required to pay a profit repatriation tax") 
29 investor  may  well  be  exposed  to  additional  administrative  and  legislative  obstacles 
relating to investment activities. For example, in order to get a licensing permit, the new 
legislation may require an investor to obtain a number of additional approvals of various 
agencies concerned.
13  If this were to occur, an  investor would inevitably lose valuable 
time in order to  comply with these requirements, resulting in major inconvenience and 
additional financial burdens. 
In  addition,  the  practice of introducing  amendments  into  existing  legislation  is  also 
flawed,  and amendments are often made to resolve short-term issues which undermine 
the existing principles of legislative regulations. A good illustration of such practice can 
be seen in the case of  American Richfield Company (ARCO), which decided to invest in 
the Russian oil and gas market in September 1996 by expanding its partrIership with AO 
Lukoil Holding (one of the Russia's largest oil companies),  subsequently signing a $5 
billion venture to jointly develop projects in the former Soviet Union.14 In order to allow 
the transformation of  ARCO (which initially was formed as a stock company) into a non-
commercial organisation, an amendment was made to the Russian Civil Code envisaging 
the  possibility  of  the  conversion  of joint  stock  companies  into  non-commercial 
organisations,  the  participants  of which  have  completely  different  rights  regarding 
participation in the management of the said legal entities.  IS  This example shows that the 
lack of coordination between federal and regional legislation in the Russian Federation is 
a destabilising factor for entrepreneurial activity. 
In summary, pursuant to the provisions of  the Constitution of  the Russian Federation and 
the Russian federal Law on Foreign Investment, both federal and local governments have 
powers to  regulate  foreign  investment.  As  a result,  investors may well  be  exposed to 
taxation laws, excise fees and licensing requirements at both the federal and local levels 
13  Basi,  R,  'Foreign Investment in  the Russian Oil and Gas  Industry:  A  Time for  Reckoning' (1993) 5 
International Legal Perspectives, 45 (note 13) 
14  'ARCO Expands Partnership with Russian LUKOIL' The New York Times  20 September 
1996<http://query.nytimes.com/gstifullpage.html?res=9406EODDI43DF933A1575ACOA960958260 (7 
August 2006) 
15 Ernst & Young, Investicionni Climat v Rossii (The Investment Climate in Russia)  (Moscow: Ernst & 
Young, 1999) 
30 concurrently,16 meaning that an investor may be "legally" required to pay, for example, 
its exploration and drilling license fees, as well as the land use taxes, at least twice. 
III. The RF Law on Subsoil of  1992 
In  order  to  overcome  the  inconsistencies  brought  about  by  the  Law  on  Foreign 
Investment in conjunction with other forms of  pre-existing investment legislation, in 1992 
the federal government introduced a new law, which became known as the RF Law on 
Subsoil of 1992
17  (Subsoil  Law)  which  was  drafted  specifically  to  regulate  foreign 
investment in natural resources. 18 
Importantly, this law made one significant advance towards the establishment of a more 
acceptable legislative climate for foreign investors. It provided for the use of  concessions 
and Production  Sharing Agreement contracts (PSA Contracts), in conjunction with a 
licensing system,  which were designed to  stabilise the investment environment and to 
attract foreign capital.
19  In the following section the reader will be presented with a brief 
overview of  the advantages and peculiarities of  a typical PSA Contract. 
1.  The nature and significance of  the typical production sharing agreement 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) are contracts pursuant to which foreign investors 
transfer to the government of the Host State a share of the oil produced in lieu of taxes. 
Such transfers, in effect, constitute payment made by the investors to the Host State,z° 
The percentage of oil received by the Host State should total in value that to which the 
State would have received from same investors by means of taxation, including income 
tax, value added tax (V AT), export and other taxes. 
16 Stoleson, M, above n 4, 677 
17 The Subsoil Law 1992 (Russian Federation) was based on the concept of  the state as owner of  the 
resources giving an administrative-law permit ("licence") to operators to explore and exploit mineral 
deposits.  See Waelde, T and Friedrich, M, Introductory Note: The 1996 Russian Production-Sharing Law, 
The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, 2000 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/joumal/htmllvo13/article3-12.html> (16 July 2007) 
18 Coine, G, above n 1,429 
19 Come, G, above n 1,429 
20 Stoleson, M, above n 4, 681. 
31 To regulate  PSAs, the  majority of the  Host States introduced into their legal  systems 
various  Production sharing  Laws  (PSA Laws), designed to  attract foreign  investment 
specifically in the oil and  gas industries.
21  A typical PSA Contract protects the foreign 
investor by enabling him to contract out of  the legal environment of  the Host State. 
A Production Sharing Agreement includes the following elements: the foreign investor 
and  the  government  of the  Host  State  negotiate  a  contract  listing  the  rights  and 
obligations of  the parties, which are then enforceable in either international arbitration or 
the courts of a third country?2 When oil is produced, the foreign investor is allotted a 
portion of  the produced oil sufficient to cover the costs of  the project (known as Cost Oil) 
and whatever is left (known as Profit Oil) is divided between the foreign investor and the 
government  of the  Host  State  (known  as  Government  Take)  according  to  a  pre-
determined percentage.23 
The main feature of  a PSA contract is that it is entirely self-contained,24 in that it allows 
the foreign investor legal protection and guarantees regarding their investment. Similarly, 
the Host State benefits by  attracting foreign investment while maintaining control over 
the  specifics  of large  scale  oil  projects,  and  maintaining  title  over  the  resources  in 
question throughout the process of  exploration and extraction.25 
2.  Peculiarities of  the Russian law regulating Production Sharing Agreements 
In Russia, the concept of  Production Sharing Agreements seems to have taken on a life of 
its own.  The provisions of the Russian Subsoil Law were somewhat different to  those 
21  Coine, G, above n 1,362 
22  Moss, G,  'Petroleum Investments in Russia:  Newly Enacted Law On Production Sharing Agreements 
Does Not Solve All Problems' (1996) 
<www.law.duke.edulshell/cite.pl%3F7%2BDuke%2BJ.%2BComp.%2B%26%2BInfOIo271%2BL.%2B671 
%2Bpdf+Moss,  +G, +Petroleum+Investments+in+Russia&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd= l&gl=au> (14 August 2007) 
23  Smith, E and Dzienkowski, J,  'A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements' (1989) 24 
Texas International Law Journal 13, 28 
24 Skelton, J, 'Investing in Russia's Oil and Gas Industry: The Legal and Bureaucratic Obstacles' (1993) 8 
National Resources and  Environment 26 
25 Ibid.  This is different from other popular forms of  oil contracts such as concession agreements where the 
state actually transfers ownership of  the oil to the foreign investor.  See also Smith, E, 'From Concessions 
to Service Contracts' (1992) 27 TULSA Law Journal 493, 527 
32 provided  for  in  the  typical  PSA  Laws.  Namely,  the  sharing  of production  was  not 
performed with a company holding the title to the resources, but directly with the Russian 
government (in offshore operations), and jointly with regional authorities (when the area 
in question was in a regional authority jurisdiction). In other words, the mineral rights in 
the Russian Federation were typically held by the State (or State enterprise) whereas an 
investor was provided with a mere authority to exploit such rights on behalf of  the State. 
Furthermore, subsequent to the conclusion of a PSA Contract, the investors still had to 
obtain the mineral licence, required under the Subsoil Law. 
Hence, the Russian Subsoil Law did not offer investors the same level of security in that 
it  still  exposed investors to other relevant  legislation in force  on the  territory of the 
Russian  Federation.  As  a  result,  the  familiar  problems  of  overlapping  authority, 
supervening legislation and hostile taxation environment were created?6 It is therefore 
appropriate  to  conclude  that  Russian  law,  with  regard  to  the  Production  sharing 
Agreements,  did  not  allow  for  the  self-contained  contracts  anticipated  by  foreign 
investors. 
In  order  to  add  clarity  and  consistency  to  the  existing  Subsoil  Law,  in  1995  the 
government of  the Russian Federation introduced another federal law dealing particularly 
with Production Sharing Agreements. This law became known as the Law on Production 
Sharing of  1995 (Russian PSA Law). 
IV.  The Law on Production Sharing of  1995 
While under the old system the mineral right was vested exclusively with the State, with 
the introduction of  the new law, the Law on Production Sharing of 1995, the investor did 
not need to obtain a mineral licence subsequent to the conclusion of a PSA Contract. In 
particular, under Articles 2-4 of  the Russian PSA Law, subsequent to the conclusion of a 
PSA Contract, the mineral licence was issued to the investor quasi-automatically, making 
26 Stoleson, M, above n 4, 683 
33 the contract seemingly self-contained
27 Despite this, it is still far from clear whether even 
under  this  law  the  recognition  of contractual  supremacy  will,  indeed,  be  applied  to 
practice. 
1.  An attempt to  deal with  issues  of overlapping authorities  and supervening 
legislation 
Attempting  to  mitigate  the  risks  of overlapping  and  conflicting  authorities,  evolving 
legislation, double taxation and endless bureaucracy, the drafters of  the Russian PSA Law 
introduced a so-called "stability" clause.  Namely,  Article  17  of the  Russian PSA  Law 
requires  consent from  both  parties  for  changes to the  agreement,  thus  precluding the 
unilateral imposition of  revised terms by the government. 
At the  same time,  the  second limb of Article  17  was drafted in contemplation of the 
legislative  changes,  whereby  the  investors  were  allowed  to  obtain  "same  economic 
benefits" they would have obtained, in case the applicable legislation was indeed altered. 
In particular, the relevant provisions of  Article 17.2 read as follows: 
If the  changes  to the  federal  or local  legislation have  a  negative  effect  on  the  foreign 
investor,  the tenns of the  agreement between that  investor and the  Host  State  shall  be 
modified so  that the  investor  can  obtain  same  economic  benefits  which  it  would have 
obtained in the absence on any legislative changes. (Translation).28 
27 The Russian administrative law is drafted in a manner that represents a so-called "command by the 
State".  Some commentators even note that this law embodies the traditions of  the Communist command-
control planning system: Waelde, T and Friedrich, M, Introductory Note: The 1996 Russian Production-
Sharing Law, The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, 2000 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/htrnVvo13/article3-12.html> (16 July 2007).  On the other hand, 
the "civil law" approach, embodies in the Russian Civil Code of  Civil Procedure (under which the new Law 
on Production Sharing Agreements 1995 (Russian Federation) was created), is considered to implement the 
notion of  equality in contractual relationship between the Host State and the investor. 
28 Original text: "CTaTbH 17. CTafiuJlbHOCTb YCJlOBUH COfJlameHUH. 
2. B cnyqae, eCJIU B  TeqeHHe cpOKa .a:eHCTBIDI cornaIlleHIDI 3aKoHo.a:aTeJIbCTBOM POCCHHCKOH cDe.a:epaQHH, 
3aKoHo.a:aTeJIbCTBOM cy6beKToB POCCHHCKOH cDe.a:epaQHH H  rrpaBOBbIMH aKTaMH opraHOB MeCTHoro 
caMOYIIpaBJIeHIDI 6y.a:YT YCTaHOBJIeHbI  HOPMbI, yxy.a:IllaIOIlI,He KOMMepqeCKHe pe3YJIbTaTbI .a:eHTeJIbHOCTH 
HHBeCTopa B  paMKaX COrJIaIlleHIDI, B  COfJIaIlleHHe BHOCHTCH  H3MeHeHIDI, 06eCrreQHBaIOIlI,He HHBeCTOpy 
KOMMepQeCKHe pe3ynbTaTbI, KOTopble MornH 6bITb HM rronyQeHbI IIpH IIpHMeHeHHH .a:eHCTBOBaBIllHX Ha 
MOMeHT 3aKJIIOQeHIDI COrnaIlleHIDI 3aKOHo.a:aTeJIbCTBa POCCHHCKOH cDe.a:epaQHH, 3aKOHo.a:aTeJIbCTBa 
34 Hence, while this "stability" clause, in theory, was an innovative solution to the problem 
of  overlapping authority, its wording, as expressed in Article 17 of  the Russian PSA Law, 
was  too  vague  to  mitigate  investors'  concerns.  In  particular,  this  "stability"  clause 
neglects  to  provide  definitions  of certain  crucial  terms,  such  as  negative  effect  and 
economic benefit, leaving their interpretation to the authorities of the Host State. Even if 
the authorities agree  with the investor that the investor was  deprived of the economic 
benefit  solely  due  to  changing  legislation,  the  PSA  law  does  not  describe  how the 
agreement may be modified to protect the investor's profit margin.
29 
2.  An attempt to deal with the issue of  aggressive taxation 
Similar to the issue of changing legislation, Russian PSA  Law, arguably, failed to deal 
adequately with the matter of aggressive taxation. Article  13.1  of the Russian PSA  law 
(CmambR  13.1) reiterates a traditional PSA structure whereby the investor pays the Host 
State a percentage of  the oil produced in lieu of  taxes.  30 In other words, the investor was 
freed from having to pay any taxes other than income tax and certain payments for the 
use of  subsoil. The original text of  Article 13.1 reads as follows: 
CmambJl13. HaJIOrH H nJIaTex(H npH "CnOJIHeRHH COrJIameHHH 
1.  3a  HCKJIIOqeHHeM  Harrora  Ha  npH6billb  H  IIJIaTeiKeii  3a  rrOJIb30BaHHe  He,lQ)aMH, 
HHBecTop  B TeqeHHe  cpoKa  .n:eiicTBIDI  cornarrreHIDI  C yqeTOM  nOJIOiKeHHH  rryHKTa  3 
HaCTOHIIJ,eH  CTaTbH  oCB060iK.n:aeTcH  OT  B3HMaHIDI  HaJIOrOB,  C60pOB,  aKlUf30B  H HHbIX 
06H3aTeJIbHbIX  IIJIaTeiKeH  (3a  HCKJIIOQeHHeM  rrpe.n:ycMoTPeHHblx  rryHKTOM  6 
HaCTOHIIJ,eH cTaTbH), npe.n:ycMoTPeHHblx 3aKOHo.n:aTeJIbCTBOM POCCHHCKOii <l>e.n:epalUfH. 
B3HMaHHe YKa3aHHbIX HaJIOrOB,  C60pOB H HHbIX 06H3aTeJIbHbIX IIJIaTeiKeH 3aMeHHeTCH 
pa3.n:eJIOM  npO.D:YKlUfH  Ha  YCJIOBIDIX  cornarrreHIDI  B  COOTBeTCTBHH  C  HaCTOHIIJ,HM 
<l>e.n:epaJIbHbIM 3aKoHoM.31 
cy6'beKTOB POCCHHCKOH <l>e.n:epaIIHH H npasOBbIX aKTOB opraHoB MeCTHoro CaMoynpaBJIeHIDI. IIopH.n:oK 
BHeceHIDI TaKHX H3MeHeHHH orrpe.n:eJIHeTCH COrJIarrreHHeM." 
29  Stoleson,  M,  above  n  4, 683:  "Presumably the  drafters  intended the  investor to set  off the  damages 
incurred by challenging legislation against the government take of  the produced oil. If  this is the case, then 
the investor is only protected from local taxation and fees  up to the  amount of  government take.  In case 
where a local or federal authority imposes regulations which amount to more then the government take, the 
investor will be left without recourse". 
30 Law on Production Sharing Agreements 1995 (Russian Federation), Article 13.1 
31 Article 13. Taxes and other duties payable upon entering into an agreement. 
35 However,  paragraphs  two  through  to  SIX  of Article  13.1  compromised  the  law  by 
imposing upon an investor an additional number of  taxes, including income tax (as high 
as 32  per cene
2
), value added tax
33  (recoverable only if oil is  found  and produced
34
), 
bonuses, royalty payments, and payments for the use of land.  A closer analysis of this 
law, therefore, shows that the taxes payable by the investor under the Russian PSA Law 
are almost identical to those payable under the Russian Law on Foreign Investment. This 
supports the view that the Russian PSA Law offers little, if  any, benefit to an investor. 
Likewise,  the  investor  who  signs  a  PSA  Contract  with  the  Russian  Federation  is 
automatically subjected to  existing legislation in the area of export duties and tariffs.
35 
For example, Article 9.2 of the Russian PSA  Law states that investors may export oil 
without limitations "except those [limitations] found in the Law on Foreign Investment" 
(emphasis  added).  One  of the  limitations,  however,  gives  the  government  power to 
impose "export tariffs,  quotas and license fees" as it deems appropriate.
36 This finding 
points  to  the  fact  that the  Russian  government may unilaterally modify any tariff or 
license structures, which the parties contracted for,  every time it exercises its authority 
under the Law on Foreign Investment. 
1. Except for the income tax and royalty payments, the investor ... is freed from paying its taxes and other 
duties otherwise imposed by the law ofthe Russian Federation. The payment of  taxes and other relevant 
duties are substituted by sharing of  product as prescribed by the agreement and in accordance with the 
current law of  the Russian Federation. (Translated by the author ofthis thesis) 
32  Vaughan,  K,  'Russia's Petroleum Industry:  An Overview of its Current Status, The Need for Foreign 
Investment, and Recent Legislation', (1994) 25 Law and Policy in International Business 813, 826 
33  Under Article  13.3  of the  Law  on Production  Sharing Agreements  1995 (Russian  Federation),  the 
investor must pay value added tax, which is essentially a tax on the incremental value the foreign investor's 
service add to the [mal product of exportable oil,  including the  value of goods and services the foreign 
investor must utilize to produce the final product. The value added tax is an especially lucrative tax for the 
Russian government in light of Article 7.2, which mandates that the investor gives preference to Russian 
products, services and technology.  Under Article 7.3 the investor must not only use Russian contractors, 
producers and suppliers, but must also stipulate in the PSA contract to using a "minimum percentage of 
technological  supplies  that  must  be  purchased  in  Russia".  This  means  that the  investor  is  forced  to 
purchase goods and services in Russia under Article 7.2, which are then subject to value added tax under 
Article 13.3: Moss, G, above n 22,2 
34 Law on Production Sharing Agreements 1995 (Russian Federation), Article 13.3 
35 Id, Article 9.2 
36 Moss, G, above n 22,2 
36 It can thus be concluded that in the areas of  tax, export duties, and dispute resolution, the 
Russian  PSA  Law  is  firmly  attached  to  existing  Russian  legislation.  What  is  more 
damaging for foreign investment, however, is the fact that this legislation is still prone to 
continuous  changes  and  amendments,  which  could  potentially  destroy  a  profitable 
venture.
37  There  are  currently  no  provisions  in  the  Russian  PSA  Law  to  restrict  the 
government of the Russian Federation from exercising its  legislative powers under the 
Law on Foreign Investment and the Subsoil Law to raise income taxes or export duties.
38 
This is particularly challenging for foreign investors considering that both federal  and 
local governments have a constitutional right to raise taxes or enact new ones (if they 
consider it appropriate) regardless of the "stability" provisions of Article 17 of the new 
Russian PSA Law.
39 
V.  The 2005 draft of  the new Subsoil Law 
In the  year 2000,  the Russian  government decided to renew the country's legislative 
situation and adjust it to a more market-based legislative environment. These efforts have 
started after adoption of  the first economic program of  the Russian government following 
the election of  Vladimir Putin as the Russian President. The Program was adopted by the 
government headed by Michail Kasyanov, and had included a wide range of legislative 
initiatives, the purpose of which was the establishment of the comprehensive legislative 
framework for further developments of the economy. The first tier of these legislative 
reforms has included adoption of  the Land Code, third part of  the Civil Code, second part 
of the Tax Code, new Labour Code, etc., thus introducing the basic legal framework for 
normal functioning of  market institutions. 
The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources was put in charge of the development of  the 
new Subsoil Law.  A draft of this law was settled in early 2003.
40  This draft law was 
37 Stoleson, M, above n 4, 685 
38 Moss, G, above n 22, 2 
39 Constitution of  the Russian Federation  1993, Article  132.1  (local authorities can "manage municipal 
property" and" establish local taxes and levies") and Article 75.3  (Federal government may establish a 
"system of  taxes to be collected for the federal budget") 
40 Milov, V, The New Russian Subsoil Law and its Implications on Oil & Gas Upstream Business and 
Foreign Investment (Moscow: Institute of  Energy Policy, 2005), I 
37 further  revised  by the  Ministry of Economic  Development and Trade of the  Russian 
Federation, which in tum proposed another draft of the same legislation. In 2004, after 
the reorganisation of  the Russian government connected with the re-election of  Vladimir 
Putin, ministerial responsibilities with regard to the new law had again been changed, and 
the Ministry of Natural Resources, under the new head Yuri Trutnev, was put in charge 
of  the development of  the new law. The Ministry, headed by Mr Trutnev, finally, chosen 
to develop its own new draft, differed completely from those proposed earlier.41 
This last draft was finally approved by the Russian government on March 17,2005, and 
submitted to the State Duma on June 17, 2005. It should be noted that this draft did not 
touch upon the issue of overlapping legislative powers, nor did it discuss the matter of 
double taxation.  However, it did attempt to resolve the issue of continuous legislative 
changes much feared by the investors. The drafters of  this law seemed to have reached a 
consensus  that  the  new law should  produce  minimum  effect on the  existing  license 
holders in terms of  reconsideration of  the initial terms of license agreements (to avoid the 
negative impact of the new law on the business and investment climate in the subsoil 
sector).42 Therefore, all of the recent draft law versions had included provisions to retain 
previously issued rights for  old investors,  so  new legislation would apply only to the 
relationships, which began after the new law became effective, or to the relationships 
with investors who would voluntarily choose to transfer from licenses to civil contracts. 
The general weakness of this draft,  however,  was in the fact that the licenses already 
issued  were  not just  left  alone  under  the  old  license  conditions,  but  were  given  a 
completely new regulatory framework, different from the one set by the existing subsoil 
legislation. This meant that while the new law seemed to have shielded investors from 
any issues related to the change of legislation, such a shield in reality was only illusory. 
This is because the old licenses would violate the new legislative requirements, unless 
they were either amended or reissued to ensure their compliance to the new law.43 This 
proposed new law, however, still has not corne into force,  and the primary law which 
41Id  2 
42 Id: 3 
43 Ibid 
38 governs the subsoil area in the Russian Federation to-date remains the 1992 federal Law 
on  Subsoil,  with  its  subsequent  additions  and  amendments  (particularly  those 
incorporated in 1995). 
VI.  Conclusion 
Russian law regulating the development of its subsoil (including investment) has a long 
history of development. Despite some progress in the area of the introduction of  market-
based legal mechanisms in subsoil activities and strengthening of fundamental laws and 
guarantees for foreign investors, current law preserves the environment of  uncertainty for 
foreign investors.
44 In other words, one of  the largest barriers for the attraction of  foreign 
investment into the Russian oil and gas industry is Russia's unstable legal regime and, in 
particular, the lack of  adequate laws regulating this sector.
45 
C. Expropriationl nationalisation 
I.  General 
The second major obstacle for foreign investors in the Russian energy sector is the Host 
State's right to expropriate or nationalise foreign investment. This right is inherent in the 
sovereignty of each State.
46 The concept of "State sovereignty", which will be looked at 
in detail in chapter 4, lies at the heart of  both customary international law and the Charter 
of the  United Nations.
47 State  sovereignty denotes the competence,  independence and 
44 Ernst & Young, above n 15 
45 Vaughan, K, above n 32,832 
46 GA Resolution 523 (VI) on Integrated Economic Development and  Commercial Agreements (General 
Assembly, Sixth Session, 360tb plenary meeting, 12 January 1952) 
<http://daccessdds.un.orgidoc/RESOLUTION/GENINRO/067178/IMGINR006778.pdflOpenElement> (18 
December 2006); GA Resolution 626 (VII) on Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and  Resources 
(General Assembly, Seventh Session, 41ltb plenary meeting, 21  Decemberl952) 
<http://daccessdds.un.orgidocIRESOLUTION/GENINRO/079/69/IMGINR007969  .pdflOpenElement> (18 
December 2006) 
47 United Nations. UN Charter <http://www.un.orglaboutunlcharter> (16 August 2007) (In accordance with 
Article 2(1) of  the UN Charter, the world organisation is based on the principle of  the sovereign equality of 
all member states.  While they are equal in relation to one another, their status of  legal equality as a mark of 
sovereignty is also the basis on which intergovernmental organizations are established and endowed with 
the capacity to act between and within states to the extent permitted by the framework of  an organisation.) 
39 legal equality enjoyed by all free States. This concept is generally used to encompass all 
matters  in which States are permitted to make  independent decisions  and  act without 
intrusion  from  other  sovereign  States.  These  matters  include  choices  of political, 
economic,  social  and  cultural  systems, the formulation  of foreign  policy  and,  among 
other matters, the ownership of  the State's natural resources. 
The  principle  of State  sovereignty  is  enshrined  In the  Constitution  of the  Russian 
Federation. Article 4(1) of  the Constitution states: 
CyBepemneT POCCuHCKOH: <l>e.ll.epaQllll  pacnpOCTPaIDIeTC~ Ha BCIO ee TeppliTopllIO. 
(The sovereignty of  the Russian Federation shall cover the whole of  its territory). 
The Russian Federation, as a sovereign State and as the ultimate proprietor of  its natural 
resources,  has  a  right  to  deal  with  its  property  in  a  manner  in  which  it deems  fit. 
Collateral to such power is a statutory right to dispose of  the natural resources, including 
the disposition by way of expropriation or nationalisation, which is precisely one of the 
primary concerns of  foreign investors.48 
II. Meaning of  the concept of  expropriation/ nationalisation 
Expropriation is commonly understood to mean unilateral interference by the State with 
the  property  (or  comparable  rights)  of the  investor,  whereby  the  State  deprives  that 
investor of control of the latter's property.49 A similar concept is nationalization, which 
denotes the transfer of  an economic activity to the public sector as part of  a general inter-
governmental program of  social and economic reform. 
Traditionally, the direct physical dispossession of the property of the foreign investor by 
the  Host  State  was  not  in  itself illegal  provided  that  such  dispossession  met  three 
conditions of legality.  First,  it was done  for a public purpose which was in the public 
48 The right to expropriate! nationalize foreign property will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four 
49 Amoco International Finance Crop v Iran, 15 Iran-U.S C.T.R. 189 (1987-III); Mobil Oil Iran. Inc v Iran 
(1987-III) 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3. 
40 interest.  Second,  it was  not discriminatory, and was carried under due  process of law. 
And  third,  it  was  accompanied  by  the  payment  of prompt,  adequate  and  effective 
compensation.  50  However,  an  act  of the  taking  of foreign  property  has  come  to  be 
clouded with difficulty as a result of the progressive expansion of the concept of taking. 
Today,  this  concept  is  said  to  include  "direct  taking"  (or  in  other  words  - "direct 
expropriation"),  and  "indirect  taking",  also  known  as  "indirect"  or  "creeping" 
expropriation. 
The  problem  of "indirect"  taking  of foreign  property  is reasonably  straight  forward. 
Indirect taking diminishes the rights and interests of the investor by State action without 
necessarily affecting the direct ownership of the foreign investment.  In other words,  it 
means that such governmental taking does not need to meet the three above-mentioned 
conditions of legality, resulting in the dispossession of investor's property without any 
compensation. Such a broad understanding of indirect taking would potentially cover all 
government actions including state legislations and regulations. 
Indirect expropriation is generally achieved through restrictions and infringements upon: 
(i) the entry of  foreign wealth into the country, (ii) the use of foreign wealth, and (iii) the 
revenues produced from the investment of that wealth.
51  Within the first  category are 
situations in which the Host State prohibits the entry of  foreign capital into certain sectors 
of industry.  For  example,  in  the  Canadian  National  Energy  Program,  the  Canadian 
government stated that: 
Finns that are foreign-controlled  will  continue to be non-eligible  for  the  Foreign 
Investment Review Act (FIRA) purposes .... [T]he government does not want to see 
the  oil companies  use  their cash  flow  to expand into  the  non-energy part of the 
economy,  nor does  it want foreign-controlled firms  to buy already-discovered oil 
and gas reserves.
52 
50 Such provisions oflegality can be found in, inter alia, Article 13 of  the 1994 ECT 
51  Mendes, E, 'The Canadian National Energy Program: An Example of  Assertion of  Economic 
Sovereignty or Creeping Expropriation in International Law' (1981) 14 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 475, 489-501 
52 'Canadian National energy Program' (1 August 2007) 
<http://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.caJ~carman/courses/nep.html> (5 August 2007) 
41 The second category involves situations in which the Host State decreases the  use of 
foreign wealth by increasing public sector ownership in a particular industry. Increased 
public sector ownership is  usually achieved by accelerating tax regimes and conferring 
rights and concessions for domestic traders and industries.
53  The negative effect of this 
type of  action is particularly acute in the Russian Federation where the taxation regime is 
in a state of constant evolution and federal and regional governments are able to impose 
separate and concurrent taxes. 
Under  the  last  category  of methods  for  achieving  indirect  expropriation  of foreign 
investment,  the  foreign  government  can  use  exorbitant  taxation  policies  for  already 
existing contractual rights. Such governmental regulations could be designed to depress 
the trading shares of foreign-controlled firms so that takeover bids by the public sector 
become more  attractive.  Evidently,  under any of the  above-mentioned mechanisms of 
"indirect" expropriation, the investor risks losing property (or a substantial part thereof), 
and is unlikely to be compensated by the Host State for the former's apparent losses. 
III.  The  consequences  of  expropriation/  nationalisation  on  investors' 
interests 
While governments will typically compensate property owners for a direct expropriation, 
it is rare for governments to compensate property owners for reductions in property value 
caused by regulatory changes. In general, most States do not provide compensation for 
the  effects  of regulatory  changes  resulting  from  legislative,  executive  or  judicial 
decisions,  even  though  such  changes  may  cause  losses  more  severe  than  outright 
expropriation. 
53  Mendes, E, above n 51,489-501 
42 D.  State  immunity  from  jurisdiction  in  legal  and  arbitral 
proceedings 
The third issue posing a major concern for  foreign investors is that of State immunity. 
State immunity is based upon the concept of sovereignty in the sense that a sovereign 
may not be  subjected,  without its approval,  to  the jurisdiction of another sovereign.  54 
State immunity may be pleaded by a Host State when a person wishes to make that State 
a party to legal proceedings in the court of  another State.  55 If  successful, the plea prevents 
a foreign court from exercising jurisdiction over that Host State.  56 
State immunity is a doctrine of customary international law. It was developed from the 
judgements of domestic courts  (case  law)  whose  approaches  to  State  immunity differ 
from one country to another depending upon the country's legal, political and economic 
systems. In most Western countries, the concept of sovereign immunity is interpreted in 
line  with  the  theory  of "restrictive"  State  immunity.  Such  theory  is  based  on  the 
distinction  between  commercial  activities  of the  State  (acta jure  gestioinis)  and  its 
sovereign activities (acta jure imperii). According to this theory, a State enjoys immunity 
only if  it acts in its capacity as a sovereign. Conversely, if  a State engages in commercial 
activities, it would not be in a position to enjoy the privileges of  immunity.  57 
In some of the developing countries and countries with transitional economies, among 
which are the blocs of the former Soviet Union (including the Russian Federation), the 
concept of the immunity of the sovereign State is still seen as "absolute". As opposed to 
the notion of "restrictive" State immunity, the theory of "absolute" State  immunity is 
based  on the  idea  that  no  suit may  be  brought  against  a  State  without  its  consent, 
regardless of the nature of the dispute. If a judgement is entered into against the State's 
consent, such judgement may not be executed. 
54 Newman, L and Hill, R (ed), The Leading Arbitrator's Guide to International Arbitration (New York: 
Juris Publishing, 2004), 143 
55 Aust, A, Handbook of  International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 159 
56 In this case the dispute can only be disposed of  only by the court of  the foreign State itself, or by an 
international court or tribunal, or by diplomatic settlement 
57 Newman, L, et ai, above n 54, 144 
43 An example  of the  application  of absolute  State  immunity  is  shown  in the  case  of 
Embassy o/the Russian Federation v Compagnie Noga d'importation et d'exportation.
58 
The  Russian  Federation,  as  a  sovereign  State,  signed  not  only  an  arbitration  clause 
providing for arbitration at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, but also an express 
waiver of  "any right of  immunity". The Paris Court of  Appeal came to the conclusion that 
the waiver of immunity did not extend to the immunity from execution guaranteed by the 
1961  Vienna  Convention on  Diplomatic Relations and customary international law on 
diplomatic immunities.
59  Likewise, in two recent German cases
60 the court ruled that the 
Russian Federation el1ioys state immunity at the level of  execution of  the award since the 
attached claims arose directly out of  sovereign activity. Furthermore, the court confirmed 
that Russia had not waived  its  execution immunity.  And whilst the agreement in the 
relevant bilateral investment treaty to  submit disputes to arbitration was held to be an 
implicit waiver of immunity from suit, such a waiver did not extend to  immunity from 
execution proceedings. 
In summary, the theory of  "absolute" immunity is based on the assumption that the State 
and its property should always be protected and be governed by its own interests under its 
own laws. In exercising this right, a State does not lose its sovereignty by entering into 
commercial  transactions  with  other  States  or  foreign  investors,  regardless  of the 
contractual agreement between the parties. Such a legal position clearly poses a number 
of issues for investors in the Russian oil and gas industry. It means investors will not be 
able  to  challenge the position of the Host State  in any  other jurisdiction, without the 
consent of  the latter. 
58 Case No. 2000/14157, Paris Court of  Appeal, 1
st Chamber, Section A (unpublished) (decision rendered 
on 10 August 2000) 
59 Consequently the Court of  Appeal ordered the lifting of  arrest orders obtained by Noga with respect to 
bank accounts opened in the name of  Russian Federation 
60 Case No. VII ZB 08/05 and VI ZB 09/05, German Federal Court (4 October 2005) 
44 E. Enforced exposure to State courts 
The final obstacle for foreign investors that will be looked at in this chapter is the issue of 
investors'  enforced exposure to the jurisdiction of the Host State's courts.  In order to 
preserve their sovereignty and also to prevent the interference with the decisions of their 
own domestic courts,  sovereign States often appeal  to  the so-called doctrine of Local 
Remedies,  which  in  principle,  precludes  any  diplomatic  protection,  as  well  as 
international adjudication or arbitration,  so  long as the  aggrieved party (in this case a 
foreign  investor)  has  not  exhausted  the  remedies  offered  by  the  administrative  and 
judicial systems of  the Host State.
61  Such enforced exposure to the Hose State's domestic 
courts  causes  a  great  deal  of concern  for  foreign  investors  due  to  the  high  level  of 
corruption and the lack of  separation of  judicial and political powers in some Host States. 
What this means is that the foreign investor, by making an investment, is automatically 
submitting to the law (or the absence of it) of the Host State, which may not only prove 
unfavourable in terms of  commercial interest, but which may potentially be applied by a 
non-impartial adjudicator. 
The doctrine of Local Remedies  is also promulgated in the  so-called Calvo  Doctrine, 
pursuant  to  which  the  jurisdiction  in international  investment  disputes  lies  with  the 
country in which the  investment is  located.  The  Calvo  Doctrine  operates to  prohibit 
adjudication  or  arbitration,  or  indeed  any  diplomatic  intervention,  before  the  local 
remedies are exhausted. 
Historically, both these doctrines were justified as a necessity to prevent the abuse of the 
jurisdiction of weak nations by more powerful ones. They have since been incorporated 
into many investment treaties, statutes and contracts. Nowadays, both these doctrines are 
used in concession contracts and clauses to give local courts final jurisdiction. 
In the Russian Federation, the doctrine of Local Remedies is  embodied in the Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration of  1993, the mandatory rules of  which, provide for 
61 Brownlie, Principles of  Public International Law 5
th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 546-47 
45 cases where national courts have exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of disputes. 
Among these disputes are  cases relating to  administrative and public order issues (eg. 
disputes  with  government  bodies  regarding  tax,  competition  issues,  etc);  bankruptcy; 
incorporation  and  liquidation  of legal  entities;  disputes  between  a  company  and  its 
shareholders;  and  protection of goodwil1.
62  Furthermore,  if one  of the  parties  to  the 
dispute  is  a  foreign  entity,  the  list  for  exclusive jurisdiction  is  extended  to  include 
disputes over state property, including issues of  privatisation, disputes over real property 
located in  Russia,  disputes  over registration of trade-marks  and patents in Russia and 
disputes on invalidation of entries in the state registers (eg.  the real property register). 
Hence, exposure to Russian domestic courts poses another concern to foreign investors, 
resulting in yet another obstacle in the expansion of foreign participation in the Russian 
energy industry. 
F. Conclusion 
Russia is a vast country stretching across Europe and Asia, possessing immense wealth in 
the form of  exploitable natural resources, technology and a large skilled workforce. It is a 
country  whose  goals  are  to  move  towards  a  market  system  based  on private  capital 
investment  and  enterprise  and  to  integrate  rapidly  into  the  world  economy.  The 
opportunities  for  investment  in  the  Russian  Federation  are  immense.  However,  the 
existing level of foreign direct investment in the Russian economy remains far short of 
the existing need. The low levels of  investment are not due to any lack of  opportunities or 
potential. The foreign direct investment shortfall is attributable to the fact that political 
and legal conditions in Russia are not altogether favourable to foreign investors.
63 
This chapter has  identified some of the major obstacles for  foreign  investors to  inject 
capital  into  the  ventures  situated  within  the  territory  of the  Russian  Federation.  In 
62 Kilkov, M, 'Arbitration and Enforcement ofIntemational Arbitral Awards in Russia' in The European 
Arbitration Review 2007 (2007), 
<http://www.globalarbitrationreview.comlhandbooks!3/sections/6/  chapters/  4 3/russia>, Section Two (15 
August 2007) 
63  6giit~ii, M, Attracting Foreign Direct Investment/or Russia's Modernization: Battling Against the Odds, 
paper presented at the EOCD-Russia Investment Roundtable, 19 June 2002, 1-3 
46 particular, this chapter presented an overview of the alleged inefficiencies of Russia's 
internal  legal  regime,  including  overlapping  legislative  powers,  aggressive  taxation, 
supervening  legislation,  expropriation  and  nationalisation,  sovereign  immunity  and 
enforced exposure to Russian domestic courts. 
Some of the legislative drawbacks highlighted in this chapter are purely academic and 
hence are not indicative of the actual situation faced by investors in the Russian oil and 
gas industry. It is also noteworthy that there are views that the Russian legal environment 
provides adequate solutions for  investment activities located within the borders of the 
Russian Federation.
64 The information provided in the following chapters will be based 
upon the assumption (which is not necessarily correct) that Russian internal laws preserve 
the environment of  uncertainty for foreign investors. In the next part the author will argue 
that  a  combination  of contract  and  public  international  law can  offset  the  risks  and 
challenges discussed in this chapter. 
64 Rozenberg, M, 'Commercial Dispute Resolution in Russia' (October 2006) Russian Investment Review 
44,44-45.  See also OgiitlYii, M, above n 63,3-10 
47 Part II 
Investment Protection Mechanisms Chapter Three 
Enforcement of State contracts as a mechanism for investment 
protection 
A. Introduction 
The  stability  of the  investment  conditions  responsible  for  economIC  and  financial 
performance  of the  investment  venture  lies  at the  heart  of investors'  concerns.  Such 
matters are, therefore, frequently placed at the centre of contractual negotiations. This is 
particularly so for natural resources and energy projects, which are typically lengthy in 
duration,  expensive  and  risky.l  In  this  chapter  it will  be  proposed  that  the  parties' 
contractual undertakings can provide much needed stability. 
In this regard,  the  parties'  contractual undertakings (contractual terms)  can serve as  a 
powerful tool for the protection of  the investor's rights in that such undertakings provide 
investors with a real possibility of enforcing the Host State's contractual obligations. The 
main objective of this Chapter is to demonstrate that where the peculiarities of the Host 
State's  internal  legal  regime  for  the  protection  of foreign  investment  fail  to  provide 
investors with satisfactory solutions, the provisions of the parties' contract may fill the 
gap  created  by  the  existing  legal  commotion.  This  chapter  will  analyse  various 
contractual terms providing for the protection of  foreign investment, and will conclude by 
suggesting  that  correctly  formulated  and  well-structured  contractual  clauses  will 
1 Waelde, T, Stabilising International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract 
Interpretation, paper presented to the Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Policy, Professional Paper No 
PP13, CPMLP 1994,5 
49 generally provide much needed assurance to the potential investors in the Russian energy 
industry. 
B.  Contract  with  government  as  a  method  of  political  risk 
management 
Contracting with the State (or State agency) is an important component of political risk 
management.  This  strategy  is  informed  by the  intention  to  commit  the  government 
(including future governments) to the specific investment and fiscal regimes agreed upon 
during  the  negotiations.  The  compilation of the  originally negotiated  investment  and 
fiscal  conditions results  in an agreement, which is  also commonly known as a "State 
contract"  . 
2 
An  investment  agreement  represents  the  preferred  legal  instrument  for  setting  the 
framework for large-scale and high-risk projects.
3 The presence of specific provisions in 
the agreement could potentially warrant against any subsequent government intervention. 
Such provisions will often include stabilisation clauses, renegotiation clauses, arbitration 
clauses and clauses selecting law and forum. A brief survey of the contents and nature of 
such contractual clauses will now be undertaken. 
C. Stabilisation clauses 
I.  General nature and meaning of  the stabilisation clause 
Stabilisation  clauses  are  used  to  protect  investors  against  the  detrimental  effects  of 
adverse changes to national legislation.
4 Stabilisation (or "freezing") clauses are aimed at 
restraining  a  Host  State's  government  from  abrogating  or  otherwise  intervening,  by 
2 Waelde, T and Ndi, G, (eds), International Oil and Gas Investment: Moving Eastwards? (London: 
Graham & Trotman, 1994),133 
3 Waelde, T, above n 1,23 
4 CA Settebello Ltd V Banco Totta and  A cores [1985] 1 WLR 1050, 1059 
50 exercise of State powers, in investment agreements concluded with foreign participants.
5 
In other words, a stabilisation clause prevents the Host State from changing its laws that 
govern the relationship between it and the investor.
6 
A stabilisation clause usually states that the law in force on a given date - typically, the 
date on which the contract takes effect - is the law that will apply between the parties, 
regardless  of future  legislation,  decrees,  or  regulations  issued  by  the  Host  State.  A 
stabilisation  clause  could  thus  be  appreciated  as  one  of the  most  useful  methods  of 
dealing with the political risks of  foreign investment. 
II.  The purpose of  a stabilisation clause 
The  purpose  of a  stabilisation  clause  is  to  preclude  the  application  of subsequent 
legislative (statutory) or administrative (regulatory)  acts  made by the  government that 
modify the legal situation of the investor.
7  It prevents any new or changed laws from 
having a detrimental effect on the rights guaranteed in the investor-State contract. 
8 
For such a clause to be effective it must be contained in an agreement to which the State 
is directly or indirectly a party.9 If such an agreement exists, it is possible to argue that 
5 Waelde, T, above n 1,  1 
6 Stewart, C, 'Commentary 1.1 in Transnational Contracts' in Bishop, Crawford and Reisman (eds), 
Foreign Investment Disputes (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 
7 Ibid 
8 In this regard, it is also important to note a point of  view of  Professor Sornarajah, who wrote as follows: 
"Though the conventional wisdom is that such clauses are binding on the State party which had directly or 
indirectly participated in the making of  the contract, there are theoretical difficulties in the way of  accepting 
such a conclusion. The first theoretical difficulty is that a mere contractual provision cannot fetter the 
legislative sovereignty of  the host State. Unless the State wished to exempt a particular foreign investment 
contract from the scope of  its law, it is to be assumed that the legislative change applies to all foreign 
investment contracts. To overcome this problem, the argument is made that the contract containing a 
stabilization clause is [analogous] to a treaty and that the "treaty" is beyond the scope of  national 
legislation. This is a far-fetched argument because treaties are made by States, whereas the foreign investor 
does not have the capacity to enter into relationships involving treaties or [any similar instruments]. A 
treaty involved a mutual surrender of  sovereign rights and the foreign investor has no sovereign rights to 
surrender". (See Sornarajah, M, 'The Settlement of  Foreign Investment Disputes' in Bishop, Crawford and 
Reisman (eds), Foreign Investment Disputes (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2005), 290) 
9 See Sornarajah, M, 'The Settlement of  Foreign Investment Disputes' in Bishop, Crawford and Reisman 
(eds), Foreign Investment Disputes (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 
51 the State has  committed itself not to extend later changes to its laws to the particular 
contract.  to 
III. Structure of  a stabilisation clause 
A good example of  a stabilisation clause can be found in the contract between the parties 
in LIAMCO v Libya.
ll In that case, the stabilisation clause provided as follows: 
The Government of Libya,  the  Commission and the  appropriate provincial authorities 
will take all steps necessary to ensure that the Company enjoys all the rights conferred by 
this Concession [contract1.  The contractual rights expressly created by this Concession 
shall not be altered except by mutual consent of  parties. 
This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be construed in accordance 
with the Petroleum Law and the Regulations  in  force  on the date of execution of the 
Agreement  of Amendment  by  which  this  paragraph  (2)  was  incorporated  into  this 
Concession Agreement.  Any amendments  to  or repeal of such  Regulations  shall  not 
affect the contractual rights of  the Company without its consent. (Emphasis added). 
As noted by Stewart, the first paragraph makes it clear that mutual consent of  the parties 
is  needed
12  to  alter  the  contractual  rights  secured  by  the  concession.13  The  second 
paragraph establishes that the municipal law by which the concession is to be interpreted 
is fixed as of a certain date, so that no later government legislation or action can infringe 
upon the company's contractual rights. 
to Id 290 
llLi~mco v Libya (1982) 20 ILM 53 
12 It  must be noted that the first paragraph, in requiring mutual consent to change the concession contract, is 
sometimes referred to as an "intangibility clause", which is distinct from the stabilization clause in a way 
that it was not freeze the law as of  a certain date 
13 Stewart, C, above n 6, 293 
52 A stabilisation clause used by one of  the fonner Soviet republics reads as follows: 14 
Upon  approval  by  the  Parliament  of the  Azerbaijan  Republic  of this  Agreement,  this 
Agreement shall constitute a law of  the Azerbaijan Republic and shall take precedence over 
any other current or future  law,  decree  or administrative  order (or part thereof) of the 
Azerbaijan Republic which is inconsistent with or conflicts with this Agreement except as 
specifically otherwise provided in this Agreement. 
Comparable to  the  first  example,  the  key element of this  stabilisation clause  was the 
removal of the government's power to unilaterally alter the investor's property rights by 
changing municipal law. It also reaffinned that the investor's consent is necessary before 
any such changes in law will affect the investor. 
In summary, the main objective of the traditional fonn of the stabilisation clause is to 
"freeze" the  applicable law, the  fiscal  regime or other essential investment conditions 
present at the time of entering into the contract. The incorporation of such a clause into 
the  contract  means  that  the  government  is  contractually  prohibited  from  enacting 
legislation  inconsistent  to  the  agreement,15  or  alternatively,  if such  legislation  was 
enacted, it should either be  declared not applicable, or be followed  by the payment of 
appropriate compensation. 
The modern stabilisation clause is, therefore, a provision responsible for allocation of  the 
investment  risks  whereby  the  State  promises  to  maintain  the  present  contractual 
environment, or to compensate the foreign investor should the investor's financial burden 
increase as  a result of legislative change.  Such compensation may  be an offset of the 
financial  value of subsequent legislation against  payments  due  by  the  investor to  the 
State, or by a corresponding counter-payment by the State to the investor. 16 
14 Amoco Group Agreement Dated 14 December 1996 on the Expropriation, Development and Production 
Sharing for Prospective Structures Ashrafi, Dan Ulduzu & Area Adjacent in the Azerbaijan Sector of  the 
Caspian Sea, 52 Basic Oil Laws &  Concession Contracts: Russia & NIS 1 (Supplement 24) (2003), Article 
22.1 
15 Waelde, T, above n 1, 57 
16 Waelde, T, above n 1,60 
53 D. Renegotiationl adaptation clauses 
Other useful tools protecting the interests of  foreign investors within the contract are so-
called "renegotiation clauses".  Renegotiation  clauses  demand  that  before  resorting  to 
arbitration  or  litigation  before  the  State's  courts,  the  parties  must  first  attempt  to 
reconsider the terms of their contracts.
17  In other words,  these  clauses put the parties 
under an obligation to renegotiate their contractual commitments, in good faith, following 
the occurrence of  a dispute.  IS If renegotiation fails, either a specific adaptation procedure 
or the contract's general dispute settlement mechanism will be activated. 19 
The  renegotiation  clause,  originally  designed  to  prevent  the  governments'  desire  for 
change,  in effect has the  same  function as  a  standard stabilisation clause.  One of the 
major benefits  of renegotiation clauses  is  that they  allow for  easy  adaptation  of the 
agreement to  changed circumstances caused by governmental disruptions, while at the 
same time requiring the parties to find a workable solution to their situation. 
Likewise, in its request for renegotiations of  the contractual terms, a party may, at times, 
defer to the rules of  the applicable law. A number of  laws recognise the right of  a party to 
demand  an  adaptation  or  variation  of the  contract  based  upon  the  grounds  of a 
fundamental change of the circumstances surrounding the contract. This right can imply 
the  duty  of the  other  party  to  cooperate  in  this  adaptation  process  through  the 
renegotiation of the contract.
20 Similar to the decision of  the court or an arbitral tribunal, 
the  result of such  negotiations  can  be  a  clarification  of facts,  a  clarification  of the 
meaning of the contract, or an adaptation of the existing contract to new circumstances. 
The advantage of  renegotiation is that the parties can leave this classification open, and it 
may  well  be  that  one  party  may flatter  itself in having  obtained  an  adaptation of a 
17 Hom, N, 'Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects' (2004) 19 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law, 21 
18 Waelde, T and Ndi, G, 'Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus 
Contract Interpretation' (1996) 31  Texas International Law Journal 215 
19 Hom, N and Norton, J, Non-Judicial Dispute Settlement in International Financial Transactions 
(Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 
20 Hom, N, (ed), Adaptation and Renegotiation of  Contracts in International Trade and Investment, (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1985), 15 
54 contract,  whilst  the  other  is  of the  opinion  that  this  was  only  a  clarification  of an 
unchanged contract.21 
For example, a number of BITs prescribe a  'cooling off period followed by a certain 
procedure  on  how  to  initiate  and  conduct  negotiations  as  a  prerequisite  for  the 
commencement of arbitration.  An example of such a provision can be found in Article 
9(2) of the 2002 BIT between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Thailand, in 
which relevant parts it is stated that: 
If the  dispute  cannot be settled by means  of negotiations  and  consultations  within  a 
period of  six months,  the dispute will be submitted at the choice of the  investors for 
settlement to [a competent court or arbitration]. (Emphasis added). 
A  similar  proVISIon  is  contained  In  Article  8(2)  of the  BIT  between  the  Russian 
Federation  and  Hungary  of 1995  (prescribing  a  six-months  cooling  off period)  and 
Article 8(2) of the BIT between the Kingdom of Great Britain and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics of 1989 (prescribing a three-months cooling off  period). 
If, however, the other party clearly indicates that it is determined not to conduct such 
negotiations, or if  its demeanour obviously obstructs negotiations, the other party may be 
entitled to go directly to arbitration. 
In  international  business  contracts,  In particular,  contracts  which  reqUIre  long  term 
cooperation  (e.g.  exploration  and  drilling  contracts),  the  need  for  renegotiation, 
adaptation or variation of  the contract has been long recognised. This practice is common 
in modern investment contracts. In particular, the duty to renegotiate the contract in the 
light  of a  change  of circumstances  is  laid  down  in  a  number  of typical  legislative 
provisions.
22  A  good  example  is  that  of the  Azerbaijan  Union  Production  Sharing 
Agreement (1998), which Article 22(2) states as follows: 
21  Hom, N, above n 17,21 
22 Baur, Hobe (eds), Rechtsprobleme von Auslandsinvestitionen (Baden-Baden, 2003), 65 
55 [I]n the event that any Governmental Authority invokes any present or future law,  treaty, 
decree  or administrative  order which  contravenes  the  provisions  of this  Agreement  or 
adversely or positively affects the rights or interests of  the Contractor hereunder, including, 
but not limiting to, any changes in tax legislation, regulations or administrative practice, or 
jurisdictional changes pertaining to the Contract Area, the terms of  this Agreement shall be 
adjusted to re-establish the economic equilibrium of  the Parties, and if  the rights or interests 
of the  Contractor  have  been  adversely  affected,  that  [the  State]  shall  indemnify  the 
Contractor  (and  its  assignees)  for  any  [disadvantage],  deterioration  in  economic 
circumstances, loss or damages that ensure therefrom. (Emphasis added). 
In summary, a renegotiation clause is intended to provide the parties with an opportunity 
to  renegotiate  their  original  bargain.  The  use  of a  renegotiation  clause  in a  foreign 
investment agreement also provides an opportunity for continuity of a contact whereby 
investors  have  the  chance  to  update  and  modify  their  contractual  positions.  Overall, 
renegotiation clauses are designed to avoid conflict, and therefore are used as one of a 
number of  possible investment protection mechanisms.
23 
E. Arbitration clauses 
I.  Significance of  an arbitration clause 
The  use  of an arbitration  clause  in contracts provides the  investor with an access  to 
international arbitration as an alternative to a national jurisdiction of  the Host State. Such 
clauses are used to ensure that the dispute is looked at by an independent third party on 
an international level. 
A  valid arbitration clause represents  a  binding agreement between the  parties,  and  is 
enforceable on both national and international levels.  An example is that of the model 
ICC arbitration clause,24 which reads as follows: 
23  Somarajah, M, above n 9, 307 
24 'Recommended Arbitration Clauses' The London Court o/International Arbitration (LClA) 
<http://www.lcia.orglARBJolder/arb_english  _  main.htrn#recommended> (5 July 2009) 
56 All disputes  arising out of or in  connection with the present contract shall be finally 
settled under the Rules of Arbitration of  the International Chamber of  Commerce by one 
or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules. 
Another  such  example  is  the  model  clause  of the  London  Court  of International 
Arbitration. This clause states: 
Any disputes arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any questions 
regarding its existence validity or termination, shall be referred to and fmally resolved by 
arbitration under the Rules of  the London Court of  International Arbitration, which Rules 
are deemed to be incorporated by reference to this clause. 
The place of  arbitration shall be [insert]. 
The governing law of  this contract shall be the substantive law of  [insert country]. 
The number of  arbitrators shaH be [one! three]. 
The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be [insert]. 
If the contract does not contain an arbitration clause, an investor may still make use of 
such a clause if it can be found in any bilateral or multilateral investment treaty between 
the Host State and the investor's home State.  For example, in the case of the Russian 
Federation, a British investor need not rely solely on the provisions of the contract with 
the State (regarding any potential arbitration). Instead, he or she may rely upon Articles 
8(2) and 8(3) of  the 1989 Agreement between the Government of  the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of  the Union of  Soviet Socialist 
Republics for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investments, allowing for the 
dispute between the Host State and the investor to be resolved by means of  arbitration.
25 
Other similar examples can be found in Article 9(2) of the 1998 Russia - Ukraine BIT, 
25 In particular, Article 8 reads as follows: 
(2) Any disputes which have not been amicably settled shall, after a period ofthree months from written 
notification of  a claim, be submitted to international arbitration if  either party to a dispute so wishes. 
(3)Wbere the dispute is referred to international arbitration, the investor concerned in the dispute shall have 
the right to refer the dispute either to: 
(a) the Institute of  Arbitration of  the Chamber of  Commerce of  Stockholm, or 
(b) an international arbitration or ad hoc arbitration tribunal to be appointed by a special agreement or 
established under the Arbitration Rules of  the United National Commission on International Trade, unless 
the parties to the dispute agree in writing to modify them. 
57 Article  9(2)  of the  2002  Russia - Thailand  BIT,  Article  8(2)  of the  1995  Russia -
Hungary BIT, etc. These examples show that an agreement to  arbitrate can be entered 
into in two ways:  directly (i.e. through the contract) or indirectly (i.e.  by means of the 
relevant  provisions  incorporated  in  applicable  treaties),  and  can  be  enforced  by  the 
investor regardless of  the method it was entered into. 
An arbitration clause agreed to between the parties and inserted into their contract is, as 
argued  by Stewart/
6  preferable to those  provided by  the treaties.  This  is  because the 
contractual arbitration clause can be tailored to the particular needs of  the parties, as well 
as  address  all  peculiarities of the  contractual  undertakings.
27  However,  the  arbitration 
clauses in both instruments can co-exist if  they are drafted carefully. These clauses oblige 
States to honour their investment obligations. A State that refuses to submit to arbitration 
to which it had previously consented violates its duties under the investment contract and 
under intemationallaw, and as a result, may be held liable in damages on both levels.
28 
II.  Validity of  contracts and severability of  arbitration agreement 
Validity is an important element of each and every contract. Therefore, another important 
issue regarding  State contracts is that of legality.  There  have been a number of cases 
where  a  State  enters  into  an  agreement with an investor by  promising,  for  example, 
certain additional subsidies or amendments to the existing set tariffs
29 only to have these 
concessions cancelled later on.  The  conferral of such concessions may have been the 
result of  an erroneous assessment of  national law by the representatives of  the Host State, 
or  outright  false  representation.  A  far  reaching  legal  consequence  of allegations  of 
misrepresentation would  be  to  deny jurisdiction and  arbitrability on the  grounds  that 
26 Stewart, C, above n 6, 225 
27 Ibid 
28 Horn, N, above n 17, 15 
29 In the HUBCO investment dispute in Pakistan, it was alleged that certain amendments to the tariffs 
agreed by the foreign investor with the former government were "illegal, fraudulent, collusive, without 
consideration, and designed to cause wrongful loss ... to the government of  Pakistan". See Cornell, H, 
'Himpurna and HUB: International Arbitration in Developing Countries' (2000) 1519 Mealey's 
International Arbitration Report 39 
58 parties to a contract tainted by illegal practices  have forfeited any rights of  the assistance 
of  the machinery of  justice in settling the dispute.
3o 
One of the possible solutions to the issue of validity of contracts is now offered by the 
doctrine  of "severability" of the  arbitration clause.  The  doctrine  of "severability" (or 
"autonomy") of  the arbitration agreement is well established in international arbitration.
31 
"Severability" means that the validity of  an arbitration clause within the contract does not 
depend on the validity of the contract itself and may be enforced even if the contract is 
deemed void or voidable. According to this doctrine the dispute should nevertheless be 
submitted to arbitration, pursuant to the valid arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal, 
after  affirming  the jurisdiction,  should  rule  on the  merits  of a  dispute  including the 
decision  of whether  there  is  an  illegality  of the  contract.  This,  in  fact,  is  today's 
prevailing view in literature and practice
32 which has been followed in many awards.  33 
F. Choice-of-Iaw clauses: selecting the applicable law 
The  law  governing  the  contract  often  plays  a  vital  role  in  investor-State  disputes. 
Sometimes the whole outcome of the dispute depends on the law chosen by the parties. 
State contracts  generally contain an express choice of law clause.  This  clause is  also 
common in international commercial contracts. By and large, this clause reads as follows: 
This contract is governed by the law of  [insert country/ state]. 
Where an international contract has connections with several jurisdictions, it is strongly 
advisable that parties indicate the law to which the contract is subject.
34 All major legal 
30 A  WARD in ICC case no 1110 (1963) rendered by Gunnar Lagergren, reprinted in Wetter, Issues of 
Corruption before International Arbitral Tribunals, (1994) 10 Arbitration International 277 
31  See Article 16(1) UNCITRAL Model Law; Section 7 of  the English Arbitration Act 1996; Article 6(2), 
(4) of  the 1998 ICC Rules 
32 Redfern, A and Hunter, M, Law and  Practice of  International Commercial Arbitration, 3
rd ed London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) sections 3-28 at 153 
33 Establishment of  Middle East State v South Asian Construction Company, ICC award no. 4145 (1984), 
XII YBCA 97 (1987); US Partner v German and Canadian Partners, ICC award no. 6286 (1991), XIX 
YBCA  141, sec. 22; Iranianparty v Greekparty, award in ICC case no. 3916 (1982), (1984) III  JDI930. 
34 Sornarajah, M, above n 9, 257 
59 systems now recognise that the parties to the contract have the autonomy to determine the 
law applicable to the contract.
35 Technically, this would mean that a party anticipating a 
risk could ensure the application of a system of law which would favour that party's 
interests, and select that system as applicable.
36 
As  noted  by Professor  Sornarajah,37  the  choice  by  the  parties  is  limited  to  the  legal 
systems with which the contract has some connection. The parties normally choose the 
national law of  the Host State, together with a stabilisation clause. Less common, but still 
in use,  are clauses that select the neutral law of a third State to govern the contractual 
relationship. Least likely is a choice of  the law of  the home State of  the investor.
38 
In the absence of an express choice of law, the rules of private international law
9  will 
come into play.40 Conflict principles will usually point to the application of  the law of  the 
contracting  State  party,  in  addition  to  such  rules  of international  law  as  may  be 
applicable.
41 
Choice-of-Iaw clauses play an invaluable role in State-investor contracts. They can serve 
as an additional mechanism of  investment protection by providing for a law favourable to 
35 Redfern, A, Hunter, M, Law and  Practice of  International Commercial Arbitration, 3
rd ed (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 10 
36 Sornarajah, M, above n 9 
37 Sornarajah, M, above n 9 
38 Hom, N, above n 17,  13 
39 In the absence of  an express choice of  law, the courts or tribunals will be left to decide what the intention 
of  the parties as to the applicable law would have been, limiting the scope of  party autonomy in 
international investment contracts. But, despite this, the strategy that has been devised in investment 
protection by capital exporting country lawyers has been to lift the foreign investment contract out ofthe 
scope of  national laws and subject to an international regime. In other words, the rules of  private 
international law that determine the applicable law in such cases come into play. In this regard some 
commentators have submitted that State contracts, in the absence of  the choice-of-Iaw clauses, are 
subjected to the rules of  public international law. See Bockstiegel, K, Der Staat als Vertragspartner 
auslandischer Privatunternehmen (The State as a Contract Party to Foreign Private Enterprise) (Frankfurt: 
Athenaum Verlag, 1971); Sornarajah, M, above n 9. ([The appropriateness of  international law come from 
the fact thatJ "the money and assets come from overseas; they are brought in by foreign nationals; there is a 
situation where the foreigners or their assets are injured, [etc  1") 
40 Sornarajah, M, above n 9, 257 
41 Convention of  Settlement ofInvestment Disputes between States and Nationals of  Other States, 1965 
<http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlbasicdoc-archive/9.htm> (20 August 2007) (Washington Convention or 
ICSID Convention) (entered into force on Oct 14 1966), Article 42(1) 
60 both parties. As a result, the process of  selecting the law governing State contracts should 
not be underestimated. 
G. Forum selection clauses 
The forum is the physical place of the hearing of a dispute. Choice-of-forum clauses are 
also important for reasons similar to those concerning choice-of-Iaw clauses. As observed 
by  Professors  Bishop  and  Lee,42  "not only  is  it paramount that  the  law upholds the 
expectations of  the parties as expressed in their agreement, but it is also important for the 
parties to be able to assess the risk of their venture". The risk can be better evaluated if 
the forum for determining the disputes is known in advance. Professor Bishop concludes 
by saying that without choice-of-forum clauses, the possibility of having to litigate in a 
hostile forum may outweigh the benefits of the transaction.  In other words,  choice-of-
forum clauses are designed to protect investors from the forced acceptance of a hostile 
forum by a State-party, which quite often has far greater bargaining power. 
Choice-of-forum  clauses  are  particularly  important  when  drafting  arbitration  clauses. 
Such an example may be found in the model arbitration clause of the London Court of 
International Arbitration. The relevant part of  this clause states: 
The place of  arbitration shall be [insert country! city}. 
Hence, if a foreign investor is concerned with the internal legal regime of a particular 
Host State (such as, for example, the Russian Federation), it would be strongly advisable 
to  include  into  the  contract  a  carefully  drafted  arbitration  clause,  selecting  a  forum 
outside of  the Russian Federation, and selecting the arbitration rules which are familiar to 
that investor or are more favourable to that investor's needs. 
42 Bishop, R and Lee D, 'Enforceability of  Forum - Selection Clauses in International Commercial 
Contracts' (1995) International Trade Law Journal 20 
61 H. Sanctity of contract versus State sovereignty 
I.  The nature of  the issue 
One of the defences that could potentially be raised by the State in omitting to comply 
with  its  obligations  under  the  contract  (including  the  stabilisation  provisions)  is  the 
principle of State "sovereignty".  This principle will be  looked at in detail  in the  next 
chapter. However, at present, it is important to note that pursuant to this principle, States 
can make independent decisions and act without intrusion from other States in a variety 
of  subject matters, including ownership of  the State's subsoil resources. 
In  other  words,  if the  Host  State  deems  it  necessary  to  alter  its  national  subsoil 
legislation,  or decides to  expropriate or nationalise certain property rights  (previously 
granted to foreign investors under a contract), the State will be in the position to do so 
legally  (under  the  principle  of State  "sovereignty")  regardless  of any  contractual 
obligations to the contrary. Hence, there arises a question as to the true functional value 
of the  contract,  and  whether  its  provisions  could effectively  bind  a  sovereign  State. 
Underlying the debate are the concepts of sanctity of contract (''pacta sunt servanda") 
and the doctrine of  permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR).43 
II. Solutions offered by international law 
Where unilateral intervention by the government results in breach of a contract, which 
contains a valid stabilisation clause, then this matter falls to internationallaw.
44 A careful 
analysis of relevant scholarly writings reveals that the question as to  the precise status 
and effect of  the stabilisation clause under international law is not settled.
45 One school of 
43  Makarczyk, J, PrinCiples of  a New International Economic Order (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1988) 
44 Waelde, T, above n 1, 32 
45 See Paasivirta, E, 'Internationalization and Stabilization of  Contracts Versus State Sovereignty' (1989) 
LX  British Yearbook of  International Law, 337 
62 thought has expressed the view that any breach by the State of its contractual obligations 
under the agreement is unlawful under internationallaw.46 
However, an opposing group of writers have expressed doubts as to the validity of the 
stabilisation clause under international law. Where its intended purpose is to "freeze" the 
applicable  law as  at the date  of contracting, these writers  see  in  such  a  provision an 
attempt to fetter the public powers of the  State. If so, it is argued that such an attempt 
would  constitute  derogation  from  the  principle  of sovereignty.47  While  States  could 
exercise  their  sovereignty  in making  agreements  with  foreign  investors,  sovereignty 
would  also  constitute  a lawful  ground  for  the  termination of these  agreements  (with 
compensation).48 
The  doctrinal  debate  on this  issue  has  divided  scholarly opinion.  No  dominant  view 
seems  so  far  to  have  emerged.  The  natural  tendency has  thus  been to  look towards 
international arbitral practice for guidance. 
46 See Kissam, L and Leach, E, 'Sovereign Expropriation of  Property and Abrogation of  State Contracts' 
(1960) 28 Fordham Law Review 177; Carlston, K, 'Concession Contracts and Nationalisation' (1958) 52 
American Journal of  International Law 260.  See also the dissenting opinion of  Sir G. Fitzmaurice in the 
Aminoil Arbitration (1982) 211.L.M., para 23, and Arbitrator Dupuy in Texaco v Libya, (1978) 21 LL.M. 3, 
24-25 
47 See Sereni, A, 'International Economic Institutions and the Municipal Law of  States' (1959) 92 Recueil 
des Cours 210; Garcia-Amador, F, 'The Proposed New Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law 
Governing Nationalisation and Compensation' (1980) 12 University o/Miami Journal o/International Law 
1 
48 See Paasivirta, E, 'Internationalization and Stabilization of  Contracts Versus State Sovereignty' (1989) 
LX  British Yearbook of  International Law, 338.  Also, according to Arechaga ['International Law in the 
Past Third ofa Century' (1978) 159 Recueil des Cours, 307], for example, an anticipated violation of  such 
a clause would give rise to a "special right" to compensation.  This "special right" implies that the amount 
of  indemnity in such instances would be much higher than would otherwise be the case [See Schachter, 0, 
'International Law in Theory and Practice' (1982) 178 Recueil des Cours, 113-114]. It  could, for instance, 
imply a duty to compensate which extends to prospective gains or lost profits (due to the private party) for 
the remainder of  the period which the contract still has to run. It  could also imply that the investor is 
entitled to compensation for any additional financial burdens imposed by subsequent unilateral 
amendments [See Geiger, R, 'Unilateral Change of  Economic Development' (1974) 23 LC.L.O. 73, 109-
103] 
63 III. Solutions offered by arbitral practices 
A  review of international  arbitral  practice also  seems to  indicate  divergent views.  In 
AGIP v.  The  Popular Republic of Congo,49  the  Tribunal  ruled that the presence of a 
stabilisation clause in the agreement between the parties did not affect, in principle, the 
State's sovereign and regulatory powers.  Hence,  the  clause  was  held to  be valid and 
enforceable  under international  law,  having  been judged not to  amount to  derogation 
from the principle of  sovereignty.  50 
Texaco  v.  Libya
SJ  involved  arbitral  consideration  of a  stabilisation  clause.  The  sole 
arbitrator stated that: 
There is no doubt that in the exercise of its sovereignty a State has the power to make 
international  commitments...  There  is  no  value  to dwell  at any  great  length  on the 
exercise and value of  the principle under which a State may within the framework of its 
sovereignty,  undertake  international commitments with respect to  a private party.  The 
result  is  that  a  State  cannot  invoke  its  sovereignty to  disregard commitments  freely 
undertaken through the exercise of  this same sovereignty, and cannot through measures 
belonging to its  internal  orders make null and void the rights of the contracting party 
which has performed its various obligations under the contract. 
In Aramco  v.  Saudi Arabia,52  another oil  industry arbitration,  the Tribunal carne  to  a 
similar  conclusion  with  regard  to  the  binding  force  of the  stabilisation  clause  under 
international law: 
49 (I  982) 21  I.L.M., 735-736 
50 Waelde, T, above n 1,36 
51 53 IIL.R. at 471,475. See also RCA v China (1936) 30 American Journal o/International Law 535, in 
which the tribunal stated that the Chinese government could "certainly sign away part of  its liberty of 
action", and that "it can also do so as well in an implicit manner, if  a reasonable construction of  its 
undertakings under the agreement leads up to that conclusion." 
52 Saudi Arabia v Aramco (23 August 1958) 27 ILR 117, 168 (Aramco case). See also Mobil Oil Iran, Inc v 
Iran (1 987-III) 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3 (at 64-65, where according to the tribunal, "contemporary 
international precedents have concluded that such contractual [stabilisation] provisions preclude a 
sovereign during the stated period from exercising the rights it otherwise possesses under international law 
to take an alien's property for a public purpose, and without discrimination, and for a just compensation." 
64 By reason of its very sovereignty within its territorial domain ... nothing can prevent a 
State  from  binding itself by  the  provisions of a concession and from  granting to  the 
concessionaire irretractable rights, as  such rights have the  character of acquired rights. 
(Emphasis added). 
These  decisions  seem  to  give  recognition  and  validity  to  stabilisation  clauses  under 
international law. However, there are also decisions where the conclusions reached by the 
arbitral  tribunal  cast  doubts  upon  the  extent of the  protection  offered  to  the  foreign 
investor by such clauses. 
In the Libyan oil nationalisation case, for  example, the arbitrators (in two of the three 
awards)  reached  the  conclusion  that  stabilisation  clauses  cannot  prevent  a  unilateral 
change of  terms and conditions by a government.  53 In Kuwait v.  Aminoi/
54 it was held that 
the sovereign rights of  the State could be "contracted away", but only for a limited period 
of  time.  55 A similar conclusion was reached in LETCO v.  Liberia.
56  These cases illustrate 
a lack of consistency in international jurisprudential practice which is  indicative of the 
uncertainty which  prevails  over the  status  of stabilisation  clauses  under  international 
law.
57 
IV. Solutions offered by modern State contracts 
Modern State oil and gas contracts may provide a method of circumventing the issue of 
State  sovereignty  in  investor-State  contractual  agreements.  These  contracts  (which 
include production sharing agreements), create a financial regime whereby the investor 
assumes risk and expenditure, and is paid out of production. Here, the mechanism for 
remuneration  provides  that  "recoverable  expenses"  ("cost oil")  include  all  taxes  and 
government levies except those expressly mentioned in the agreement.  In other words, 
53  BP v Libya (1979) 53 ILR 297 (per arbitrator Lagergren). See also, arbitrator Mahmassani in Liamco v 
Libya (1982) 62 ILR 70 
54 66 I.L.R. at 519-627, in particular para 95 
55 Waelde, T, 'Stabilite du Contrat' (1981) Rev. de I'Arb.  Mann, F, 'The Doctrine of  Jus Cogens in 
International Law' (1973) in Further Studies in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990),84, 
257 
56 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987) 
57 See Crawford, J and Johnson, W, 'Arbitrating with Foreign States and their Instrumentalities' (1986) 5 
International Finance Law Review 11, 11-12; and Amoco International Finance Crop v Iran,  15 Iran-U.S 
C.T.R. 189 (I987-III), at 199 
65 the government may change its tax requirements, but this change would be of little (if 
any) relevance to the investor who will, according to the agreement, recover additional 
taxes  and  levies  by  incorporating  them  under  the  heading  of "cost oil".  58  The  cost 
recovery  mechanism expressed  in production sharing  agreements  thus  functions  as  a 
stabilisation clause without interfering in the State's sovereign powers of legislation.  59 
From this  perspective, the  stabilisation clause  has been converted from  an instrument 
aimed  at  the  government's  legislative  powers  to  a  risk  allocation  mechanism  in 
commercial contracts with the State. 
In  summary,  contemporary  practices  have  moved  away  from  the  use  of traditional 
"freezing" clauses, preferring a mechanism whereby the risk of government disruption is 
placed upon the shoulders of  the Host State by explicit allocation or by implication in the 
contract's  cost  recovery  and  cost  accounting  rules.  Hence,  stabilisation  (and  other 
similar) clauses represent a direct response to the inherent legal weakness of government 
contracts and as such offer a valuable mechanism for investment protection. 
I. Conclusion 
It is not disputed that parties must honour their contractual undertakings. Hence, the first 
mechanism for the protection of an investor's rights lies within the "four comers" of the 
main  document  binding  the  parties  - their  contract.  The  enforcement of contractual 
provisions  provides  investors  with  the  real  possibility  of enforcing  the  Host  State's 
obligations under its contract. The contract usually sets out the details of  the independent 
investment and the obligations of  the parties to support the project. In addition it typically 
includes or makes reference to the governmental permit or permits necessary to carry out 
that investment, provisions as to the tax treatment and provisions regarding the transfer of 
profits to the investor.  60 
58 Waelde, T, above n 1,61 
59 Blinn, K, at aI, International Petroleum Exploration Agreements: Legal Economic and Policy Aspects 
(London: Euromoney Publications, 1986), 69-81 
60 Hom, N, above n 17, 12 
66 In order to protect their capital, foreign investors should insist upon the incorporation into 
their contracts of certain specific provisions known to operate as safeguards against any 
questionable conduct by the Host State. In this chapter I have outlined examples of such 
clauses,  and  provided  a  brief overview  of their  nature  and  significance.  It may  be 
concluded that a carefully drafted contract may and will serve as a powerful mechanism 
for the protection of  foreign investment in countries with yet unstable legal environments, 
including, among others, the Russian Federation. 
67 Chapter Four 
The concept of state sovereignty & investors' rights to 
diplomatic protection 
A. Introduction 
In the  previous  chapter  it  was  argued that carefully drafted contracts  may  serve as  a 
useful  tool  for  the  protection  of investors'  rights.  Aside  from  the  enforcement  of 
contractual  obligations,  there  exists  numerous  other  mechanisms  offering  foreign 
investors  significant  protection.  These  mechanisms  come  from  the  sphere  of public 
international  law,  and  include  diplomatic  protection,  customary  law  and  treaty  law 
protection. In this chapter I will discuss diplomatic protection of  foreign investment. Prior 
to that, however, I will examine the concept of  permanent State sovereignty over natural 
resources, along with the rights and obligations attached to that concept. 
B. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
I.  General meaning of  the concept of  State sovereignty 
The concept of  State sovereignty lies at the heart of both customary international law and 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 
1  State  sovereignty  denotes  the  competence, 
I  'UN Charter' United Nations <http://www.un.orgiaboutunlcharterl>(14August2008) (in accordance 
with Article 2(1) of  the UN Charter, the world organisation is based on the principle ofthe sovereign 
equality of  all member states. While they are equal in relation to one another, their status of  legal equality 
as a mark of  sovereignty is also the basis on which intergovernmental organizations are established and 
endowed with the capacity to act between and within states to the extent permitted by the framework of  an 
organisation) 
68 independence and  legal  equality of all  independent States with regard to  their natural 
wealth.  The  concept  encompasses  all  matters  in  which  States  are  permitted,  by 
international law, to make  independent decisions and act without intrusion from  other 
sovereign States. These matters include, but are not limited to,  the choice of political, 
economic,  social  and  cultural  systems,  the  formulation  of foreign  policy  and  the 
ownership of  the State's natural resources. 
II.  The  nature of the concept of permanent State sovereignty over natural 
resources 
1.  UN Resolutions 
The  sovereignty of States over their natural  resources is  an established rule of public 
international  law.
2  During  the  period from  1945  to  1962, following  the  epoch of the 
dominance  of law  protecting  foreign  investors
3
,  the  United  Nations  adopted  several 
resolutions in which Member States attempted to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. 
Consequently, the scope of  "natural" resources and the activities covered by the principle 
of  permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR), were promulgated.
4 
One of the first internationally accepted instruments recognising the right of developing 
countries  to  manage  their  national  resources  independently  was  the  1952  General 
2 'UNCLOS 1982' Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf  1958 (ratified by Russia on 22/1111960) 
<http://www.oceanlaw.netitexts/summaries/table.htm> (12 July 2007) 
3 Before the Second World War the international investment law was overly protective of  the interests of 
the foreign investors. The Majority of  these investors were from industrialized nations who were 
transferring their businesses to the developing countries. After the World War II, this situation compelled 
the developing nations and the newly de-colonized States into promoting the development of  a new 
international principle which recognized and protected their rights over their natural resources and wealth 
in their own countries. The promotion of  this "Permanent sovereignty over natural resources" was the 
natural manifestation of  the fear of  the developing nations that the Western world would continue 
exploiting their natural recourses without conceding them ajust and equitable share. These countries saw 
foreign investment as a threat to their national sovereignty, especially since within that time there was a 
boom of  mineral and energy resources, which naturally led to intensive involvement of  many European and 
North American companies in the exploration and exploitation of  natural resources in developing countries. 
See Warden-Fernandez, J, 'The Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: How It  Has Been 
Accommodated Within the Evolving Economy' (2000) CEPMLP Annual Review, Article 4 
4 Warden-Fernandez, J, 'The Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: How It  Has Been 
Accommodated Within the Evolving Economy' (2000) CEPMLP Annual Review, Article 4 
69 Assembly  (GA)  Resolution  523  (VI)  on  Integrated  Economic  Development  and 
Commercial Agreements.
5 This Resolution, in its relevant parts, provided that: 
Member States of  the United Nations, within the framework of  their general economic 
policy,  should  ...  consider  the  possibility  of  facilitating  through  commercial 
agreements  ...  the  development of natural  resources  which  can be  utilised  for  the 
domestic needs of  the under-developed countries and also for the needs of  international 
trade.
6 
This Resolution was created with the aim of realising economic growth of developing 
nations, and allowing these States an opportunity to use their natural recourses for the 
purpose  of integrating  such  development  within  the  general  expansion  of the  world 
economy. 
In the same year, the General Assembly passed another resolution, which became known 
as  GA  Resolution 626 (VII)  on Right to  Exploit Freely Natural Wealth  and Resources. 
This  Resolution  was  adopted  after  the  argument  submitted  by  Uruguay  that  the 
development of the under-developed countries required the recognition of their right to 
freely exploit their natural wealth and resources in accordance with the stipulations of  the 
UN Charter relating to the principle of  self-determination. In particular, the relevant parts 
of  Resolution 626 (VII) 
7 read as follows: 
The General Assembly recommends that ... all Member States, in the exercise of  their 
right to freely  use and exploit their natural wealth and resources  ... [are] to have due 
regard,  consistently with their sovereignty, to the needs for maintaining the  flow  of 
capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic co-operation among 
nations. The General Assembly further recommends all Member States to refrain from 
acts ... designed to impede the exercise of  the sovereignty of any State over its natural 
resources. 
5 General Assembly, Sixth Session, 360th plenary meeting (12 January 1952) 
<http://daccessdds.un.orgidocIRESOLUTION/GENINRO/067178/IMGINRO06778.pdf?OpenElement> [(18 
December 2006) 
6 Ibid, recommendation 1(b)(ii) 
7 General Assembly, Seventh Session, 411th plenary meeting (21 Decemberl952) 
<http://daccessdds.un.orgidocIRESOLUTION/GENINRO/079/69/IMGINR007969.pdf?OpenElement> (18 
December 2006) 
70 The initial draft of this Resolution was opposed by countries in both the developed and 
developing world, as it allowed Member States, in the exercise of  their sovereign powers, 
to  nationalise  certain  aspects  of private  property,  resulting  in  a  huge  disincentive  to 
foreign investment.
8 Finally, it was agreed upon that the mention of  nationalisation in the 
Resolution should be avoided and the current draft was thus adopted.
9 Debates during the 
adoption of this Resolution clarified the point that all  sovereign States had the right to 
freely manage their wealth and natural resources.
10 
Furthermore,  the  1958  General  Assembly  Resolution  1314  (XIII)  containing 
Recommendations  Concerning  International  Respect for  the  Rights  of Peoples  and 
Nations to Self-Determination stipulated the principle of  PSNR as an element of  the right 
to self  -determination.
ll Paragraph 1 of  Resolution 1314 (XIII) specifies that, in surveying 
"the status of permanent sovereignty of  peoples and nations over their natural wealth and 
resources, due regard shall be paid to the rights and duties of States under international 
law".12  This  instrument  carried  significant  importance  because  it  established  the 
Commission  on  Permanent  Sovereignty  over  Natural  Resources  which  undertook 
preliminary studies and surveys of  the position of  the PNRS, culminating in the adoption 
of the  1962  GA  Resolution  1803  (XVII)  on  Permanent  Sovereignty  over  Natural 
Resources. 
8 Warden-Fernandez, J, 'The Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: How It Has Been 
Accommodated Within the Evolving Economy' (2000) CEPMLP Annual Review, Article 4 
9 The modified part read as follows: "{RJecomends that all Member States in the exercise of  their right 
freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and recourses whenever deemed desirable by them for their 
own progress and economic development, to have due regard, consistently with their sovereignty, to the 
need for the maintenance of  mutual confidence and economic co-operation among nations; Recommends 
further all Member States to refrain from acts, direct or indirect designed to impede the exercise ofthe 
sovereignty of  nay State over its natural recourses." See Schrijver, N, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 46 
lO Dias, A, International Law  for Global Environmental Cooperation: A Critical Assessment of  the Scope 
and  Role of  Permanent Sovereignty over natural Resources, Report STITCD/21 for the United Nations 
(New York: UN Department for Development Support and Management Services, 1994) 
II Warden-Fernandez, J, 'The Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: How It Has Been 
Accommodated Within the Evolving Economy' (2000) CEPMLP Annual Review, Article 4 
12  'Succession of  States in Respect of  Matters other than Treaties' The Yearbook of  the International Law 
Commission (2 June 1969) 76-77 < http://untreaty.un.orglilc/publications/yearbooks/1969.htm> (14 August 
2008) 
71 GA Resolution 1803 (XVII) is considered a turning point for the principle of PSNR. This 
is because, firstly, it declares inviolable the exercise of  the right to permanent sovereignty 
over  natural  resources,  and  the  right to  nationalise  or expropriate  on the  grounds of 
"public utility, security or national interest". It also establishes legal obligations for the 
payment of "appropriate compensation" according to international law; and in the event 
of conflict, contemplates the possibility of agreement between the States for settlement 
through arbitration or international adjudication.
13  Specifically, the relevant paragraphs of 
GA Resolution 1803 stipulate:
14 
I. The right of peoples and nations to pennanent sovereignty over their natural  wealth 
and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of  the 
well-being of  the people of  the State concerned. 
4. Nationalisation, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public  utility,  security  or national  interest which  are  recognised  as  overriding purely 
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall 
be  paid appropriate  compensation,  in  accordance  with the  rules  in  force  in  the  State 
taking  such  measures  in  the  exercise  of its  sovereignty  and  in  accordance  with 
international  law.  In  any  case  where  the  question  of compensation  gives  rise  to  a 
controversy,  the  national  jurisdiction  of the  State  taking  such  measures  shall  be 
exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, 
settlement of  the dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication. 
Between 1962 and  1974, many countries were experiencing the  era of nationalisation, 
which meant that  States were  regaining  greater  control  over the  exploitation of their 
natural resources. This development resulted in the creation of the  1966 GA  Resolution 
2158  (XXI)  on  Permanent  Sovereignty  over  Natural  Resources,15  which  in  essence 
highlighted  the  importance  of the  principle of PSNR as  the  foundation  of economic 
13  See Schrijver, N, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
85; also see <http://www.unhchr.chlhtmVmenu3/b/c_natres.htm> (18 December 2006) 
14 'GA Resolution on Pennanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' United Nations (14 
December 1962) < http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm> (14 August 2008) 
15 General Assembly, 1  478
th plenary meeting (25 November 1966) 
<http://daccessdds.un.orgldocfRESOLUTION/GENINRO/004/611IMGINROOO461.pdf?OpenElement> (18 
December 2006) 
72 development with respect to developing countries. Significantly, in paragraphs  1 and 3 
respectively, it provides that: 16 
1.  The General Assembly reaffirms the inalienable right of all  countries to exercise 
permanent sovereignty  over their natural resources  in  the  interests  of their national 
development. .. 
3.  The  General  Assembly  states  that  such  an  effort  should  help  in  achieving  the 
maximum possible development of the natural resources of the developing countries 
and in  strengthening their ability to undertake this  development themselves,  so that 
they  might  effectively  exercise  their  choice  in  deciding  the  matters  in  which  the 
exploitation and marketing of  their natural resources should be carried out. 
2.  Treaty law 
As far  as  treaty law is concerned,  the  right to  PSNR is  most explicitly recognised in 
Article  1 of the  1966  Human  Rights  Covenants  and  Article  21  of the  1981  African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, where it is stated that, "All people may  ... freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources". The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
also  recognises  the  principle  of PSNR,  providing  that  the  Treaty  shall  "in no  way 
prejudice the rules in Contracting Parties governing the system of  property ownership of 
energy resources". 17  That treaty was created specifically to regulate investment activities 
in the energy sector. Article 18(1) ECT states: 
16 Ibid. 
The  contracting  parties  recognize  State  sovereignty  and  sovereign  rights  over  energy 
resources. They reaffIrm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject to the 
rules of  international law . 
17 Energy Charter Treaty (1 April 1994) Article 18.3 < http://www.encharter.orglindex.php?id=28> (14 
August 2008) 
73 Pursuant  to  Article  18(2)  ECT,  Contracting  Parties  also  retain  sovereIgn  rights  to 
determine the system of property ownership of natural resources.
I8  The ECT specifies 
that each Member State continues to hold the right to decide which geographical areas 
within its territory are to be made available for exploration and development of energy 
resources. 19 
3.  EU Directives 
The principle of  PSNR was also affirmed in instruments adopted within the framework of 
the European Union, and the European Economic Area (EEA). For example, in Directive 
94/22IEC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  30 May 1994 (the Licensing 
Directive), on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons,  it is  stated  that:  "Member States  have  sovereignty  and 
sovereign rights over natural resources [within] their territories". The Licensing Directive 
was  integrated  into  the  Agreement on the  European Economic Area on 1  September 
1995.  In this context, the EEA Joint Committee adopted a joint statement containing a 
Declaration by the Parties to the EEA Agreement in which they declare that States have 
sovereign rights over their petroleum and other natural resources. 
4.  State legislation 
In conjunction with the sources derived from international law, the principle of PSNR is 
often provided for in State legislation. For example, according to the Constitution of  the 
former  Soviet  Union,  mineral  resources  were  the  exclusive  property  of the  State. 
Likewise, the domestic legislation of some of  the Australian States has also provided that 
"all minerals in their natural state belong to the Crown".20 
18 'A Reader's Guide' Energy Charter Treaty (l April 1994) 36 
<http://www.cne.cl/vinculos/documentos/EnergyChart.pdf+energy+charter+treaty+A+Reader%E2%80%9 
9s+Guide&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=l&gl=au> (14 August 2008) 
19 Energy Charter Treaty, above n 16, article 18.3 
20 Mining Act 1971-1976 (S.A), ss 16 and 18, provided that "all minerals in their natural state belong to the 
Crown and property [in these minerals] passes upon recovery to the person by whom they have they have 
been lawfully mined. In Victoria, on the other hand, only all minerals in land not alienated before 1892 are 
vested in the Crown (Mines Act 1958 (Vic.), s 291(2». All coal in New South Wales is vested in the Crown 
74 Similarly, Article 9 of the  1993  Constitution of the Russian Federation which, in effect, 
repeats the provisions of  Article 1(2) of  the 1992 Russian Law on Subsurface, and grants 
the  Russian  Federation  sovereign  rights  over  "land  and  other  natural  resources", 
establishing that the subsurface and the minerals contained in it are the property of the 
State. 
5.  Case law 
The  right  to  freely  dispose  of natural  resources,  including  disposition  by  way  of 
expropriation or nationalisation, is further recognised in a number of  international arbitral 
decisions.  In  the  Texaco AwarcP
1  (1977),  which considered Libyan oil  nationalisation 
measures, the Tribunal held that: 
Territorial sovereignty confers upon the State an exclusive competence to organise as it 
wishes the economic structure of its territory and to introduce therein any reforms which 
may  seem to  be  desirable to it.  It is  an  essential  prerogative  of sovereignty  for  the 
constitutionally  authorized  authorities  of the  State  to  choose  and  build  freely  an 
economic and social system. International law recognizes that a State has this prerogative 
just as it has the prerogative to determine freely its political regime and its constitutional 
institutions. 
A similar view was expressed in the Liamco
22 case, where an arbitrator observed that GA 
Resolution 1803  (XVII) represented compelling evidence "of the recent dominant trend 
of international  opinion  concerning  the  sovereign  rights  of States  over  their  natural 
resources". 
as a consequence of  the Coal Acquisition Act 1981  (N.S.W.).  In Queensland, all minerals with the 
exception of  gold and coal, also belong to the Crown (Mining Act 1968-1983 (Qld.), s 110(2». The 
consequence of  Crown ownership is that authority to prospect these substances, whether they form part of 
Crown land or alienated land, is derived from legislation and not the common law. Once the substance has 
been extracted, in terms of  the legislation, it falls into the ownership of  those authorised to extract it. In this 
light, the Supreme Court of  Western Australia (in Sirr v Dwayer [1984} W.A.R. 326 at 328 per Wallace J.) 
has decided for example, that title to mineral products does not pass to the holder of  relevant license 
"unless the holder of  the license has extracted and removed from the land ... for treatment and sale as his 
property a prescribed amount" 
21  Texaco v Libyan Arab Republic (1978) 17 ILM 3-33, para 59 
22 Liamco v Libya (1982) 20 ILM 53 
75 In summary, the principle of  PSNR is not only a well recognised legal concept, but also a 
product of  political, economic and social relations. The decolonisation process marked its 
genesis, and the efforts of newly-independent States, to enhance their opportunities for 
development, had  a profound impact on its evolution.  The concept of PSNR imposes 
upon a State certain rights and obligations which that State ought to carry into effect. 
Therefore, the next step is  a consideration of the  rights  and obligations attached to  a 
sovereign State by virtue of  the concept of  PSNR. 
III.  Rights  and  obligations  attached  to  the  principle  of  permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources 
Once the existence of  the principle of  PSNR is established, one must examine the myriad 
rights  and  obligations  arising  from  it.  There  are  a  number  of rights  and  obligations 
afforded to the State by this principle. These include: 
1.  the right to dispose of  its natural resources, including by way of expropriation or 
nationalisation;23 
2.  the right to explore and exploit its natural resources;24 
3.  the right to regulate flows of  foreign investment;25 
23  Texaco v Libyan Arab Republic (1978) 17 ILM 3-33, para 59 
24 'GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' United Nations (14 
December 1962) < http://wwwl.umn.eduJhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm> (14 August 2008), GA Res. 523 
(VI) and 1803 (XVII); UNCTAD I, General Principle 3 (1964); UNCTAD Res. 46 (III, 1972); TDB Res. 
88 (XII, 1972) where it is stated that "Countries and its nationals have a right to freely dispose and 
determine the use of  its natural resources"; and GA Res. 626 (VII), 3
rd preamble, where it was stated that 
"Countries and its people have a right to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources". 
25 GA Resolutions 1803 (XVII), 21  (XXI), and 3281 (XXIX) are the most pertinent ones as far as 
regulation of  foreign investment is concerned. They all affirm the rights of  States to regulate foreign 
investment according to their own objectives and development plans. By way of  example, GA Resolution 
1803 declares that the use of  natural resources, as well as the import offoreign capital required for these 
purposes "should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely 
consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorisation, restriction or prohibition of  such 
activities".(,GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' United 
Nations (14 December 1962) <http://wwwl.wnn.edulhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm>(14August2008).In 
the same trend, GA Resolution 2158 declares that exploitation of  natural resources of  each country "shall 
always be concluded in accordance with its national laws and regulations". (UN Doc. AlC.21L.1386 Corr.6, 
5 December 1974).  Further to the above, the NIEO Declaration provides that States, on the basis of  their 
full sovereignty, should take measures in the interest of  their national economies to regulate and supervise 
the alternatives of  Trans-National Corporations (TNe) operating within their territory.(GA Res. 3201 (S-
76 4.  the  right  to  manage  natural  resources  pursuant  to  national  environmental 
policies;26 
5.  the right to use natural resources for national development;27 
6.  the  right  to  grant  and  authorise  licenses  for  the prospection,  exploration  and 
production of  minerals;28 and 
7.  the right to immunity in legal and arbitral proceedings. 
The obligations imposed upon a State include: 
1.  an obligation to respect the rights of  other States;29 
2.  an obligation to provide minimum standards of  treatment;30 
3.  an obligation to afford full protection of  its domestic laws;31 and 
4.  an  obligation  to  pay  adequate  compensation  in  cases  of expropriation  or 
nationalisation. 
VII), para. 4(g), 1 May 1974). See also Salacuse, J., W, BIT by BIT The Growth o/Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L Law 655, 659-60 
(1990) 
26 Article 19(3) ECT. Other regional Conventions, such as the African Convention on the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources (1968), the Convention on the Conservation of  European Wildlife and 
Natural Habitats (1979) and the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of  Nature and Natural Resources 
(1985), are less assertive in this respect. However it must be noted that the ECE Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979) does embody a reference to Principle 21  of  the Stockholm 
Declaration (see preamble, para. 5). 
27 Kuwait v Aminoil (1982) 21  ILM 1023,97-99 (The relevant quote reads as follows: "This concession - in 
its origin a mining concession granted by a State whose institutions were still incomplete - became one of 
the essential instruments in the economic and social progress of  a national community in full process of 
development. This transformation took place at first by means of  successive levies going to the State, and 
then through the growing influence ofthe State in the economic and technical management ofthe 
undertaking  ... and the regulations of  work and investment programs. The contract of  Concessions thus 
changed its character and became one of  those contracts in regards to which, in most legal systems, the 
State, while remaining bound to respect the contractual equilibrium, enjoys special advantages") 
28 'Working Paper on Natural Resources and Concessions in the Context of  the MAl' Organisation/or 
Economic Cooperation and Development (12 January 2000) 2 (DAFFEIMAIISTIRD(97)2IFINAL) 
<http://wwwl.oecd.orgidaf/mai/pdf/st/strd972fe.pdfflsearch='working%20paper%200n%20natural%20reso 
urces> (29 December 2006) 
29 'GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' United Nations (14 
December 1962) < http://www1.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm> (14 August 2008) 
30 Orellana, M, International Law on Investment: The Minimum Standard o/Treatment (Geneva: Centre 
for International Environmental Law, 2003), 1 
31 Salacuse, J W, Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search/or a Grand Bargain. 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Volume 19 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 65 
77 A detailed analysis of all rights and obligations attached to the principle of PSNR falls 
outside of the  ambit of this  thesis.  For the  purposes of this  chapter, however,  I shall 
discuss  the  Host  State's obligation to  respect the  rights  of other States,  and  also  the 
investor's right to diplomatic protection. 
IV. The Host State's obligation to respect the rights of  other States 
UN Resolutions  on PSNR have seldom referred explicitly to the obligation to respect 
international law and the rights of other States. Some of the clearest examples of States 
being  compelled  to  respect  the  rights  of other  States  can  be  seen  in  the  following 
instruments. 
In UN Resolution 837 (IX), the General Assembly requested the Commission on Human 
Rights  to  complete  its  Draft  Article  on  the  rights  of people  and  nations  to  self-
determination,  including  recommendations  concerning  their  PSNR,  with  the  phrase 
"having due regard to the rights and duties of  States under international law"  .  32 Similarly, 
in Resolution 1314 (XIII) the General Assembly instructed the Commission to require the 
States to  have "due regard to the rights and duties of [other]  States under international 
law". Subsequently, the 1962 Declaration, which resulted from the Commission's work, 
employed in its operative part the following formulation:
33 
The free and beneficial exercise of  the sovereignty of  people and nations over their natural 
resources  must be  furthered  by  the  mutual respect of States  based  on their  sovereign 
equality.34 (Emphasis added). 
32 'Recommendation Concerning International Respect for the Right of  Peoples and Nations to Self-
Determination' United Nations  (14 December 1954) 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GENINRO/095/72/IMGINROO9572.pdf?OpenElement> (I 
September 2008) 
33  'GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' United Nations (14 
December 1962) < http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm> (14 August 2008), para 5. 
34 Ibid. Paragraph 8 of  this Declaration stipulated that "Foreign investment agreements freely entered into 
by, or between, sovereign States shall be observed in good faith", and "Agreements entered into by States" 
related to contracts with non-State entities, normally transnational corporations, those entered into between 
States are treaties. The former seems to imply that non-state entities enjoy the protection of  pacta sun! 
servanda directly under international law. 
78 GA  Resolution  2158  (XXI,  1966)  includes  a  reference  to  "mutually  acceptable 
contractual  practices",35  a  phrase  which  can be  seen  as  an  alternative  reference  to 
international law obligations. Article 2 of  the Charter of  Economic Rights and Duties of 
States (CERDS) contains no direct reference to international obligations, but is subject to 
the "fulfillment in good faith of  international obligations".36 
As  far  as  multilateral  treaties  are  concerned,  ample  support  can  be  found  for  the 
proposition that, in regulating foreign investment, States must observe the requirements 
of international law. The most explicit reference to general international law obligations 
relating to PSNR can be found in Article 1 of the 1966 Human Rights Covenants, which 
provides that: 
All  people  may,  for  their  own  ends,  freely  dispose  of their natural  resources  without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon 
the principle of  mutual benefit, and international law. 
Similarly, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981) stipulates that: 
The free disposal of  wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the 
obligation  of international  economic  co-operation  based  on  mutual  respect,  equitable 
exchange and the principles of  international law.  37 
In summary, the State's obligation to respect the rights of other sovereign States derives 
from the former State's right to PSNR, and is well recognised in international law and 
practice. It follows that this obligation confers upon an investor (as a national of another 
State) the right to diplomatic protection. This topic is discussed below. 
35 General Assembly, 1478
th plenary meeting (25 November 1966) 
<http://daccessdds.un.orgidocIRESOLUTION/GENINRO/004/611IMGINR000461.pdflOpenElement> (18 
December 2006) 
36 Charter of  Economic Rights and Duties of  States, adopted Resolution Al3281 (XXIX) of  the United 
Nations General Assembly (CERDS), December 12  1974,28 Y.B.U.N. (1974), Article 20) 
37 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (21  October 1986) <http://www.africa-
union.orgiofficial_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Banjul%20Charter.pdf> 
(l  September 2008), article 21.2 (emphasis added) 
79 C. The remedy of diplomatic protection of investment 
I.  General principles 
The most traditional means of obtaining redress for foreign investors disadvantaged by 
breaches  of international  law is  known  as  "diplomatic protection".  While  diplomatic 
protection existed in  various  forms  before modem times,  it was not until  the time of 
Vattel
38  that a  clear  attempt  was  made  at explaining diplomatic  protection.  In  1758, 
Vattel wrote: 
[T]he sovereign of the  injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible,  force the 
aggressor to full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain the 
chief  end of  civil society, [namely] protection.
39 (Emphasis added). 
Vattel's theories not only asserted the right of the States to protect their nationals, but 
implied that there was an obligation on States to do so. A consequence of  this view was 
that injury incurred by the alien was regarded as being a violation of an obligation owed 
by the Host State to the alien's home State. This explanation was the result of  the theory 
that the individual has no rights in internationallaw.4o 
The right and duty of States to protect their nationals abroad was also strongly asserted in 
some later studies of diplomatic protection, including those of Fauchille,41 Oppenheim42 
and Holland.
43 
38 Emerich de Vattel was a Swiss philosopher, diplomat and legal expert whose theories laid the foundation 
of  modern international law and political philosophy. He is most famous for his 1758 work Droit des gens; 
ou,  Principes de loi naturelle appliques ala consuite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains (The 
Law of  Nations or the Principles of  Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of  Nations and 
Sovereigns). This work is focused largely on the rights and obligations of  citizens and States. 
39 Vattel, E, 'The Law of  Nations or The Principle of  Natural Law, Book I: Of  Nations Considered in 
Themselves' (1758) <htlp://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/> (23 July 2007) 
4{) Martens, G F, Precis du droit des gens moderne de ['Europe, vol 1 (1831), 224ff. See also Ameresinghe, 
C F Local Remedies in International Law, 2nd ed (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
44-45 
41  Fauchille, P, 'Traite de droit international public' (1922), The American Journal of  International Law, 
884,922 
42 Oppenheim, L, International Law - A Treatise, vol 1 (London, Longman, Green & Co, 1905),375 
43 Holland, T E, Lectures on International Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell,1933), 165 
80 The  principle  that the  alien's home  State,  and not the  alien  himself,  has  the  right to 
proceed  against  the  Host  State  for  its  illegal  actions  has  been recognised  in  several 
international judicial decisions.  In  the  Mavrommatis  Palestine  Concessions  Case,  the 
PCIJ stated that: 
[I]t is  an elementary principle of international  law  that a  State  is  entitled to  protect its 
subjects, when injured by  acts contrary to international law committed by another State, 
from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By 
taking up the case of  one of its subjects and resorting to a diplomatic action or international 
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its right to 
ensure, in the person of its subject, respect for the rules of internationallaw.
44 (Emphases 
added). 
In the Mavrommatis case, the question was whether the dispute, which stemmed from an 
injury to  a national of the  claimant's  State,  was a  dispute  involving two  States  or a 
dispute between a private individual and a State. It was held that the dispute in question 
was  a  dispute  between  two  States,  even though  it  arose  from  an  injury  to  a  private 
individual. 
The  PCIJ  later  confirmed  the  ruling  in  Mavrommatis  in  the  Panavezys-Saldutiskis 
Railway Case.  This  dispute  concerned  the  expropriation of a  concession  given to  an 
Estonian company by the Lithuanian Government. The PCIJ, in this instance found that: 
In the opinion of  the Court, the rule of international law [ ... ] is based on that in taking up 
the  cases  of its  nationals,  by  resorting  to  diplomatic  action  in  international  judicial 
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure in 
the person of  its national respect for the rules of  internationallaw.
45 
In the Serbian Loans Case,46  where the dispute arose from the failure to service certain 
loans taken by the Serbian Government from French bond-holders, and in the Chorzow 
Factory Case,47  which concerned an expropriation of alien property, the same principle 
44 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v UK) (1924) P.C.U. (ser. A) No.2, 12 
45 Panavezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (1938) PCIJ Series AlB No.2, 16 
46 Serbian Loans Case (1929) PCIJ Series A No. 20 
47 Chorzow Factory Case (1928) PCIJ Series A No. 17 (Merits) 
81 was held to be applicable. In Serbian Loans,48 the application of  the principle resulted in 
the finding that the dispute before the Court was one between two States.  In Chorzow 
Factory  the  Court  applied  the  same  principle  in  order  to  conclude  that the  damage 
suffered by the claimant (State) was identical to that suffered by its national. 
In principle, when a national of State A suffers injury within the territory of State B, 
international law holds that the injury is as an injury to State A (instead of  an injury to the 
national  of State  A)  - and  as  a  result,  a  remedy  of diplomatic  protection  becomes 
available.  Such protection may take a  number of forms,  including consular action on 
behalf of  the investor, negotiation, mediation, judicial and arbitral proceedings, reprisals, 
severance of diplomatic relations, economic pressure and, as a final resort, the use of  the 
force.
49  Diplomatic  protection  embraces  all  cases  of official  representation  by  the 
Government on behalf of its citizens (or their property interests) within the jurisdiction of 
another for the purposes of  preventing certain violations of  international law, or obtaining 
redress for the injuries caused by such violation.  50 
II.  Requirements of  the "Local Remedies"  rule 
It is important to note that diplomatic protection can only be sought after the investor has 
tried, but failed, to obtain relief through the domestic courts of the Host State, i.e.  after 
the investor has exhausted all "local remedies". 
In accordance with the  doctrine  of "local remedies",  before  resort may be  had to an 
international court or arbitral tribunal, the State should have an opportunity to redress its 
violation by its own means and within the framework of  its own domestic legal system.
51 
The foundation of  the "local remedies" rule is, first and foremost, the observance of State 
sovereignty and a recognition that a State should be  presumed competent to process a 
48 Chorzow Factory Case (1949) ICJ Reports 181 
49 Dugard, J R, 'First Report on Diplomatic Protection' International Law Commission (United Nations), 
15, UN Doc. A/CNA/506 (2000) <http://untreaty.un.orglilc/guide/9_8.htm> (1  September 2008) 
50 Ibid. 
5! Interhandel Case (1959) I.C.J. 5,27 
82 matter through its own judicial organs. In other words, this rule allows a sovereign State 
independence and freedom from interference in its judicial decision-making.  52 
The principle of State sovereignty may prevent an investor from utilising the remedy of 
diplomatic protection if the investor is  unwilling to resort to the Host State's domestic 
Court system. There is, however, an exception to the "local remedies" rule. 
III.  Exception  to  the  rule:  waiver of the  exhaustion of IILocal Remedies" 
requirements 
The "local remedies" rule can be waived. An express waiver of the rule of exhaustion of 
"local remedies" takes place where the Host State expressly agrees that the rule will not 
apply to  a  particular dispute.
53  Such  a  waiver  may  be  incorporated  into  the  parties' 
investment contract, in which case it will be deemed an "express" waiver. Alternatively, 
the waiver may be packaged in investment treaties between the States concerned. In the 
latter case, the waiver will be "implied" from the treaty provisions where, for example, 
the parties have agreed to a dispute resolution mechanism outside of the jurisdiction of 
the Host State courts. 
For example, Articles IX(2) and IX(3) of the 1989 Russia - Canada BIr
4 states that "if 
the dispute cannot be settled amicably, it may be submitted by the investor to arbitration", 
in which case "the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the Rules of  Arbitration of 
the  United Nations  Commission on Trade and  Development" (UNCITRAL).  Similar 
provisions were made in Article 9 of  the 1991 Russia - Korea BIT,55 Article 8 of  the BIT 
52 Sorensen, M, Manual of  Public International Law (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1968) 531,584 ("The 
foundation of  the rule is the respect for the sovereignty and jurisdiction of  the State competent to deal with 
the question through its judicial organs.") 
53  Amerasinghe, C F, Local Remedies in International Law, 2
nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law, 1993) 247 
54 Agreement between the Government of  Canada and the Government of  the Union of  Soviet Socialist 
Republicsfor the Promotion and ReCiprocal Protection of  Investment (10 November 1989) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iiaJdocsibits/canada  _ ussr.pdf> (1  September 2008) 
55 Agreement between the Government of  the Republic of  Korea and  the Government of  the Union of  Soviet 
Socialist Republics for the Promotion and  Reciprocal Protection of  Investment (10 July 1991) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iiaJdocsibits/korea  _  ussr. pdf  > (1  September 2008) 
83 between  Russian  and  Norway,56  and  many  other  BITs  entered  into  by  the  Russian 
Federation. Furthermore, Article XI(l) of the Russia-Canada BIT, for example, requires 
"any disputes between the contractual parties ... be settled through diplomatic channels". 
A provision to the same effect may be found in Article 10 of  Russia - Korea BIT. These 
provisions  represent  an  implicit  waiver  of the  requirement  to  exhaust  the  "local 
remedies", which subsequently, can be implied into the investment contract between the 
Russian Federation, on the one hand, and a foreign investor, on the other. 
The Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of other States (ICSID) is  an example of multilateral treaties which exclude the "local 
remedies" rule.  By virtue of Article 26 of that Convention, where a Host State and an 
alien (whose home State is a party to the Convention) agree to submit to international 
arbitration under the auspices of ICSID, there is no need for the alien to exhaust "local 
remedies" before seeking arbitration (unless specific provisions are otherwise made for 
such recourse).  57  It is  also  worth noting that  where  an express waiver is given in an 
investment treaty, it is normally irrevocable.  58 
In summary, the "local remedies" rule can be effectively waived by inserting a specific 
provision into the parties' investment contract. Alternatively, an investor can draw on the 
provisions already incorporated into certain bilateral and multilateral investment treaties 
between its home State and the Host State. Such provisions are known as implicit waivers 
of  the local remedies rule. 
56 Agreement between the Government of  the Kingdom of  Norway and the Government of  the Russian 
Federation on Promotion and  Mutual Protection of  Investment (4 October 1995) < 
http://www  .unctad.org/sections/diteiiiaJdocsibits/norway  Jussia.pdf> (1 September 2008) 
57 Amerasinghe, C F, Local Remedies in International Law, 2
nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law, 1993) 247 
58 UK Pleadings in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, unreported; ICJ; Pleadings (1951), 118-119 Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (preliminary objection), unreported; ICI; Judgment of22 July 1952; (1952) I.C.J. Reports 
109 
84 D. Conclusion 
The remedy of  diplomatic protection stems from the Host State's obligation to respect the 
rights of other independent States, which in tum derives from the concept of PSNR. The 
remedy of diplomatic protection is still well-alive and to date stands as one of the most 
useful  tools  available  to  foreign  investors  seeking  reparation  from  Host  States.
59 
Diplomatic  protection  provides  the  person  who  goes  abroad  (or  sends  his  property 
abroad)  with the  assurance  that  at  least  some  attempt will  be  made  to  see  that their 
investment  enjoys  the  minimum  of security  and  fair  treatment.  It also  provides  a 
procedure whereby many disputes are settled. In addition, it inspires a more considered 
treatment of  aliens, which further reduces the likelihood of  dispute. 
One of the pre-conditions of the utilisation of this remedy, however,  is  the compliance 
with the "local remedies" rule. Pursuant to this rule, any claim against the Host State is 
inadmissible unless an aggrieved party has first tried to resolve its dispute in the courts of 
the  Host  State.  This  enforced  exposure to  the  system  of local  courts  places a  heavy 
burden upon investors due to the inefficiencies of  some of the Host States' internal legal 
systems. 
There is,  however, an exception to  the "local remedies" rule.  Under this exception the 
"local remedies" may not need to be exhausted if the parties elect to contract out of the 
rule.  The parties  can contract out of local remedies by either incorporating a  specific 
provision to that effect into the contract, or by relying on the provisions of the relevant 
bilateral or multilateral investment treaties that provide for such a waiver. 
59 Geck, Encyclopedia o/Public International Law, voll (1996) 'Diplomatic Protection' 145 
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Protection of foreign investment under public international law 
A. Introduction 
Public  international  law on investment protection is  widely  accepted  as  a  useful  and 
powerful  tool  for  foreign  investors  in their  battle against certain actions  of the  Host 
States. For the purposes of  this chapter, I will concentrate on two major sources of  public 
international law: treaty law and customary international law. In the course of  this chapter 
I will discuss the nature and significance of these investment protection tools. It will be 
put that the investment protection offered by public international law is in itself sufficient 
to safeguard the interests of  foreign investors on the territory of  the Host States. 
B. Protection of foreign investment under treaties 
I.  General 
The number of  regional, bilateral and multilateral investment agreements and treaties has 
grown dramatically in the last few decades.  These agreements have a common general 
purpose - to provide for the promotion and protection of investment of one contracting 
party in the territory of another. This part of my thesis will provide an overview of the 
investment protection mechanisms offered by the existing treaty law. First, I will outline 
the  purpose  and  scope  of the  investment  treaties.  Second,  I  will  cover  the  major 
substantive  interpretations  of  investment  protection  provisions  such  as  "National 
treatment"  protection,  "Most  Favoured  Nations"  protection,  "Fair  and  Equitable 
treatment" protection and last but not least, the protection offered by the Host State's 
86 obligations to provide  "most constant protection and security" of foreign investment. 
Finally,  I will analyse the  dispute settlement mechanisms provided for  in international 
investment  agreements,  and  highlight  the  significance  of protection  offered  by  the 
recognition and enforcement of  international arbitral awards. 
II.  The purpose and  scope of  international investment treaties 
International  investment  treaties,  referred  to  in  this  section,  are  the  bilateral  and 
multilateral investment treaties, more commonly known as BITs and MITs. By and large, 
both BITs and MITs perform a similar function - they protect foreign investment from 
the  acts  of expropriation  and  governmental  taking;  however,  there  exist  significant 
differences  between  the  two.  The  BITs  represent  the  expression  of a  bilateral  deal 
between two States reflecting the interests of two contracting parties. The MITs, on the 
other hand, aim at reaching a much larger target group with a view of  creating a system 
of  multilateral economic integration.
60 
The modem type of  investment treaty provides for a wide ambit of  protection, including a 
wide  definition  of "investment",61  various  clauses  relating  to  treatment  of foreign 
investment,  and  a  broad  range  of dispute  settlement  mechanisms.  Furthermore,  it 
typically contains a wide concept of  expropriation as "any measures directly or indirectly 
depriving investors of  their investments" (emphasis added).62 At the same time it clearly 
defines the limits of the Host State's right to expropriate.  A good illustration of this is 
provided in the US-Czech BIT, in which relevant parts it is stated that: 
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization  ... except for a public purpose, in 
60 Waelde, T, MITs (Multilateral Investment Agreements) in the Year 2000: A Contribution to Melanges 
Phillippe Kahn (2000) CEPMLP, Volume 4-15 Article 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vo14/article4-15.html> (1  September 2008) 
61 Agreement on Encouragement and ReCiprocal Protection of  Investment between the Kingdom of  the 
Netherlands and the Czech and  Slovak Republics 
<http://www.unctad.orglsections/dite/iialdocslbits/czech  _  netherlands.pdf>  (1  September 2008), Article 1 
62 Ibid, Article 5 
87 accordance with due  process of law,  in  a non-discriminatory manner,  upon payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
63 
A similar example can be found in a number of  Russian BITs.64 For instance, Article 5(1) 
of  the 1995 Russia -Hungary BIT reads as follows: 
Investment of investors of one Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or 
subjected to other measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose. The expropriation 
shall be carried out under the process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and shall be 
accompanied by the payment of  prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
Overall,  the  mam  function  of the  investment  treaties  is  the  protection  of foreign 
investment. Non-discrimination, including "most-favoured-nation" status and "national" 
treatment, as well as "fair and equitable" treatment principles are therefore illustrative of 
the function of modem investment treaties and show their contribution to a more secure 
national and international economic partnership. 
III.  UNational" treatment protection (non-discrimination) 
Under most investment treaties, the Host State is obliged to treat the foreign investor no 
less  favourably  than  it  treats  its  domestic  investors  in  "like  circumstances".  Such 
principle  of non-discrimination  generally  takes  two  forms  - "Most-Favoured-Nation" 
(MFN) treatment and "National" treatment. 
63  Treaty with the Czech and  Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment (19 December 1992) 
<http://www.unctad.orglsections/dite/iialdocslbits/czech  _  us. pdt> (1  September 2008) 
64 Agreement between the Government of  the Republic of  Hungary and the Government of  the Russian 
Federationfor the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment (6 March 1995) 
<http://www.unctad.orglsections/dite/iialdocslbitslhungary  Jussia.PDF> (1  September 2008), Article 5(1); 
Agreement between the Government of  the Kingdom of  Thailand and the Government of  the Russian 
Federationfor the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment (October 2002) 
<http://www.unctad.orglsections/dite/iialdocslbits/russia_thailand.  pdt> (1  September 2008) Article 4; 
Agreement between the Government ofthe Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of  the Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment  (6 April 1989) <http://www.unctad.orglsections/dite/iialdocslbits/uk_ussr.pdt>  (1  September 
2008)Article 5; and Agreement between the Government of  the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of 
Ministers of  the Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of  Investment (28 November 1998) 
<http://www.unctad.orglsections/dite/iialdocslbitslrussia_ukrain.pdf> (1  September 2008) Article 5 
88 "National" treatment concerns discrimination against investors from foreign countries in 
relation to  national  (or  domestic)  investors.  It requires  each party to  a  treaty to  treat 
foreign investors no less favourably than it treats its domestic investors (once the former 
have crossed the border and became part of domestic commerce).  In other words, if a 
State grants a particular right, benefit or privilege to its own citizens, it must also grant 
these advantages to citizens of  other States. 
The obligation to provide foreign investors with a similar treatment is now incorporated 
in most of  the BITs and MITs, and operates in the following manner: if  it is noted that the 
two compared businesses are treated differently, to the detriment of the foreign investor, 
then the government of the  Host State has the burden of proof to  show that it has an 
adequate reason for such preferential treatment. If  this burden is not met, it will be safe to 
conclude that the investor has proven discrimination, which in effect means that the Host 
State has breached its sovereign obligations and hence may be held liable under certain 
provisions of  public international law. 
In S.D. Myers v Canada,65 the tribunal took the view that: 
In assessing whether a measure is contrary to a "National" treatment norm, the following 
factors should be taken into account. First, whether the practical effect of  the measure is to 
create a disproportionate benefit for nationals over non-nationals. And second, whether the 
measure  appears  to  favour  its  nationals  over  non-nationals  who  are  protected  by  the 
relevant treaty. (Emphasis added). 
Interpretation of "National" treatment provisions also entails a determination of which 
businesses or activities ought to be compared.
66 Here, the concept of  "like" circumstances 
becomes an important premise of the application of the "National" treatment standard. 
However, "National" treatment provisions typically do not identify the criteria by which 
65  S.D.  Myers, Inc.  v.  Canada, unreported; Partial Award on the Merits; City of  Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
13 November 2000, 252 
<http://www.nafiaclaims.comiDisputes/CanadalSDMyers/SDMyersMeritsA  ward.  pdt> (I September 2008) 
66 'Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review' UNCTAD Series of  International 
Investment Policies for Development (2005) 33 < http://www.unctad.org/enldocs/iteiit20054_en.pdf> 
(1 September 2008) 
89 similarity  or  likeness  is  to  be  determined.
67  This  issue  has  arIsen  In a  number  of 
investment disputes.  In  S.D.  Myers  v  Canada,  for  example,  the  tribunal  focused  on 
whether  the  domestic  and  foreign  businesses  in  question  were  in  commercially 
competitive sectors. Thus, while the Myers investment was in the area of waste export, 
and the domestic business was dealing with waste disposal facilities, they were found to 
be in like circumstances as one could potentially take away the business from the other.  68 
By comparison, the tribunal in the Methanex
69  case has considered the precise scope of 
the term "like circumstances". It took a narrower approach to the requirement "in like 
circumstances" by asking whether the activities of  the foreign investor were comparable 
to economic activities in the domestic sphere, rather than a broader approach used in the 
Myers case. 
In summary, one of the main expectations arising from an investment agreement is that 
foreign  investors  will  not  be  subject  to  discriminatory  treatment  by  the  Host  State, 
whether  through  legal,  administrative  or  other  decision-making.7o  In  this  regard  the 
protection  offered  by  the  "National"  treatment  provisions  in  the  investment  treaties 
prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination of  foreign investment as compared to the 
domestic investment in "similar circumstances". 
IV.  IlMost-favoured-nation (MFN)" treatment protection 
1.  The concept of  the treatment 
A second component of non-discrimination in investment treaties typically includes the 
requirement  that  a  foreign  investor  be  accorded  the  highest  standard  of treatment 
available  to  an investor from  any  other foreign country.  This method of protection is 
known as "most-favoured-nation" (MFN) treatment. 
67 Id 
68 S.D. Myers v Canada, above n 6,  251 
69 Methanex v United States, unreported, UNCITRAL, Decision on Amici Curiae (IS January 2001) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/llc5818.htm> (1 September 2008);Methanex v United States, unreported, 1  st Partial 
Award (7 August 2002) (NAFTA) <http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationlI2613.pdt> (1 
September 2008); Methanex v United States, unreported, UNCITRAL, Final Award (3 August 2005) 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationl51052.pdt> (l September 2008) 
70 UNCT  AD Series ofIntemational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7, 32 
90 MFN  treatment  concerns  discrimination  among  investors  from  foreign  countries.  It 
requires each party to a treaty to grant to every other party the same treatment that it has 
undertaken to grant to any other country, with respect to the same activity. Notably, this 
does not confer particular advantages to any particular investor. Rather, it means that that 
investor will be granted the same trade advantages (such as low tariffs) that are granted to 
any investor from any other nation. In effect, having MFN status means that one nation 
will not be treated worse than any other. 
Traditionally, MFN treatment was applied primarily to the duties charged on imports. 
However, in recent decades specific provisions have extended the MFN principle to other 
areas of international economic contracts, such as the establishment of  enterprises of  one 
country's nationals in the territory of the other; navigation in territorial waters; real and 
personal property rights;  intangible property rights such as patents, industrial designs, 
trademarks,  copyrights  and  literary property;  government purchases;  foreign-exchange 
allocations and taxation.  71 
In  order  to  stress  the  worldwide  recognition  of the  international  character  of this 
principle, it is emphasised that MFN treatment was made one of the core obligations of 
commercial policy under the Havana Charter where Members undertook the obligation 
"to give due regards to the desirability of avoiding discrimination ... between foreign 
investors".72 Furthermore, the importance for international economic relations is shown 
by  the  fact  that  MFN  treatment  provisions  of the  GATT  (Article  I  General  Most 
Favoured  Nation  Treatment)  and  the  GATS  (Article  II  Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment)  provide  that  this  obligation  shall  be  accorded  "immediately  and 
unconditionally".  73 
71  Encyclopredia Britannica Online <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9053931> (29 May 2006) 
72 United Nations Conference on Trade and  Employment, Final Act and Related Documents (April 1948) 
Article 12 (International Investment for Economic Development and Reconstruction), paragraph 2(a)(ii) 
<http://openlibrary.org/alOL57361A> (1  September 2008) 
73 Although in the case of  the GATS, a member may maintain a measure inconsistent with this obligation 
provided that such measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the Annex on Article II Exceptions. 
See 'Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law' Organisation/or Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) , Working Papers on International Investment, Number 2004/2 
(September 2004)  3 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085.pdt> (l September 2008) 
91 2.  Example of  the MFN treatment clause in operation 
Generally,  MFN clauses operate  in the  following  manner:  a  State  (the  granting state) 
undertakes an obligation towards another State (the beneficiary State) to  accord MFN 
treatment  in  an  agreed  sphere  of relations,  and  that  beneficiary  State  accepts  it.
74 
Ultimately, the extent of the  benefits to  which the beneficiary State  may lay  claim  is 
limited by the treatment extended by the granting State to a third State. It is thus the mere 
fact of a more favourable treatment that sets in motion the operation of the clause. This 
treatment may be  based upon a treaty, or another agreement or law.
75  The beneficiary 
State, on the strength of  the MFN clause, may also invoke the clause to demand the same 
benefits as were given to the third State.
76 
A good illustration of  how this principle operates can be found in the case of  MefJezini v 
Spain.
77  In  this  case  the  Argentine  investor  in  Spain  was  permitted  to  use  a  more 
beneficial time requirement in the arbitration process found in the Chile-Spain BIT (as 
opposed  to  the  Argentina-Spain  BIT under  which the  claim was  filed).  The  tribunal 
accepted this as an application of  the MFN principle, subject to limitations that it did not 
override public policy considerations of the parties to the negotiations.
78  On this basis, 
the more favourable procedural treatment was applied. 
In the case of one treaty between the granting State and the beneficiary State containing 
the MFN clause, and the other treaty between the  granting State and a third State, the 
74 The clause may also determine the persons or things to whom and to which the MFN treatment is 
applicable. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, above n 14, 
75 Report of  the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Works of  Its Thirteenth 
Session (1978), Yearbook of  the International Law Commission, AlCN.4/SERAlI978/Add.1 (part 2), 
article 8, commentary 8 
76 Subject to the wording of  the MFN clause, the mere fact that the third State has not availed itself ofthe 
benefits which were extended to it by the granting State does not release the granting State from its 
obligations under the MFN clause. See Report of  the International Law Commission to the General 
Assembly on the Works ofIts Thirteenth  Session (1978), above n 16, article 5, commentary 5 
77 Emilio Augustin MajJezini v The Kingdom 0/  Spain, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB/9717; Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000; unreported; ICSID; Award, 13 November 2000; unreported, ICSID; 
Rectification of  Award, 31  January 2001 (Argentina! Spain BIT) 
78 Emilio Augustin MajJezini v The Kingdom o/Spain, unreported, ICSID Case No. ARB/9717; Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000; unreported; ICSID; Award, 13 November 2000, paras 62-63 
92 treaty that contains the MFN treatment clause is considered to be the "basic" treaty.79 The 
majority of  the Court in the landmark Ang!o-Jranian Oil Company case80 held that: 
[T]his is the treaty which establishes the judicial link between the beneficiary State and the 
third party treaty and confers upon that State the rights enjoyed by the third party. A third 
party treaty, independent and isolated from the basic treaty, cannot produce any legal effect 
as  between  [ ...  ]  the  beneficiary  State  and  [ ...  ]  the  granting  State.  The  beneficiary  is 
entitled, to the extent provided by the MFN provision under its  own treaty, to claim all 
rights and favours extended by the granting State to the third State. This extension can be 
seen as "ingenious" legal shorthand to treaty process. (Emphasis added). 
This  case  was  based  on  a  dispute  which  resulted  from  the  nationalisation  by  the 
Government ofIran of  the oil industry. The United Kingdom invoked the MFN clauses of 
the agreements concluded with Iran in 1857 and 1903 to seek the treatment foreseen in 
the  1934  Treaty  of Friendship  between  Iran  and  Denmark  and  similar  agreements 
concluded with Switzerland and Turkey in 1934 and 1937 (that guaranteed all treatment 
be in accordance with internationallaw).81 
On this same topic other commentators have also noted that: 82 
79 Report of  the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Works of  Its Thirteenth 
Session (1978), above n 16, article 8, commentary 1 
80 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Preliminary objection), unreported; ICJ; Judgment of  22 July 1952; (1952) 
I.C.J. Reports 109 
81 The Court dismissed this case on the basis that it had no jurisdiction. In contrast see also Lloyds Bank v 
de Ricqles and de Gaillard, unreported, Commercial Tribunal of  the Seine (1930),  where the Commercial 
Tribunal of  the Seine dismissed a claim by Lloyds Bank, which having been ordered to give security for 
costs. Lloyds invoked Article I of  the AnglO-French Convention regulating commercial maritime relations 
of28 February 1882 to benefit from the provisions of  a Franco-Swiss Treaty of 15 June 1889, which gave 
Swiss nationals the right to sue in France without being required to give security for costs. Lloyds argued 
that Article I engaged the parties to give each other "immediately and unconditionally the benefits of  every 
favour, immunity or privilege in matters of  commerce and industry which have been conceded by one of 
the parties to any third nation whatsoever, whether within or beyond Europe." In this case the Tribunal held 
that a party to a convention of  general character such as the Anglo-French Convention could not claim the 
MFN clause the benefit of  a special Convention such as the Franco-Swiss Convention, which dealt with 
one particular subject, namely freedom of  the obligation to give security for costs. In other words, the 
Tribunal adopted the view that MFN clauses could not be invoked to compare treatment provided under 
two treaties dealing with different subject matters. See also Ustor, E, 'Forth Report ofthe Most-Favoured-
Nation Clause' (1973) Yearbook of  the International Law Commission, vol 2, 1973,9 
<http://untreaty. un.org/ilc/docurnentation/english/a  _ cn4  _ 266.pdf> (I September 2008) 
82 Schwarzenberger, G, International Law as Applied  by International Courts and Tribunals, 3rd ed 
(London: Stevens, 1957), 243 
93 [T]he MFN principle contributes greatly to the rationalisation of  the treaty-making process 
and leads to the automatic self-revision of  treaties which are based on the most-favoured-
nation standard. It makes unnecessary incorporation of the treaty between grantor and the 
beneficiary of  the "most-favoured-nation" treatment of  any of  the relevant treaties between 
the grantor and the third States and their deletion whenever such treaties cease to be in 
force.  So long as this last-mentioned aspect of the matter is kept in mind, most-favoured-
nation clauses are correctly described as  drafting (and deletion) by reference.  (Emphasis 
added). 
Since MefJezini v.  Spain, there have been at least three other major cases dealing with the 
applicability of the  MNF  standard to  dispute  settlement.  The  case  of Siemens,83  also 
favours  the application of MFN status to  dispute settlement.  Two other cases, namely 
Salim-84  and Plama,85  say the opposite,  focusing  on the  intention of the  parties as  the 
decisive factor. 86 
Although the MafJezini  case's primary concern was with the applicability of the MFN 
provision to  dispute  settlement,  it had also  raised questions as  to whether substantive 
protection that is  greater in a BIT with another country may be relied upon by a third 
party investor. The trend regarding this issue is becoming more restrictive because of  the 
view that no  third-party provision  should  impact on the  underlying "bargain" in any 
given BIT.87  As a result, recent cases have limited the possible application of such third-
party treaties to situations where the additional rights do not impact upon the balance of 
rights in a significant way so as "to go to the core of matters that must be specifically 
negotiated by the contracting parties".88 Whilst it is difficult to determine with precision 
83 Siemens v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (English), 3 August 2004 
(Germanyl Argentina BIT) 
84 Salini Construttori Sp.A. and  Italstades Sp.A. v The Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan, unreported, award, 
9 November 2004 <http://worldbank.orglicsidlcases/awards.htm> (1  September 2007) 
85 Plama Consortium Limited v Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005 (Energy Charter Treaty) 
86 In this view, only where the parties to the BIT have a clear and unambiguous intention of  incorporating 
the dispute settlement provisions from other treaties (by operation of  the MFN clause) - will this be 
possible. See UNCTAD Series ofIntemational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7,36 
87 Ibid. 
88 Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed SA. v United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID; Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003 (Spain! Mexico BIT), para 69. Also see ADF Group Inc.  v United 
States of  America, unreported; ICSID; Case No. ARB(AF)/OO/I, Final Award, 9 January 2003 (NAFTA) 
94 when such a test has been met, it does display a greater degree of  restraint than originally 
feared in the immediate aftermath of  the MafJezini decision. 
One of the recent decisions by an ICSID tribunal in the MTD Equity Bhd v Chile case
89 
has suggested a broader notion in this regard.
9o The tribunal considered that: 
The [ ...  ] standard of  treatment has to be interpreted in the manner most conductive to fulfil 
the  objectives  of the  BIT  to  protect  investment  and  create  conditions  favourable  to 
investments.
91 
Accordingly,  the  tribunal  felt  that  the  inclusion  of standards  found  in  other  BITs 
concluded by Chile with other States was "commensurate with its purpose". The tribunal 
justified this reasoning by pointing to the fact that the contracting parties found it prudent 
to exclude, from the  coverage of the MFN clause, matters relating to tax and regional 
cooperation. This approach can certainly broaden the coverage of a BIT. However, the 
tribunal required that the provision relied upon in a BIT with a third country fall within 
the  ambit  of the  fair  and  equitable  treatment  standard.  Thus,  only  those  provisions 
specifically relevant to  the  clarification of obligations under BIT containing the MFN 
clauses may be considered.
92 
Whilst it is true to say that the MFN clauses may generally be found in most international 
investment agreements, one ought to be mindful of the exceptions attached to them. In 
particular, GATT members recognised in principle that the MFN rule should be relaxed 
to accommodate the needs of developing countries, and the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development  (UNCTAD)  in  1964  has  sought to  extend  preferential  treatment to the 
exports of the developing countries. Another challenge to the MFN principle has been 
posed by regional trading groups such as the European Union (EU), which have lowered 
89 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd & MTD Chile S.A.v Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/OI17, Award, 25 May 2004 
(Malaisiai Chile BIT) 
90 UNCTAD Series ofInternational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7,36 
91  MTD EqUity Sdn.  Bhd & MTD Chile S.A.v Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/OI17, Award, 25 May 2004 
(MaIaisiai Chile BIT), para 104 
92 UNCTAD Series ofInternational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7,36 
95 or eliminated tariffs amongst members while maintaining tariff walls between member 
nations and the rest of  the world. Free Trade Agreements also represent an exception. 
In summary, MFN treatment is essentially a method of establishing equality of trading 
opportunity between States by making bilateral agreements multilateral. As a principle of 
public international law, it establishes the sovereign equality of States with respect to 
trading  policy.  As  an  instrument  of economic  policy,  it provides  a  treaty  basis  for 
competitive international transactions, and as a tool for investment protection, it prohibits 
discrimination among trading nations, and their nationals. 
V.  uFair and equitable" treatment protection 
The standard of  fair and equitable treatment originated in customary international law. 
Subsequently there  were numerous  international and regional  agreements and treaties, 
which also laid the foundation of  this principle and confirmed its essence as a significant 
part of public international law. 93  In recent years, however, with the growing number of 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, the principle offair and equitable treatment 
turned into a standard clause of  the contractual agreements between the States.
94 
93  See 'Havana Charter Treaty' United Nations (24 March 1948), Article 11(2) 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.netlmisc/havana.pdf> (3 September 2008); Economic Agreement of  Bogota (5 
February 1948), article 22 <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-43.html> (3 September 2008); US 
Treaties of  Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
<http://www.gartiassociates.comlCMfPracticalInformationiPracticalInformation  7  46  .  asp> (3 September 
2007). See also, Shawcross, A, 'The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round Table: 
Comment ofthe Draft Convention by its Authors' (1960) Journal of  Public Law 9,119-124 
94 See, for example, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment between the 
Kingdom of  the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Republics 
<http://www  .unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocsibits/czech  _  netherlands.  pdf>  (1  September 2008); 
Treaty with the Czech and  Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of  Investment (19 December 1992) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/czech  _  us. pdf> (1  September 2008); Agreement between 
the Government of  the Republic of  Hungary and  the Government of  the Russian Federation for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment (6 March 1995) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iiaidocs/bits/hungarL  russia. PDF> (1  September 2008); Agreement 
between the Government of  the Kingdom of  Thailand and the Government of  the Russian Federationfor the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment (October 2002) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bitsirussia  _thailand.  pdf> (I September 2008); Agreement 
between the Government of  the Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of  the 
Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment  (6 April 
1989) <http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/uk  _ ussr. pdf>  (1  September 2008); Energy 
Charter Treaty (December 1994) <http://www.ena.ltlpdfailTreaty.pdf> (20 August 2007) 
96 A breach of  fair and equitable treatment occurs "where it is shown that an investor has 
been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the treatment is raised to the level 
that is unacceptable from the international prospective".95 For example, the breach would 
be deemed to have occurred where the Host State's government fails to give full notice 
directly to a ship-owner regarding the impending seizure of a ship,96 or where an investor 
is required to produce excessive documentation for export permits in the forestry sector,97 
or  indeed,  where  the  government  officials  engage  in  an  improper  transfer  of 
governmental funds from a private bank account into a more suitable one.98 
In the  case of Genin v Estonia,99  the tribunal defined fair and equitable treatment to 
include: 
Acts following a wilful neglect of  duty, an extreme insufficiency of  action falling far below 
international standards, subjective bad faith, or a wilful disregard of  due process.  100 
Other arbitrations under both MITs and BITs have further considered the implications of 
this standard.
10l  For example, in Pope & Talbot, 102 it was held that the standard applies 
to conduct that requires a failure of due process that "surprises the observer". This line 
was applied to reach a finding against Canada for what was seen as overly aggressive use 
95  S.D. Myers v Canada, above n 6, 263 
96 Middle East Cement Shipping and  Handling Co. SA. v Arab Republic of  Egypt, unreported; ICSID Case 
No. ARB/99/6, Award, 12 April 2002 (Greece/ Egypt BIT) 
97 Pope &  Talbot, Inc. v The Government of  Canada, unreported; UNCITRAL, Award on Merits, 10 April 
2001; unreported; Award on Damages, 31 May 2002; unreported; Award on Costs, 26 November 2002 
(NAFTA) 
98 Emilio Augustin MajJezini v The Kingdom of  Spain, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7; Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000; unreported; Award, 13 November 2000; unreported; Rectification of  Award, 
31 January 2001 (Argentina! Spain BIT) 
99 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited v Republic of  Estonia, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 
Award, 25 June 2001 (United States/ Estonia BIT) 
100 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited v Republic of  Estonia, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 
Award, 25 June 2001, paragraphs 367, 371 (United States/ Estonia BIT) 
101  S  b  ee Pope & Tal  ot, Inc.  v The Government of  Canada, unreported; UNCITRAL, Award on Damages, 
31 May 2002, para 57; Mondev International Ltd v United States of  America, unreported; ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2; Award, 11  October 2002 (NAFT  A), paras 114-116 
102 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v The Government of  Canada, unreported; UNCITRAL; Award on Damages, 31 
May 2002, para 64 
97 of administrative powers to gather information on the export levels of the  company's 
forest products, which was the subject matter of  the arbitration.
lo3 
In the Modev v United States case,104 concerning property transactions in Boston between 
a Canadian developer and the city of  Boston, the tribunal noted two further key elements 
in relation to fair and equitable treatment. First, the standard is needed to provide a level 
of real protection to investors. Second, a tribunal does not have unfettered discretion to 
decide when the  standard  is  breached,  but must reach  its  assessment  on the  basis of 
relevant sources of  international law. 
In the case of Tecmed v Mexico,105  the tribunal focused on the breach of expectations of 
the  investors  as  being  subject  to  the fair  and equitable  treatment  rule.  The  tribunal 
considered the fair and equitable provision as a principle of good faith conduct, adding 
that it requires the Host States to act in a manner that is consistent, transparent and free 
from ambiguity.  106 
In ADF Group Inc.  v United States of  America, the Host State's legislation requiring the 
foreign investor to use only domestically produced raw material was also held to be in 
violation  of this  principle.
107  The  Claimant  in  ADF Group  Inc.  v  United  States  of 
America, a steel producer, claimed damages for alleged injuries resulting from  federal 
legislation and  implementing regulations  that required  federally-funded  state highway 
projects to use only domestically produced steel. The Claimant argued, inter alia, that the 
US  breached  its  NAFTA  obligations  to  provide  fair  and  equitable  treatment.  In 
particular, this case concerned the United States' "Buy America Requirements", which 
provided that only steel products produced and manufactured in the United States could 
be use in the construction of  the American highways. This requirement adversely affected 
103 UNCTAD Series ofIntemationai Investment Policies for Development, above n 7, 38 
104 Mondev International Ltd v United States of  America, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 
Award, 11 October 2002 (NAFTA), para 119 
105  Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID; Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003 (Spain! Mexico BIT) 
106 Ibid, para 154 
107 ADF Group Inc.  v United States of  America, unreported; ICSID; Case No. ARB(AF)/OO/l, Final Award, 
9 January 2003 (NAFTA) Electronic <http://www.state.gov/s/Vc3754.htm> (3 September 2008) 
98 the  operations of ADF,  a  Canadian investor,  that was  awarded a  sub-contract for  the 
supply and delivery of structural steel components for nine bridges of the  Springfield 
Interchange Project in Northern Virginia, and which sought to carry out fabrication work 
of  US-produced steel in its facilities in Canada. 
The overall result of the decisions to date is that fair and equitable treatment provisions 
may apply not only to  what would be  considered an abuse of government power,  or 
disguised uses of government powers for improper purposes, but also to any open and 
deliberate  use  of government  powers  that  fails  to  meet  the  requirements  of good 
governance (such as  transparency, protection of the  investors'  legitimate expectations, 
freedom from coercion and harassment, due process and procedural propriety and good 
faith). 108 
In summary, it can be ascertained that the concept offair and equitable treatment, which 
was founded in customary international law and over the years adopted by most of the 
international instruments on foreign investment (including BITs and MITs), is one of the 
widely recognised tools for the protection of foreign investors, in that it proclaims the 
principle  of  non-discrimination  and  proportionality  in  the  treatment  of  foreign 
participants.  109 
VI.  ItMost constant protection and security" defence 
The  protection offered  by the  principle  of most constant protection  and security  for 
foreign investment has a particular application to periods of  civil unrest and other public 
disturbances. It encompasses damages or losses sustained by an investor as a result of 
such  violent  episodes,  whether  directly  due  to  governmental  acts  or  to  the  lack  of 
adequate protection of  the investment by government officials (or police  ).110 
108 UNCTAD Series ofIntemational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7, 39 
109 It must be noted that though most investment protection agreements require that investment and 
investors receive "fair and equitable" treatment, there is no general agreement on the precise meaning of 
this principle. See Salem, M, 'Le Developpment de la Protection Conventionelle des Investissements 
Etrangers' (1986) Journal du Droit International, No.3, 579-626 
1\0 UNCTAD Series ofIntemational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7, 40 
99 Whilst this  standard  has been primarily used  in situations  of violence,  there  are  also 
examples of its application in non-violent situations in the sense of legal protection and 
security. I II  Despite  the  more  limited  nature  of this  obligation,  it  is  of considerable 
relevance  to  certain  developing  countries,  where  different  forms  of civil  strife  and 
interference with legal rights remains frequent, and where lack of adequate protection is 
an on-going issue. 
With regard to investment law, at least three ICSID cases have focused on this obligation 
in  recent  years.
Il2  In  the  course  of these  cases,  the  tribunals  have  indicated that  the 
obligation to provide most constant protection and security does not mean that investors 
are provided with a complete insurance policy against all losses due to some form of  civil 
strife. What it means is that Host States have a duty to act in good faith and provide their 
best efforts  to  protect the  foreign-owned  property.  Only  when this  duty  is  breached, 
would an investor have an actionable claim against the Host State under this heading of 
protection. In summary, this obligation places a clear premium on political stability and 
responsibility by the Host State to ensure that any instability does not have a negative 
effect on foreign investors.
l13 
VII.  Protection  offered by the  dispute  resolution  clauses  in  international 
investment agreements 
Another major investment protection mechanism, which is offered by all or at least most 
modem  BITs  and  MITs  is  the  dispute  resolution  clauses  incorporated  into  these 
instruments.  These  clauses  are  binding  and  their  breach  amounts  to  a  breach  of 
III See See CME Czech Republic B. V.  v The Czech Republic, unreported; UNCITRAL; Partial Award, 13 
September 2001; (2002) 14 World Trade and Arbitration Materials, No.3, 109; CME Czech Republic B. V. 
v The Czech Republic, unreported; UNCITRAL; Final Award, 14 March 2003 Electronic 
<http://www.ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/CME-2003-Final_002.pdf> (17 August 2007), 314 also see Jack 
Rankin v The Islamic Republic of  Iran, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Award, 3 November 1987 (17 
Iran - United States claims Tribunal Reports), 135 &  147 
112 American Manufacturing & Trading v Zaire, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB!93/l; Award, 21 
February 1997; (1997) 12 International Arbitration Reporter 4, A-I & A-2;  Wena Hotel Ltd v Arab 
Republic of  Egypt, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB!98!4; Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 June 1999; 
unreported; ICSID; Award on Merits, 8 December 2000; unreported; ICSID; Decision on Annulment, 5 
February 2002 (United Kingdom of  Great Brittan and Northern Ireland! Arab Republic of  Egypt BIT) 
113 UNCTAD Series ofInternational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7, 41 
100 international law. Most of the modem investment agreements generally offer a menu of 
dispute resolution alternatives, including: arbitration under the ICSID Convention (ifboth 
the Host State and the investor's home State are parties to the Convention); arbitration 
under ICSID Additional Facility Rules (if either the Host State or the investor's home 
State are parties to the Convention); arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; 
or arbitration under any other rules to which both the investor and the Host State agree.
1l4 
For  example,  under  the  2002  Russia - Ukraine  BIT,115  an  investor  is  offered  three 
options: 
2. In the event [that] the dispute cannot be resolved through negotiations within six months 
as  of the  date  of the  written  notification,  then  the  dispute  shall  be  passed  over  for 
consideration to: 
(a) a competent court or an  arbitral court of the Contracting Party, in whose territory the 
investments were carried out; 
(b) the Arbitration Institute of  the Chamber of  Commerce in Stockholm, or 
(c) an "ad hoc" arbitration tribunal, in conformity with the Arbitration Regulations of the 
United National Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
What  these  options  mean  is  that  investors  are  presented  with  neutral,  efficient  and 
binding mechanisms to resolve their disputes. It is therefore not surprising that clear and 
well-formulated  arbitration  agreements,  contained  in  investment treaties,  serve  as  an 
invaluable investment protection mechanism,  and are  often treated as  prerequisites to 
investors entering into the contract with the Host State. 
In  this  context,  however,  one  should  be  mindful  that  dispute  resolution  mechanisms 
provided for in international investment treaties may differ from those provided for in the 
State contracts. For example, the provisions of  a BIT may provide for an arbitration to be 
held under the rules of  the International Centre for Settlement of  Investment Disputes in a 
neutral forum, while the dispute resolution clause in the State contract may require the 
114 United States 2004 Model BIT (2004) 
<http://www.ustr.gov/assetsITrade  Sectors/Investment/Model  BIT/asset upload  file847  6897.pdf> (3 
September 2008), article 24(3) 
115 Agreement between the Government of  the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of  Ministers of  the 
Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of  Investment (28 November 1998) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/russia  ukrain.pdf> (1 September 2008), article 9(2) 
101 dispute  to  be  settled  in the  Host-State's  domestic  courts  and  under  the  Host  State's 
domestic law.  This,  in the  first instance, raises  an issue relating to  the multiplicity of 
forums  and  leads  to  an  often  fruitless  debate  as  to  which  forum  should  be  given 
preference.  Secondly,  it  raises  the  issue  of the  so-called  Fork-in-the-road principle 
according to  which an investor, once chosen (or being forced to  choose) an option to 
litigate  before  State  courts,  loses  the  opportunity  to  bring  his  or  her  dispute  to 
international arbitration. These issues will now be discussed. 
Conflict  of jurisdictions:  overstepping  the  "Fork-in-the-road"  and  "Umbrella" 
clauses 
One  of the  potential  risks  arIsmg  from  an  investment  dispute  settlement  system  (in 
international  investment agreements)  concerns  the  possibility of initiating the  process 
provided for in the relevant treaty despite the existence of a "domestic forum" clause in 
the  investment contract  between the  investor  and  the  Host  State.  Such a  clause  may 
specify that disputes arising out of breaches of the investment contract shall be settled 
under domestic dispute-settlement systems.
1l6 There is, therefore, a contract between the 
parties in which they agree that in the event of a dispute arising out of or in connection 
with their investment, domestic law of the Host State's shall be applied.  On the other 
hand, there exists an international agreement between the Host State and the investor's 
home State whereby it is stipulated that in the event of  an investment dispute, the parties 
will agree to submit themselves to arbitration under, for example, the ICSID Rules, and 
that such arbitration should be  held in a neutral venue.  Thus, there exists a degree of 
confusion not only as  to which dispute resolution agreement is  to  apply,  but also the 
purpose of  the "domestic forum" clause if  international law is to prevail and vice versa. 
One of  the possible solutions to these issues was proposed by a number of recent ICSID 
decisions,117 in which it was stated that where the breach of an investment contract is at 
116 UNCTAD Series ofIntemational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7,  18 
117 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited v Republic of  Estonia, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 
Award, 25 June 2001 (United States/ Estonia BIT); Compania de Aguas del Aconquija & Compagnie 
Generale des Eaux v Argentice Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 21 November 2000 (France/ 
Argentina BIT); Compania de Aguas des Aconquija &  Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Generale 
102 issue, the requirement, established in the "domestic forum" clauses to pursue breach of 
contract claims in domestic dispute-settlement procedures, does not prevent the use of  the 
investor-State dispute-settlement mechanism of an international  investment agreement. 
This is so even where the alleged breach of contract is central to the establishment of a 
breach of  the investment protection obligations in the treaty.118 
The rationale behind these cases is that "domestic forum" clauses relate to breaches of  the 
contract  alone,  while  the  investor-State  claims  relate  to  breaches  of the  treaty  as  a 
separate international law obligation. Accordingly, contractual clauses should not stand in 
the way of a legitimate claim, at the international level, of a breach of an international 
obligation  as  they  should  only  be  invoked  in  cases  of contractual  as  opposed  to 
international law obligations.
1l9 This can be  viewed as  a potential disadvantage to the 
Host State, in that it may remove what appears to be a purely contractual dispute from the 
domestic  forum.  However,  it  is  equally plausible to  argue  that,  should the  "domestic 
forum"  clause  have  the  effect  of prohibiting  any  international  challenge  to  the  Host 
State's actions, the protective purpose of  the international treaties would be diminished to 
the considerable disadvantage of  the investor.120 
One important issue in this context relates to the so-called umbrella clause. This clause 
establishes a treaty obligation to respect all the commitments or obligations entered into 
in contracts or other forms  of agreements between an investor and the Host State. The 
effect of this clause is that breaches of investment contracts amount to a violation of the 
applicable international investment agreement. However, the case law on such provisions 
is  not uniform and has given rise to some uncertainty as  to  the precise scope of such 
des Eaux) v Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002 (France/ 
Argentina BIT); Salini Construtorri S.p.A. and Ita/strade S.pA v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARBOO/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001 (Italy/ Morocco BIT) (Annulment Tribunal) 
118 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija & Compagnie Generale des Eaux v Argentice Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3, Award, 21 November 2000 (France! Argentina BIT); Compania de Aguas des Aconquija & 
Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Generale des Eaux) v Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002 (France! Argentina BIT); Salini Construtorri S.p.A. and 
Italstrade S.p.A. v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARBOO/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001 (Italy/ 
Morocco BIT) 
119 UNCTAD Series ofIntemational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7,  19 
120 Ibid. 
103 clauses. In particular, in the case of SGS v Pakistanl21  the tribunal held that the umbrella 
clause does not mean that breaches of  contract are automatically "elevated" to the level of 
breaches of international treaty law.  By contrast, in SGS v Phillipines,122  the tribunal 
expressly disagreed with the analysis of  the decision in SGS v Pakistan, and held that by 
virtue of the umbrella clause, the failure of  the Host State to observe binding contractual 
commitments made it a breach of the BIT. To date, this issue has been the subject of 
some debate. 123 
It is important to note that umbrella clauses arise out of  a number of  historical precedents 
that make it clear that their objective and purpose is to extend the protection of  the treaty 
to the determination of disputes over the alleged breach of an investment contract by the 
Host State.
124  Accordingly,  such interpretation of the umbrella clause by international 
arbitral tribunals appears to be consistent with its main objective. 
In  recent  decisions,  tribunals  have  in  general  followed  a  broader  approach  on  the 
application of the umbrella clauses.
125  However, in the case of Impregilo v Pakistan,  126 
the tribunal limited its treaty jurisdiction over contractual claims to claims involving the 
State itself and not State-owned entities. In the case of Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I -
DIPENTA v Algeria,127 the tribunal emphasised the requirement that contractual claims 
brought before  a  treaty-based  tribunal  must also  amount to  a  violation  of the  treaty 
standards themselves. 
121 SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic o/Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/OII13, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003 (Swiss Confederation! Pakistan BIT) 
122 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic o/the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004 (Swiss Confederation! Republic a/the Philippines BIT) 
123 For a detailed analysis ofthese awards in the context of  the "umbrella clauses", see further cases such as 
Noble Ventures v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/OIIlI; Joy Mining v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/II, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004; and Sempra Energy Int. v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 
124 Sinclair, A, 'The Origins of  the Umbrella Clauses in the International law on Investment Protection' 
(2004) 20 Arbitration International 411-434 
125 UNCTAD Series ofInternational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7,20 
126 Impregilo S.p.A. v Islamic Republic 0/  Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
22 April 2005 
127 Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 10 August 2005 
104 Concerns  may  also  arise  III relation  to  the  so-called fork-in-the-road  principle.  The 
choice-of-forum clauses generally require foreign investors to choose either a domestic or 
an international  dispute settlement forum  when a dispute  arises.  The purpose of such 
clauses is to prevent parties from resorting to multiple forums with regards to the same 
set of  facts. However, fork-in-the-road provisions may not exclude the risk of  having the 
shareholder initiate an arbitration to protect its BIT rights, while the investment (or the 
investor's subsidiary) initiates a domestic dispute to protect its contractual or other legal 
rights, including those stemming from the treaty.  128 
On the face of such facts, several arbitral decisions have interpreted the fork-in-the-road 
provision  as  resulting  in  a  loss of access  to  international  arbitration  only where  the 
disputes and the parties before the domestic courts or tribunals are identical to the dispute 
and the parties in the international proceeding.129  In arriving at this conclusion, as noted 
by the UNCT  AD researchers,130 the ICSID tribunal may have held the view that a foreign 
investor  may  be  unable  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  local  proceedings  concerning the 
investment. They explained that: 
The domestic law ofthe [Host State] may require a defensive approach to be taken by the 
investor, such as the lodging of an appeal against a regulatory ruling, or the initiation of a 
legal  challenge to  an  administrative decision where time  limits  for  actions are short.  In 
these circumstances, it may be difficult to characterize the action of  the investor as a "free" 
choice  of forum  that negates  the  possibility of any action  at the  international  level for 
breach of treaty obligation on the part of the [Host State, as]  to  do so, would render the 
protection of  the relevant agreement nugatory. (Emphasis added). 
Indeed,  the  outcome of the  domestic  process  may itself give  rise  to  possible further 
claims under the treaty. Thus, the exclusion of international proceedings under the fork-
128 UNCTAD Series ofInternational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7, 20 
129 Enron and Ponderosa Assets v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/OI13, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004 (United States/ Argentina BIT); see also Schreuer, C, 'Travelling the BIT 
route: of  Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road' (2004) Journal a/World  Investment 
and Trade, Vol. 5, No.2, 231-256 
130 UNCTAD Series ofInternational Investment Policies for Development, above n 7, 21 
105 in-the-road clause appears to be consistent with the protective purpose of  the treaty only 
in cases of  full identity of  issues and parties. 
VIII. Direct claims by investors 
It is  noteworthy that the introduction and establishment of the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and its Rules for international commercial 
arbitration  I3l  gave  investors  an  additional  and  also  a  very  significant  measure  of 
protection. It allowed investors to bring their claims, regarding violations of  international 
law,  before  international tribunals  directly,  i.e.  without having  recourse  to  diplomatic 
protection. 
The  ICSID  was  established  to  hear  "any  legal  dispute  arising  directly  out  of an 
investment, between a Contracting State ... and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.,,132 Under the 
ICSID Convention, the investor's direct claim against the Host State was to be exclusive 
of any other remedy,133  and an investor's home  State was  precluded  from  exercising 
diplomatic protection with respect to disputes submitted to ICSID. 134 
Under  ICSID  Convention,  investors  were  generally  not  required  to  exhaust  local 
remedies  before  bringing  their  claims  to  arbitration,  although  States  were  permitted, 
131  Dodge, W S, 'Investor - State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflection on the 
Australia - United Stated Free Trade Agreement' (2006) Venderbilt Journal on Transnational Law, Vol. 
39, No.1, 8 Electronic <http://www.uchastings.edulfaculty-administrationlfaculty/dodge/class-
website/docs/publications/ausfta.pdt> (3 September 2008). Also see, Lauterpacht, H, 'The Subjects of  the 
Law of  Nations , (1947) 63 L.Q. Rev, 438, 454 
132 Convention o/Settlement o/Investment Disputes between States and  Nationals o/Other States 1965 (14 
October 1966»  <http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlbasicdoc-archive/9.htm> (20 August 2007) (Washington 
Convention or ICSID Convention), Article 25 
133 ICSID Convention, above n 74, article 26 
134 ICSID Convention, above n 74, article 27(1) ("No contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or 
bring an international claim, in respect of  a dispute which one of  its nationals and another Contracting State 
shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such 
other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.") 
106 under Article 26 of the ICSID, to require exhaustion as a condition of their consent to 
arbitration. 135 
A waiver of the local remedies rule served as a particular attraction to investors for a 
simple reason: "A foreign investor (justifiable in many instances) did not have confidence 
in the impartiality of  the local courts and tribunals in settling any disputes that may arise 
between him or her and the Host State" (emphasis added).136 Providing investors with a 
more  reliable  remedy,  such  as  award  of an international  tribunal,  meant  additional 
security and thereby "a larger flow of  private international investment.,,137 
Another great advantage of the ICSID arbitrations is that the arbitral procedure provided 
by ICSID offers considerable advantages to all parties concerned. As stated by Professor 
Schreuer: 
[TJhe foreign investor no longer depends on the uncertainties of diplomatic protection but 
obtains  direct  access  to  an  international  remedy.  The  dispute  settlement  process  is, 
[thereby], depoliticized and subjected to objective legal criteria  .... In tum the Host State by 
consenting to  ICSID arbitration  obtains the assurance that it will not be  exposed to  an 
international claim by the investor's home State. 138 (Emphasis added). 
When the ICSID Convention was drafted, it was expected that Host States would consent 
to ICSID jurisdiction either through direct agreements with investors or through domestic 
legislation.
139 However such consent is found to be more commonly provided for in the 
investment  treaties.  For  example,  Article  26(4)  of the  1994  Energy  Charter  Treaty 
135 ICSID Convention, above n 74, article 26 ("A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of  local 
administrative or  judicial remedies as a condition of  its consent to arbitration under this Convention"). The 
only contracting State to have done so by notification to ICSID was Israel, which later withdrew this 
condition. A few other countries require exhaustion oflocal remedies in some of  their BITs consenting to 
ICSID jurisdiction. See Schreuer, C, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 392 
136 See Schreuer, above n 77, 391  ("Rightly or wrongly, the national courts of  one of  the disputing parties 
are not perceived sufficiently impartial") 
137 Report of  Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes between 
States and National of  Other States  (18 March 1965) 4 I.L.M. 524,525 
138 See Schreuer, above n 77,210-21 
139 See Schreuer, above n 77, 194-210 
107 provides for  direct claims by investors with ICSID  arbitration as  one of the available 
options. 
In conclusion, the possibility of  investors to bring their claims directly to an international 
dispute resolution centre for settlement undoubtedly provided an added dimension to the 
development  of international  trade  and  investment.  Not  only  did  it  depoliticise  the 
settlement  of investment  disputes  and  allowed  the  home  State  to  remain  neutral  in 
disputes between their nationals and other States,  it also  provided investors with extra 
security and, as  a result, encouraged parties to  continue international trade and increase 
the flows of  foreign direct investment. 
IX.  Protection offered by the recognition and enforcement of international 
arbitral awards 
The existence of a system where foreign arbitral awards,  once rendered,  can be easily 
recognised, enforced and executed is yet another type of remedy available to investors 
under  international  investment  protection  law.  This  system  was  launched  by  the 
introduction ofthe New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign 
Arbitral Awards of 1958.
140 Article III of  this Convention reads as follows: 
Each  Contracting  State  shall  recognise  [international]  arbitral  awards  as  binding  and 
enforce them in accordance with the rules of  procedure of  the territory where the award is . 
relied upon, under the conditions laid down [in the Articles of  this Convention]. (Emphasis 
added). 
This system of recognition of foreign arbitral awards provides investors with additional 
security regarding their investments and as  such facilitates their willingness to  conduct 
business on an international scale. As noted by Professors Moens and Gillies, the New 
York Convention is currently the main vehicle for the recognition and enforcement of 
140 Convention on the Recognition and  Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdfJenglish/textsiarbitrationlNY  -convlXXIC  1_  e.pdt> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention), Article III 
108 international arbitral awards.
141  As to the effect rendered by this Convention, Professors 
Moens and Gillies note
142 that: 
The recognition and enforcement regime provided for in  the Convention aims to provide 
straightforward  and  effective  procedures  for  the  enforcement  of international  arbitral 
awards.  It  aims  to  promote  uniformity  in  the  principles  and  processes  applying  to 
enforcement,  irrespective  of the  country  in  which  enforcement  is  sought.  [ ...  ]  The 
Convention intends that the arbitral award be final and not subject to review by the courts 
in the country of recognition and enforcement. This, after all, is what the parties are taken 
to  have  intended  in  subscribing  to  an  arbitral  agreement.  Accordingly,  the  Convention 
limits the grounds that a party resisting enforcement can plead, although it does not entirely 
preclude judicial review.  There  is  no general provision in  the  Convention  for  a general 
review of  the award on the merits, by a court in the country where enforcement is sought. 
In other words, recognition of  an arbitral award is the official confirmation that the award 
is authentic. Hence, it has two possible effects: first, confirmation of the award as final 
and binding, and second, recognition that it is enforceable. The recognition of an award 
has the effect of rendering it res judicata in the country concerned. This means that the 
claim on which the award was  decided must not be the subject of another proceeding 
before a  domestic court or arbitral tribunal,  and that the  rendered  award  is  final  and 
conclusive.  143 
After the collapse of  the Soviet Union, that signed and ratified the New York Convention, 
the Russian Federation declared itself its  successor.  Thus Russia's official declarations 
that it would continue to exercise rights and honour obligations arising from international 
treaties signed by the Soviet Union meant that it is now assumed that Russia is bound by 
all  international  acts  that were  signed  by  the  Soviet Union,  including  the  New  York 
Convention.  In other words, the courts of the Russian Federation, as  the law presently 
stands, ought to comply with the provisions of  the New York Convention. 
141 Moens, Gabriel & Gillies, Peter, International Trade & Business: Law, Policy and Ethics, 2
nd ed 
(London: Routledge Cavendish, 2006), 591. ("The Convention has been ratified by more than 130 
countries, including all ofthe major trading nations") 
142Id 
143  'Dispute Settlement: Binding Force and Enforcement' UNCTAD, United Nations (2003) 
<http://www.unctad.orglenldocs/edmmisc232add8_en.pdf> (3 September 2008),12 
109 Russian domestic law regarding international arbitration, The  RF Arbitrazh Procedural 
Code of 24 July 2002 (No.  95-P3), by and large repeats the provisions of  the New York 
Convention. It states, in Article  148(5), that international arbitral awards are entitled to 
recognition and enforcement, subject to very few exceptions, namely where: 
(1) the agreement to arbitrate is not valid (Article VO) of  the New York Convention); 
(2) the  subject matter is  incapable of being settled by arbitration (Article V(2)(a) of the 
New York Convention); and 
(3) the recognition and enforcement of  the award would be contrary to the public policy of 
the Host State (Article V(2)(b) of  the New York Convention). 
To be more precise, Article 148(5) reads as follows: 
The  Arbitrazh  Court shall  leave  a  statement of claim  without  consideration if,  [ ...  ],  it 
establishes that there exists an agreement between the  parties [to submit their disputes to 
arbitration],  [and none  of the  parties],  at frrst  available opportunity,  [filed]  an  objection 
with respect to the consideration of the case in the Arbitrazh Court, with the exception of 
the cases where the Arbitrazh Court establishes that this agreement is  invalid, inoperative 
or cannot be executed. (Emphasis added). 
It should be noted that none of these exceptions permit local courts in Russia to review 
foreign arbitral awards on the merits. 
In summary, one of the undisputed advantages of an arbitral award is that it is final and 
binding when rendered.  Such an outcome allows not only for much desired stability in 
international  trading  relations  but also  provides  an  additional  measure  of security to 
investors  who  will,  arguably,  be  more  willing  to  invest  their  capital  in  a  foreign 
jurisdiction had they  been provided with an assurance  that  their  dispute  will  not be 
subjected to constant interference by various courts and State organs and that they can 
gain the benefit of  a system where the aggrieved party can obtain his or her rewards. 
110 c.  Protection  of  foreign  investment  under  customary 
international law 
I. An obligation to provide a minimum standard of  treatment 
The totality of obligations that a Host State owes a foreign  investor, as it was put by 
Professor Salacuse, is referred to as the "treatment" which the State owes to the investor 
or investment.
l44 The international minimum standard of treatment (MST) is a norm of 
customary international  law which governs the treatment of aliens  by providing for a 
minimum  set of principles  which  States,  regardless  of their domestic  legislation  and 
practices,  must respect when dealing with foreign  nationals and their property.145  The 
international minimum standard sets a number of  basic rights established by international 
law that States must grant to aliens, independent of the treatment afforded to their own 
citizens.  Violation  of this  norm  triggers  international  responsibility  and,  potentially, 
opens the way for international action on behalf of  the injured alien.146 
The MST principle was tied to the international law doctrine of State responsibility for 
injuries to aliens,147 which provides that an injury caused to an alien was an injury done 
to the alien's home State, and permitted claims and protection by the home State when 
domestic resources were unavailable or exhausted.148 
During the XX
th  century, an international custom providing for a minimum standard of 
treatment  evolved  in  parallel  with  the  conclusion  of  various  investment  treaties 
establishing distinct legal regimes for the protection of  foreign investment. 
144 Salacuse, J W, Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Searchfor a Grand Bargain, 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law, vol 19 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 64 
145 Roth, A H, The Minimum Standard of  International Law Applied  to Aliens (Leiden, 1949), 127 
146 Id 
147 Charzow Factory Case [1928] PCIJ Rpts Ser. A, No. 17; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case 
[1929] PCIJ Rpts Ser. A, No.2 
148 Orellana, M, 'International Law on Investment: The Minimum Standard of  Treatment' (August 2003) 
Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL), 1 
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111 Despite the  complexities of early cases in the context of customary international law, 
States continue to owe their investors the general minimum standard of  treatment, which 
includes:  "fair  and  equitable"  treatment,  "most-favoured-nation"  treatment,  and 
"national" (or "non-discrimination") treatment. The nature and content of these treatment 
measures were explained in the beginning of  this chapter. 
II. Distinction between treaty protection and customary law protection 
It is true to say that the minimum standard of protection under both the treaty law and 
customary  international  law is  quite  similar,  in that the  Host  State  generally  owes  a 
foreign investor an obligation, first, to ensure that a foreign investor is treated in the same 
manner as  any  domestic  investor  (i.e.  the  Host  State must comply with the  national 
treatment provisions). Second, to ensure that the foreign investor is not treated in a less 
favourable manner than any other foreign investor (i.e. the Host State must comply with 
the  most-favoured-nation  principle).  And  finally  the  Host  State  must  ensure  that  the 
foreign investor is provided with fair and equitable treatment (in accordance with the 
provisions of  international law, including case law). 
The distinction between the two levels of protection, however, is substantial in that the 
protection provisions offered by treaty law can only be relied upon when, first, there is an 
investment treaty between the Host State and the investor's home State, and second, this 
investment  treaty  contains  the  above-mentioned  protection  provisions.  By  way  of 
example it is worth noting that there is no bilateral investment agreement between the 
Russian  Federation  and  Australia.  This  means  that  unless  there  is  any  multilateral 
investment treaty  to  which  both the  Russian  Federation and  Australia  are  parties,  an 
Australian investor may not be in a position to rely upon the treaty protection provision. 
Hence,  the  provisions  of customary  international  law  on  the  protection  of foreign 
investment alone (i.e. MST protection provisions) may apply. 
112 D. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have highlighted the nature and significance of the two most important 
mechanisms for the protection of foreign investors offered by public international law. 
Namely,  I  discussed  some  of the  international  protection  provisions  offered  by  the 
modem treaty law and also those originated in customary law. 
In the  course of my discussions  in this  chapter  I came to  the  conclusion that public 
international  law is  capable  of safeguarding foreign  investors  from  some  of the most 
obvious detrimental acts of  the Host States. What must be kept in mind is that every Host 
State,  by  way  of its  sovereign  responsibilities,  has  an  obligation to  comply  with  its 
international undertakings.  Such international instruments, be they bilateral or,  indeed, 
multilateral,  oblige  their  member-States  to  protect  aliens  entering  their  respective 
territories.  The said protection extends to  non-discrimination among various aliens, as 
well  as  that among aliens and the State's own nationals, and also includes the fair and 
equitable  treatment  of investment  and  the  obligation  to  provide  aliens  and  their 
investment with the most constant protection and security. The same protection is also 
attributable to the minimum standard of treatment offered to investors under customary 
law. 
Another significant investment protection mechanism offered by the public international 
law  is  hidden  in  the  treaties'  dispute  resolution  provisions,  which  offer  investors 
additional security and peace of mind in case of a contemplated dispute with the Host 
State. Last but not least, the membership of  the Host State to the New York Convention is 
also considered to be a type of remedy. The New York Convention sets out a mechanism 
for  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of foreign  arbitral  awards  that  once  rendered, 
become binding and enforceable. 
113 Chapter Six 
Dealing with expropriation: conditions of legality & measures of 
protection 
A. Introduction 
In  the  previous  chapters  I  discussed  some  of the  most  widely  accepted  investment 
protection mechanisms available to foreign investors once they or their property enter the 
territory of the  Host State.  Those investment protection mechanisms dealt specifically 
with the issues of constantly changing internal legislation, double taxation and last but 
not least, overlapping legislative powers existing in certain Host States. In this chapter I 
will  explore another major obstacle for  foreign investors in the Russian energy sector, 
namely,  the  Host  State's  right  to  expropriate  or  nationalise  foreign  investment.  In 
developing this argument, I shall provide the reader with an overview of  the very concept 
of expropriation, and discuss some of the remedies and revenues available to investors 
following the occurrence of  expropriating actions made on behalf of  the Host State. 
B. The meaning of the concept of expropriation 
The  Host  State's  right  to  expropriate  is  widely  recognised  as  a  concept  of public 
international law.  Traditionally,  this  right has been regarded as  a discretionary power 
inherent within the sovereignty of each State, allowing the State to develop the welfare 
and economic progress of  the population residing within its territory.' 
1 See GA Resolution 626 (VII) on Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources (General 
Assembly, Seventh Session, 411th plenary meeting, 21  Decemberl952) 
<http://daccessdds.un.orgidocIRESOLUTION/GENINRO/079/69/IMGINRO07969.pdflOpenElement> (18 
114 Expropriation is commonly understood to refer to unilateral interference by the State with 
the  property  (or  comparable  rights)  of the  investor  whereby  the  State  deprives  that 
investor of the control of his or her propert~ by means of restrictions and infringements 
upon the entry of foreign  wealth into  the country, the  use  of foreign wealth, and the 
revenues produced from the investment of that wealth.3 Another similar concept is the 
concept of nationalisation  which denotes  the transfer  of an economic  activity  to  the 
public sector as part of a general program of social and economic reform. Both of these 
concepts will be discussed throughout this chapter under the heading of  expropriation. 
The  legal  evolution  of the  concept of permanent sovereignty  over  natural  resources 
(PSNR) and the debate surrounding its guiding principles have been seriously affected by 
conflicts  over  the  State's  right  to  nationalise  or  expropriate  foreign  property.  As 
mentioned in earlier chapters, sovereign States have a right to expropriate or nationalise 
foreign property provided they comply with certain conditions of legality, making such 
conduct acceptable. These conditions include the requirement that: first, such action was 
performed for public purpose; second, that it was done in a non-discriminatory manner, 
and  third,  that  the  expropriating  State  provided  the  injured  party  with  adequate 
compensation. 
In this chapter,  I will analyse,  first,  the  nature and origins of the right to  expropriate 
foreign  property,  and  the  form  it  generally  takes.  I  will  then  go  on to  consider  the 
conditions of legality for the act of  expropriation, including an obligation to pay adequate 
compensation.  Finally,  I  will  conclude  that  the  Host  State's  obligation  to  pay 
compensation  is  one  of the  most  effective  means  of international  legal  protection 
available to foreign investors under public international law. 
December 2006) ("the right of  people to [freely use and exploit] its natural resources ... is inherent in their 
sovereignty and is in accordance with the Purpose and Principles of  the Charter of  the United Nations") 
2 Amoco International Finance Crop v Iran, 15 Iran-U.S C.T.R. 189 (1987-III); Mobil Oil Iran, Inc v Iran 
(l987-IlI) 16 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 3 
3 Mendes, E P, 'The Canadian National Energy Program: An Example of  Assertion of  Economic 
Sovereignty or Creeping Expropriation in International Law' (1981) 14 Vand J.  Transnat'l L.  475,489-
501 
115 C. The nature and origin of the right to expropriate or nationalise 
foreign investment 
The right to expropriate or nationalise foreign investment, despite its controversial nature, 
is  inherent within  the  sovereignty of each State  and  was  recognised  even  before  the 
United  Nations  Resolutions  on  Permanent  Sovereignty  over Natural  Resources  were 
adopted.
4  This right  is  explicitly  included  in  some of the Resolutions  of the  General 
Assembly  (GA)5,  UNCTAD
6  and  also  in UNIDO  II's Lima Declaration.
7  Among the 
more general treaties, the Havana Charter attempted to acknowledge the States' right to 
nationalise. However, in its  attempt, it merely provided that Member States "have the 
right to prescribe and give effect on just terms to requirements as to the ownership of 
existing and future investments",8 a provision which had been interpreted to embrace the 
right to expropriate.
9 
More explicit, in terms of the language used, was the  1967 Draft OECD Convention on 
the Protection of  Foreign Property.lO Article 3 of  that Convention stated that: 
4 Gheirghe, E, The principle a/Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Leiden : Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 1-
45 
5 See, for example, 'GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' 
United Nations (14 December 1962) < http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm> (14 August 
2008); 'Charter of  Economic Rights and Duties of  States' United Nations (12 December 1974) 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GENINR0173 8/83/IMGINR073 883 .pdf?OpenElement> (3 
September 2008) 
6 'IDB Resolution 88 (XII)' UNCTAD (October 1972) 
<http://books.google.com.au/books?id=FQU5XCHQXLEC&pg=PA633&Ipg=PA633&dq=unctad+Resolut 
ion+88+(XII)&source=web&ots=07mTfFBR8a&sig=XerEeaz4Y  A2QD  _ KiXzpUocfGHcO&hl=en&sa=  X 
&oi=bookJesult&resnum=l&ct=result> (3 September 2008) 
7 'Lima Declaration II' UNIDG,  United Nations (26 March 1975) 
http://www.gwb.com.au/gwb/news/lima/un.html (3 August 2008)  paragraph 32 ("[E]very State has the 
inalienable right to exercise freely its sovereignty and permanent control over its natural resources, both 
terrestrial and marine, and over all economic activity for the exploitation of  these resources in the manner 
appropriate to its circumstances, including nationalisation in accordance with its laws as an expression of 
this right and that no State shall be subjected to any forms of  economic, political or other coercion which 
impedes the full and free exercise of  that inalienable right") 
g 'Havana Charter Treaty' United Nations (24 March 1948) 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.netlmisc/havana.pdf> (3 September 2008) 
9 Ibid. 
10 'Draft OECD Convention on the Protection of  Foreign Property' GECD (12 October 1967) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/39286571.pdf> (4 September 2008) 
116 No party shall take any measures depriving directly or indirectly, of  his property a national 
of  another Party unless [certain] conditions are complied with (Emphasis added). 
In addition to  the above,  most of the  bilateral  investment protection treaties  and  the 
investment  related  chapters  of multilateral  treaties  (such  as  NAFTA  and  ECT),  also 
recognise the right of a Host State to  expropriate foreign property, subject to  specific 
requirements of international law.
ll For example, Article 5 of  the 2002 Russia - Ukraine 
BIT, specified that: 
The investments or investors of  either Contracting Party, carried out on the territory of  the 
other  Contracting  Party,  shall  not  be  subject  to  expropriation,  nationalisation  or other 
measures, equated by its consequences to expropriation, with the exception of cases, when 
such  measures  are  not  of a  discriminatory  nature  and  entail  prompt  and  adequate 
compensation. 
Another example of  such a provision may be found in Article 13 of  the 1994 ECTY 
(1) Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting 
Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having 
effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation except where such expropriation is: 
(a) for a public purpose which is in the public interest; 
(b) not discriminatory; 
(c) carried out under due process of  law; and 
(d) accompanied by the payment of  prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
The  Chorzow  Factory  Case
l3  is  often  quoted  as  one  of the  first judgements which 
recognised a State's right to take foreign property.14 In another case concerning Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, the general rights of  States to nationalise foreign property was held 
11  These requirements will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
12 Energy Charter Treaty (1994) <http://www.encharter.orgifileadminJuser_uploadJdocumentlEN.pdt> (27 
July 2007) 
13  Chorzow Factory Case (1928) PCU Series A No. 17 (Merits) 
14 This case deals with liquidation and transfer of  assets of  enemy property pursuant to peace treaties. The 
Court recognized that there are may be certain exceptions to the principle of  respect for "vested rights", 
including "expropriation for reasons of  public utility, judicial liquidation and similar measures". 
117 to have become commonly recognised. IS  A further step was made in the Texaco  Case
16 
where it was pointed out that the right to nationalise should be regarded as the expression 
ofa State's territorial sovereignty. This opinion was upheld in the Liamco
l7 Award where 
Mahmassani stated that the right of  a State to nationalise its wealth and natural resources 
is a sovereign right. In the Amoco Award, the Chamber of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
recognised nationalisation as a "right fundamentally attributed to State sovereignty" and 
"commonly used as an important tool of  economic policy by many countries".  18 
The  recognition  of the  right  to  nationalise  in  general  is  also  referred  to  in the  ICC 
Guidelines;9 the  Draft UN  Code  of Conduct on  Trans-National  Corporations  (which 
acknowledges that "States have the right to nationalize or expropriate the assets of trans-
national corporations operating in their territories"),2o the ILA Seoul Declaration (where 
it is declared that "A State may, inter alia, nationalize and expropriate [ ...  ] the property, 
or  rights  in  property,  within  its  territory  and  jurisdiction,,)21  and  the  World  Bank 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Investment.22  For example,  in the  latter in is 
stated that: 
A  State  may  not  expropriate  or otherwise  take  in  whole  or  in  part a  foreign  private 
investment in its territory or take measures which have similar effects, except where it is 
done in accordance with applicable legal procedures. (Emphasis added). 
Overall, it may be stated that the  State's sovereign rights to  nationalise or expropriate 
foreign property to-date  is  a well  recognised concept of public international law.  And 
despite the fact that academic opinion on the modalities of the exercise of this right is 
15 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Preliminary objection), unreported; ICJ; Judgment of22 July 1952; (1952) 
I.e.J. Reports 109 
16  Texaco v Libya (1978) 17 ILM 59 
17 Liamco v Libya (1981) 20 ILM 120 
18  Amoco International Finance Crop v Iran, 15 Iran-U.S C.T.R. 189 (1987-III), 243 
19 ICC, Paris, Publ. No 272 (1973), section V.3.iv; also sited in Schrijver, Nino, Sovereignty over Natural 
Resrources : Balancign Rights and  Duties (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
20 UN Doc. £11990194,  12 June 1990, para. 55 
21  International Law Association, Seoul Declaration on the Progressive Development of  Principles of 
Public International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order (International Law Association, 
London, August 30, 1986), para. 5.5 (1986 Seoul Declaration) 
22 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of  Foreign Direct Investment (September 1992) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/WorldBank.pdf> (4 September 2008), section IV.l 
118 divided, this right,  without debate, is now considered to  be one of the attributes of the 
State's sovereignty which  it possesses  in relation to  all  persons  and things within its 
territorial jurisdiction. 
D. Forms of expropriation: direct versus indirect 
I. Direct expropriation 
Generally speaking, expropriation exists in two broad fonns: direct (de jure) and indirect 
(de facto). Direct expropriation constitutes a lawful act of  the State, and as such does not 
give rise to international responsibility, provided that it complies with the set conditions 
of legality.23 Every act that falls short of the compliance with these conditions is illegal 
and  as  a  result  may  trigger  international  responsibility.  A  good  illustration  of this 
principle  is  provided  in Campania  des  Desarrollo  de  Santa  Elena
24  case  where  the 
republic  of Costa  Rica  issued  a  decree  of expropriation  of foreign  undertakings  and 
proposed to pay compensation in accordance with an appraisal conducted by one of its 
agents. The plaintiff in this case did not object to expropriation, but rather challenged the 
amount of the proposed compensation, claiming that he  should be paid triple the sum 
proposed by the Costa Rican government.  What had to be identified in this case is the 
extent to  which the  measures  taken by the Host State had deprived the owner of the 
expropriated property of the nonnal control of his property. It was held that "[a] decree 
which heralds a process of administrative and judicial consideration  ... in a manner that 
effectively  freezes  the  possibility  for  the  owner  personally  to  exploit  the  economic 
potential of the property can be identified as the actual act of  taking,,25 which in itself is 
illegal. 
23 The three conditions of  legality referred to in this instance are: (i) public purpose, (ii) non-discrimination, 
and (iii) payment of  compensation. 
24 Compania des Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v Republic of  Costa Rica (2000) 39 I.L.M. 1317, 1329 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/961l, Award of 17 February 2000) 
25 Ibid. 
119 Another example of so-called  direct expropriation can  be  observed in the recent  law 
passed  by  the  government  of Bolivia.  In  particular,  on  1  May  2006,  the  Bolivian 
government passed the  Supreme Decree 28701, announcing that it was taking over oil 
and gas resources in the country.26 Similarly, in May 2006, the government of Ecuador 
has taken control of  over USD 1 billion of assets owned by the US-based Occidental, the 
largest  foreign  investors in Ecuador.
27  Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental) 
filed a request on 17 May 2006 for arbitration claiming USD 1 billion in damages under 
the Ecuador-U.S. bilateral investment treaty.  The request came two days after Ecuador 
unilaterally  cancelled  Occidental's  contracts  and  assumed  control  of its  oil  and  gas 
operations  in the  country.  As  a  result,  Occidental  claimed  that  the  cancellation  and 
additional  taxes  recently  imposed  on oil  revenues  amount  to  an  expropriation of its 
investment.28 
Overall, it can be stated that direct expropriation occurs when the government of  the Host 
State  publicly  announces  its  intention to  deprive  the  foreign  investor of its  property. 
Provided  that  such  "taking" of the  investors'  property  was  followed  by  prompt and 
adequate compensation, such activity on the part of  the Host State is not illegal and as a 
result,  it  does  not  invoke  the  State's  responsibility  under  the  auspices  of public 
intemationallaw. 
II. Indirect (Ilcreeping"  expropriation 
Indirect expropriation, likewise, is an activity of the government of the Host State that 
results in the deprivation of the wealth of an alien investor. Unlike direct expropriation, 
however, indirect expropriation is rarely accompanied by the payment of compensation. 
This is due to the fact that, arguably, it does not amount to expropriation, the taking of  the 
26 Cardona, C, 'United States: Will Recent Nationalisation in Bolivia Give Rise to Claims under Political 
Risk Insurance Policies?' Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 14 June 2006, para 1 
27 Occidental Petroleum Corporation & Occidental Exploration and  Production Company v.  The Republic 
of  Ecuador (17 May 2006) (Request for Arbitration) Electronic 
<http://www.oxy.comIPUBLICA  TIONSIPDF  lRequest%20fof'l1020Arbitration.pdt> (13 August 2006) 
28 Occidental Petroleum Corporation & Occidental Exploration and Production Company v.  The Republic 
of  Ecuador (17 May 2006) (Request for Arbitration) Electronic 
<http://www.oxy.comlPUBLICA  TIONSIPDFlRequest%20fof'l1020Arbitration.pdt> (13 August 2006) 
120 property  IS  not  direct  but  is  rather  achieved  through  other  means  (such  as  trade 
restrictions).  This type of expropriation is also commonly referred to as "disguised" or 
"creeping"  . 
By  and  large,  indirect  expropriation  is  generally  achieved  through  restrictions  and 
infringements upon: (i) the entry of  foreign wealth into the country, (ii) the use of  foreign 
wealth, and (iii) the revenues produced from the investment of that wealth.
29 Within the 
first category are situations in which the Host State prohibits the entry of foreign capital 
into certain sectors of  industry. The second category involves situations in which the Host 
State  decreases  the  use  of foreign  wealth by increasing public  sector  ownership  in a 
particular  industry  through  accelerating  taxation  regimes  and  exclusive  rights  and 
concessions.
3o Under the last category of  methods for achieving indirect expropriation of 
foreign  investment,  the  foreign  government  can  use  exorbitant  taxation  policies  for 
already existing contractual rights. 
In order to summarise the nature and effect of the concept of indirect expropriation it is 
appropriate  to  quote  Mr Highet,  an arbitrator in  Waste  Mgmt Inc.  v  United Mexican 
States/
1 who stated that: 
[A]  creeping  expropriation  is  comprised  of a  number  of elements  none  of which  can 
separately  constitute  the  international  wrong.  These  constituent  elements  include  non-
payment,  non-refurbishment,  cancellation,  denial  of judicial  access,  actual  practice  to 
exclude, non-conforming treatment, inconsistent legal blocks and so forth.  The "measure" 
at issue is the expropriation itself, and not merely a SUb-component part of expropriation. 
(Emphasis added). 
In other words, to confront the State with its action of  the illegal taking of  the property of 
another, and to subsequently penalise it for such action, one needs to show that an act of 
29 Mendes, E P, 'The Canadian National Energy Program: An Example of  Assertion of  Economic 
Sovereignty or Creeping Expropriation in International Law' (1981) 14 Vand. J  Transnat'/ L. 475,489-
501 
30 Id 
31  Waste Mgmt Inc. v United Mexican States (2001) 40 I.L.M. 56, 73 (lCSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, 
Award of2 June 2000) 
121 "creeping"  expropriation  has  in  fact  taken  place.  However,  an  act  of  indirect 
expropriation is more difficult to prove, and as a result, is more readily open to abuse by 
the governments of  Host States. 
E. The conditions of legality for the act of expropriation 
Obligations relating to the right to expropriate or nationalise foreign property, as they 
arise from, inter alia, GA Resolution 1803, are concerned with the following conditions 
of  legality:  (I)  public  purpose,  (II)  non-discrimination,  and  (III)  payment  of 
compensation. In other words, the Host State owes a foreign investor a set of  obligations 
that arise out of the former's right to expropriate or nationalise the latter's property in 
investment. Each of  these pre-conditions will now be discussed separately. 
I. Public purpose requirement 
The  public  purpose  requirement  is  derived  from  a  number  of  well-recognised 
international  sources,  among  which are the  1952  Protocol to  the  Convention for  the 
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which clearly stated that no one 
person shall be deprived of his or her possessions except in "the public interest",32 the 
1978 American Convention on Human Rights,33 where it is stated that "No one shall be 
deprived of  his property except upon payment of  just compensation, for reasons of  public 
utility or social interest, and in the cases according to the forms established by law", and 
the 1986 African Charter on Human and People's Rights34  which article  14  proclaims 
that "The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the 
32Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Paris, 20 
March 1952) as amended by Protocol No. II of 11 May 1994 which entered into force on 1 November 
1998, Article 1, < http://www.ena.lulprotocol-convention-protection-human-rights-fundamental-freedoms-
paris-march-1952-amended-version-020302545.html> (1  February 2009). 
33American Convention on Human Rights (18 July 1978), Article 21.2 
<http://www.oas.orgljuridico/Englishltreatieslb-32.html> (1 February 2009) 
34 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev. 
5,21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21,1986, Article 14 
http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrtsiinstree/zlafchar.htm (I February 2009) 
122 interest of  public need or in the general interest of  the community and in accordance with 
the provisions of  appropriate laws". 
Likewise, the GECD Draft Convention on the Protection of  Foreign Property of 1967/
5 
also states that it is legitimate and permissible to expropriate the investment in the "public 
interests".  Some  other  multilateral  investment  agreements  that  make  reference  to  a 
purpose which is in the "public interest" are the 1987 ASIAN  Investment Agreement/
6 the 
1994 ECr
7 and the 1992 NAFTA,38 to name just a few. 
With regards to the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), an overwhelming majority of 
them  also  provide  for  "public  purpose" causes.
39  For example,  Article  5 of the  1995 
Russia - Hungary BIT, in its relevant parts states that foreign investments shall not be 
nationalised or expropriated "except for a public purpose". Likewise, Article 4(1) of the 
2002  Russia  - Thailand  BIT also  provides  that  foreign  investments  shall  not  be 
nationalised or expropriated "except when such measures are taken for public interest in 
accordance with the procedures established by the law of  the Contracting Party". 
The public purpose requirement was subsequently invoked in a number of well-known 
nationalisation cases, among which are the Chorzow Factory Case,40 the Aminoil Case,41 
and the Amoco Case,42 in which the arbitral tribunal noted that: 
[a]  precise  definition  of the  public  purpose  for  which  expropriation  may  be  lawfully 
decided ... is a result of  the modem concept of  a right to nationalize the right which can be 
exercised by the State at its wide discretion". (Emphasis added).43 
35 'Draft OECD Convention on the Protection of  Foreign Property' DECD (12 October 1967), article 3.i 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/39286571.pdt> (4 September 2008) 
36 Framework Agreement on the ASIAN Investment Area (15 December 1995) article VI. 1 
<http://www.aseansec.org/6466.htm> (20 August 2007) (ASIAN Investment Agreement), Article 13 
37 Energy Charter Treaty (1 April 1994) Article lO(l)(a) <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=28> (14 
August 2008) 
38 North American Free Trade Agreement (1  January 1994) article 11 10. 1  (a) <http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.calnafta-alenalmenu-en.asp> (20 August 2007) (NAFT  A) 
39 Higgins, R, 'The Taking of  Property by the State' (1982) Recueil des Cours (1 982-III), 176,263-391 
40 Chorzow Factory Case (1928) PCIJ (Series A, no.  17), 48 
41  Kuwait v Aminoil (1982) 21  ILM, 1019-20 
42 Amoco International Finance Crop v Iran (1987) 15 Iran-U.S C.T.R. 189 (1987-III) 
123 In conclusion it may be stated that a nationalising State has wide discretion to utilise its 
right  to  expropriate  foreign  property,  provided  that  such  an  act  serves  legitimate 
purposes, in this instance - public interest, public utility and national security. 
II. Non-discrimination requirement 
The  second  pre-condition  that  a  sovereIgn  State  must  comply  with  when  making  a 
decision to expropriate foreign property is that such expropriation is conducted in a non-
discriminatory manner.44  Some of the  multilateral  treaties that make reference to  this 
condition include NAFTA45  and the  ECT,46  both of which stipulate that expropriation 
should be "without discrimination". 
Most  BITs  also  provide  explicitly  for  non-discriminatory  treatment.  The  general 
"treatment clause" in the majority of  modem BITs reads as follows: 
Foreign investors shall enjoy treatment no less favourable than that accorded to nationals of 
the Host State.
47 
In order to  illustrate this  statement,  I  shall  cite  a  number of Russian  BITs  (as  their 
provisions are most relevant for the purpose of this thesis). In particular, Article 3 of the 
1997 Russia - Cyprus BIT relevantly states that: 
43 It  must be noted that the terms "public purpose", "public utility and security", and "national interests" 
can be interpreted widely and as a result, are subject to much stipulation, judicial interpretation and 
possibly abuse. The issue ofthe abuse of  interpretation ofthese terms, however, falls outside of  the scope 
of  this thesis. For further information on this topic please see Higgins, R. The Taking of  Property by the 
State: Recent Developments in International Law (Hague Academy Recueil des Cours, 1982-III), voL  176, 
pp. 263-39; and Moinuddin, H, The Charter of  the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of  Economic 
Co-operation Among its Member States (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1987) 
44 In this instance, the discrimination refers to both discrimination between foreigners and nationals, and 
discrimination among foreigners. 
45 North American Free Trade Agreement (1  January 1994) <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.calnafia-
alenalmenu-en.asp> (20 August 2007) (NAFTA), Article 1110 
46 Energy Charter Treaty (1994) <http://www.ena.ltlpdfaiiTreaty.pdt> (20 August 2007) (1994 ECT 
treaty), Article 13(I)(b) 
47 Peters, P, 'Recent Developments in Expropriation Clauses of  Asian Investment Treaties' (1995) Asian 
Yearbook of  International Law, vol. 5, pp. 45-109 
124 Each Contracting party shall ensure in its territory for the investment made by investors of 
the other Contracting Party and for the activities in connection with such investments, fair 
and equitable treatment which would exclude the use of  discriminatory measures that might 
hinder  management,  maintenance,  use,  enjoyment  or  disposal  of  the  investments. 
(Emphasis added). 
Likewise, Article 3(1) ofthe 1991 Russia - France BIT  provides that: 
Chacune des Parties contractantes s'engage it assurer,  sur son territoire et dans  sa zone 
maritime,  un  traitement  juste  at  equilable,  conformement  aux  principes  du  Droit 
international,  aux  investissement  effectues  par  les  investisseurs  de  l'autre  Partie 
contractante,  excluant  toule  mesure  irifuste  ou  discriminatoire  qui  pourrait  entraver  la 
gestion,  l'entretien,  la  joussance  ou  la  liquidation  de  ces  investissements.  (Emphasis 
added). 
In effect, the language of Article 3(1) of  Russia - France BIT, is mirrored in Article 3(1) 
of  Russia - Egypt BIT of 1997, where it is also pronounced that: 
Each Contracting Party shall provide on its territory a just and equitable regime for capital 
investment, carried out by the investor of the other Contracting Party, and for the activity 
involved  in  making  such  capital  investment,  this  regime  shall  exclude  discriminatory 
measures, which could have  interfered with the management and disposal of the capital 
investment. (Emphasis added). 
In fact, all 52 ofthe Russian BITs include conditions to the same effect.
48 
With regard to the case law, several well-known arbitral awards refer explicitly to  the 
prohibition of discrimination. Among these are Amoco Award where it was stated that 
"[i]n the field of expropriation, discrimination is  widely held as prohibited" (emphasis 
added);  49 and the BP Case
50  in which it was also found that arbitrary or discriminatory 
expropriation violates the norms and principles of  public international law, and as such is 
48 An entire list of  all Russian BITs can be found online at 
<http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779 >. (27 July 2007) 
49 Amoco International Finance Crop v Iran, 15 Iran-U.S C.T.R. 189 (1987-III) 
50 BP v Libya (1979) 53 ILR 297 
125 absolutely  unacceptable.  In  summary  it  can  be  asserted  that  the  prohibition  of 
discrimination has formed  a well-established condition of legality for  expropriation or 
nationalisation.
51 
III. Payment of  compensation requirement 
The  final  obligation that ought to  be  complied  with  by the  State  is  that  it must pay 
compensation in the case of  nationalisation or expropriation. This requirement originates 
from customary intemationallaw. It is also spelled out in most of  the UN Resolutions on 
PSNR/
2 and in particular, such an obligation can be found in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution  1803  on  Permanent  Sovereignty  over Natural  Resources,  adopted  on  14 
September 1962,53 in which it was stated that: 
[N]ationalisation, expropriation ... shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, 
security or the national interests, which are recognized as overriding purely individual or 
private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases [when it occurs] the owner shall 
be paid appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking 
such measures in the exercise of  its sovereignty and in accordance with international law  . 
The Treaty law also recognised the obligation to  pay compensation.  54  Such obligation 
exists  in virtually  all  MITs  and  BITs  that  are  to  be  found  in  existence  to-date.  For 
example, Article VI of  the 1997 Russia - Turkey BIT expressly stipulates that:
55 
51 Mouri, A, The International Law of  Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of  the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, 1994). However, not all discrimination is prohibited. For example, 
in the Aminoil Case, the Tribunal found that "nationalizing one company but not the other did not violate 
international law" (See Kuwait v Aminoil (1982) 21  ILM, 1019-20) 
52 For example, see 'GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' 
United Nations (14 December 1962) < http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm> (14 August 
2008). It could also be argued that each reference in UN Resolutions to "obligations arising out of 
international law" implies compulsory payment of  compensation. 
53  'GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803 (XVII)' United Nations (14 
December 1962) < http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/instree/c2psnr.htm> (14 August 2008) 
54For example, see Energy Charter Treaty (1994) <http://www.ena.ltlpdfaiiTreaty.pdt> (20 August 2007) 
(1994 ECT treaty), Article 13 
55 Agreement between the Government of  the Russian Federation and the Government of  the Republic of 
Turkey Regarding the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment (15 December 1997) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocsibits/russia  _  turkey. pdt> (7 July 2009) 
126 Investments of one Contracting Party made in the territory of the other  ...  shall not be 
expropriated...  except when such measures are  .,.  accompanied by payment of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. (Emphasis added). 
The same provision can also be found,  inter alia, in Article 4(1) of Russia - Thailand 
BIT, Article 4 of  Russia - Cyprus BIT, Article 5(1) of  Russia - UK BIT, Article 13(1)(d) 
of  the 1994 ECT, etcetera. 
In arbitral awards, reference to the payment of compensation can be found, inter alia, in 
the  Chorzow  Factory  Case,56  the  Polish  Upper  Silesia  Case,S7  the  Mavrommatis 
Jerusalem Concessions Case,58 BP,59 Liamco6o and Aminoi?! cases where it was decided 
that the lack of  compensation amounted to confiscatory takings.
62 In the awards delivered 
by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the obligation to compensate foreign investors in cases 
where  property  was  expropriated  by  the  Host  State  is  similarly  recognised.  More 
specifically, the Tribunal in American International Group Inc.  v Iran  (1983)63  clearly 
stated that: 
[I]t is a principle of  public international law that even in a case of lawful nationalization, 
the former owner of  the nationalized property is normally entitled to compensation for the 
value of  the property taken. (Emphasis added). 
Likewise,  in  its  1994  Award  In  the  Ebrahimi  Case,64  the  Tribunal  armounced  that 
international  law  undoubtedly  sets  forth  an  obligation  to  provide  compensation  for 
property taken by the State. In particular the Tribunal stated that: 
56Chorzow Factory Case (1928) PCIJ (Series A, no. 17), 48 
57 German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia Case (1926) PCIJ (Series A, no. 7), 32 
58 Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions Case (1925) PCIJ (Series A, no. 5), 51 
59 BP v Libya (1979) 53 ILR 297 
6°Liamco v Libya (1982) 20 ILM 53 (Liamco case) 
61Kuwait v the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) (1982) 21  ILM 976 (Aminoil case) 
62In the latter case the Tribunal was particularly aware of  the need to maintain trust and stability for foreign 
investors and pointed out that the need for a continuous flow of  private capital called for nationalizing 
States to approach compensation issues is a manner which "should not be such as to render foreign 
investment useless, economically" (See Kuwait v the American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil) (1982) 
21 ILM 1033) 
63 American International Group Inc.  v Iran (1983) 4 Iran-US CTR 105(AIG Award) 
64 Ebrahimi v. Iran, 30 Iran-U.S. CTR 170 (1994), para. 88 
127 The Tribunal believes that, while international law undoubtedly sets forth an obligation to 
provide  compensation  for  property taken,  international  law  theory  and  practice  do  not 
support the  conclusion that the  'prompt,  adequate  and effective'  standard represents the 
prevailing standard of compensation [ ...  J.  Rather, customary international law favours an 
'appropriate' compensation standard [  ...  ]. 
The ICC Guidelines, the Draft UN Code of Conduct on mcs, the ILA Seoul Declaration 
and the  World Bank Guidelines,  all  require  payment of compensation in the event of 
expropriation or nationalisation.  Consequently, there is no  doubt that the obligation to 
pay compensation, as one of  the main principles of  public intemationallaw, is no longer 
challenged. What is challenged in this regard is the standard of such compensation, or in 
other words,  what amount of compensation is  appropriate  and  when such an amount 
should be made payable. These issues are discussed below. 
1.  Standard of  Compensation 
The issue of what standard of compensation in cases of expropriation is required, is in 
constant dispute between the developed and developing countries. The former, on the one 
hand,  suggest  that  the  compensation  should  be  "prompt,  adequate  and  effective",  a 
standard  widely  know  as  the  "triple  standard".65  The  latter,  on the  other hand,  have 
consistently denied the existence of any strict standard in this regard, by indicating their 
inclinations  to  adhere  to  the  doctrines  of "unjust  enrichment",  "excess  profits"  and 
"capacity to pay". 
Despite this continuing debate, very few multilateral treaties address the question of the 
compensation standard. One of these instruments is the OECD Draft Convention on the 
Protection of  Foreign Property66 which maintains that payment for expropriation should 
be "prompt" or "without delay". On the same topic the ASEAN Agreement67  referred to 
the  payment  as  being  "without  unreasonable  delay",  while  the  ECT provides  for 
65 The so-called Hull formula. 
66 'Draft OECD Convention on the Protection of  Foreign Property' OEeD (12 October 1967) 
<http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/35/4/39286571.pdf> (4 September 2008) 
67  k  Framewor  Agreement on the ASEAN  Investment Area (15 December 1995) 
<http://www.aseansec.orgl6466.htm> (20 August 2007) (ASEAN Investment Agreement) 
128 expropriation to be accompanied by the payment of "prompt compensation".68 Most of 
the  Russian  BITs  provide  for  payable  compensation  to  be  "prompt,  adequate  and 
effective".69  None  of these  instruments,  however,  clearly  specify  what  is  meant  by 
"prompt", "adequate" or "effective", leaving the interpretation of these definitions in the 
hands of  the judges and arbitrators. 
2. Amount of  compensation 
As  to  the  amount  of compensation,  most  of the  above  treaties  make  references  to 
"equitable"  or "adequate"  compensation,70  while  some  others  lean  towards  "prompt, 
adequate and effective".71 
Most of the BITs entertain a more  flexible  version of this  standard, namely that such 
compensation is "adequate" or is given "without delay" or "without undue delay".  The 
Russian BITs, by way of example, generally require compensation to be "without delay 
(  or prompt), adequate and effective".  72 
With regard to decisions of international  courts  and tribunals,  reference can again be 
made to the frequently quoted Chorzow Factory case, 73  where the tribunal came to the 
68 Article 13. I (d). It  must be noted that no specification of  the term "prompt" is given. 
69 For example, see Agreement between the Government of  the Russian Federation and the Government of 
the Republic of  Cyprus Regarding the Promotion and Mutual Protection of  Investment (II April 1997), 
Article 4 <http://www.unctadxi.org/templateslDocSearch.aspx?id=779 (5 February 2009); Agreement 
between the Government of  the Kingdom of  Thailand and the Government of  the Russian Federationfor the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of  Investment (October 2002) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/russia  thailand.pdt> (1  September 2008) Article 4(1)  m  -
For example, Framework Agreement on the ASEAN  Investment Area (15 December 1995) 
<http://www.aseansec.org/6466.htm> (20 August 2007) (ASEAN Investment Agreement) embodies the 
concept of  "adequate compensation" 
71  See North American Free Trade Agreement (1 January 1994) <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.calnafta-
alenalmenu-en.asp> (20 August 2007) (NAFTA), Article 1110.2-6; Energy Charter Treaty (1994) 
<http://www.ena.1t1pdfaiiTreaty.pdt> (20 August 2007) (1994 ECT treaty), Article 13(1) 
72 For example, see Agreement between the Government of  the Russian Federation and the Government of 
the Republic of  Cyprus Regarding the Promotion and  Mutual Protection of  Investment (11 April 1997), 
Article 4 <http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779 (5 February 2009); Agreement 
between the Government of  the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of  Ministers of  the Ukraine on the 
Encouragement and  Mutual Protection of  Investment (28 November 1998) 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/russia_ukrain.pdf> (1  September 2008) Article 5(1) 
73 Chorzow Factory Case (1928) PCB Series A No. 17,48 
129 decision  that the  event of expropriation should  be  followed  by  'Just compensation". 
Indeed, to be more precise, the tribunal in that case stated that: 
[T]he  disposition of an  industrial  undertaking  ...  involves  the  obligation to  restore  the 
undertaking and, if it is not possible, to pay its value at the time of indemnification, which 
value is designed to take the place of  restitution which has become impossible. (Emphasis 
added). 
A similar decision was made in the Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration, 74 where 
it was held that the government of the United States of America, which expropriated a 
certain alien property for  the purposes of a  war,  ought to pay "just compensation  ... 
taking into account the actual value of  the expropriated property as well as circumstances 
surrounding the matter" (emphasis added). The concept of  equitable compensation is also 
supported by a number of  other cases including BP, Aminoil and Liamco awards.
75 
As to the amount of compensation, most of the above decisions leaned towards "full 
compensation", representing the  full  equivalent of the property taken.  It was said that 
such a degree of  compensation was required under both customary international law, and 
the 1955  Treaty of  Amity,76  and that such compensation had to be equal to the "going 
concern" value of  the property taken, including not only physical and financial assets but 
also intangible assets such as goodwill and future profits.?? 
Despite  the  outcome  of these  decisions,  the  issue  of the  standard  and  amount  of 
compensation  is  still  not  fully  resolved,  which  is  highlighted  by the  divide  in both 
academic  and scholarly  opinion on this matter.  Such a  position  is  also  supported  by 
74 Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration (1923) 17 AJIL 362 
75 In general, in all of  these cases, in determining what appropriate compensation amounted to it was 
decided that enquiry into all circumstances of  a particular case, including a question of  what would be a 
reasonable return from the investment and the value of  the investment, were necessary. (See Kuwait v the 
American Independent Oil Company (Aminoi/) (1982) 21  ILM 976 (Aminoil case); BP v Libya (1979) 53 
ILR297; Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v Libya (1981); 20 ILM 1-87 (Liamco case» 
76 Treaty of  Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of  America and 
Iran (15 August 1955) < http://www.parstimes.comllaw/iran_us_treaty.html> (5 February 2009) (1955 
Amity Treaty) 
77 BP v Libya (1979) 53 ILR 297 (BP case), Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v Libya (1981) 20 
ILM 1-87 (Liamco case) 
130 Schwarzenberger78  who observed that "prompt compensation does not necessarily mean 
immediate  compensation"  but  means  compensation  after  a  reasonable  interval  of 
discussions on all relevant aspects of  expropriation.79 The Wodd Bank Guidelines stretch 
this standard even further by stipulating that for compensation to be  "without delay" it 
had to be given within "five years from the time of  the taking".  80 
In conclusion, the principle that a sovereign State must pay compensation for the taking 
of foreign  property  has  become  fully  recognised  and  accepted  by  the  international 
community despite the difference of academic and judicial opinion with respect to the 
standard and mode of  payment. 
F. Conclusion 
The principle that States should respect the property of  citizens of  other States has gained 
wide  recognition as  part of customary international law,  at  least to  the extent that the 
expropriating State has a duty to compensate foreign owners in cases of expropriation.81 
The prevailing view in this regard is that the expropriating State must pay compensation, 
varying from "reasonable" to the "full and just" and "adequate, effective and prompt".82 
An obligation to  pay  compensation is,  no  doubt,  one  of the most effective means of 
international legal protection available to investors. This obligation is owed by the Host 
States  under  both  customary  law  and  modern  treaty  law.  It is  appropriate  to  note, 
however, that UN Resolutions are not binding under international law,  and as a result, 
they do not describe the present state of  international law on state responsibility regarding 
78 Schwarzenberger, G, International Law as Applied  by International Courts and Tribunals, 3
rd ed 
(London, 1957) 243 
79 Id 
80  World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment 0/  Foreign Direct Investment (September 1992) 
<http://ita.law.uvic.caJdocuments/WorldBank.pdf> (4 September 2008), section IV.8 
81  Brownlie, Principles o/Public International Law 5
th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),535 
82 The Hull formula 
131 foreign investment.83 Another general problem of  investment protection under customary 
international law is that an investor (being a private body)  is  not a  subject of public 
international law. Its standing (locus standi) in proceedings with the sovereign Host State 
depends upon its access to jurisdiction and arbitration provided by a treaty law or state 
law. Customary international law does not provide for such standing.  84 
Both of  these shortcomings, as noted by Professor Horn,85 have now been addressed with 
the existence and proliferation of  international investment treaties. Investment treaties, in 
their unique way, have opened the door to international arbitration or adjudication. Part 
of the  solution  was  a  new type  of multilateral  investment  treaty  that  served  as  the 
procedural  protection  of foreign  investment  and  gave  the  investor  a  locus  standi  in 
arbitration with the Host State in case of an investment dispute. The most significant of 
these treaties were: the  1965 International Convention for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID),86 the  1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),87 and 
the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).88 
In summary it can be stated that State obligations to compensate foreign investors for the 
losses sustained by the latter as a result of the actions of expropriation or nationalisation 
made by (or on behalf  of) the Host State, under customary international law and under the 
treaty  law,  serve  as an additional  warranty  to  investors,  especially since  the  private 
investor has been granted locus standi in public international law. 
83  Hom, N, 'Arbitration and the Protection of  Foreign Investment: Concepts and Means' in Arbitrating 
Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and  Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 19 Studies in 
Transnational Economic Law, 9 
84 Id 
85 Id 
86 Schreuer, C, The ICSID-Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
64 
87 Eklund, 'A Primer on the Arbitration ofNAFTA Chapter 11  Investor-State Disputes' (1994) 11(4) 
Journal of  International Arbitration 135 
88 Waelde, 'Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty - From Disputes Settlement to Treaty 
Implementation' (1996) 12 Arbitration International 429 
132 Chapter Seven 
Investment protection provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty 
A. Introduction 
In recent years there has been increased recourse to the investment protection provisions 
and  dispute  settlement  mechanisms  of the  1994  Energy  Charter  Treaty  (ECT).  The 
reason  for  this  is  the  wide  recognition,  between exporters  and  importers  of oil,  that 
multilateral  rules  are  able  to  provide  a  more  balanced  and  efficient  framework  for 
international  cooperation  than  is  offered  by  bilateral  agreements  alone  or  by  non-
legislative  instruments.  The  ECT  therefore  plays  an  important  role  as  part  of an 
international  effort  to  build  a  legal  foundation  for  energy  security,  based  upon  the 
principles of  open competitive markets and sustainable development. 1 
The purpose of  this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of  the investment protection 
tools presented by the ECT - the first (and only of its kind) multilateral investment treaty 
that deals  exclusively with the  investments in the energy sector.  These tools  include: 
investment protection afforded by national, fair and equitable,  and most-favoured-nation 
treatments  (Article  10(1)  and  10(7)  ECT);  provisions  related  to  the  most  constant 
protection  and  security  of investment  (Article  10(1)  ECT);  provisions  relating to the 
observance of contractual and international law obligations, or so-called umbrella clauses 
(Article 10(1), last sentence); protection against expropriation (Article 13  ECT) and the 
freedom  of transfer of funds  (Article  14  ECT).  The  discussion on each of these  key 
lEnergy Charter Treaty (1 April 1994) < http://www.encharter.orglindex.php?id=28> (14 August 2008) 
133 provisions will be presented immediately after the commentary regarding the purpose and 
scope of  the ECT. 
B. Scope and purpose of the Energy Charter Treaty 
The Energy Charter Treaty is a unique multilateral treaty, limited in scope to the energy 
sector? It was designed specifically to integrate the energy sector of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe into the broader European and world markets, and to provide 
comprehensive investment protection mechanisms to investors in the energy sector. The 
ECT establishes  legal  rights  and  obligations  with respect to  a  broad range of issues 
regarding investment and trade. It is a multinational treaty in the sense that its scope 
covers the whole of Europe, the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(SIC), including the Russian Federation, plus Australia and Japan.
3 
The purpose of  the ECT, as stated in its Article 2, is: 
[To] establish a legal framework in order to promote long-term co-operation in the energy 
field,  based on complementarities and mutual benefits, in  accordance with the objectives 
and principles of  the [European Energy] Charter. (Emphasis added).4 
The  ECT  and  the  Energy  Charter  Protocol  on  Energy  Efficiency  and  Related 
Environmental Aspects were signed in December 1994 and entered into legal force  in 
April 1998. To date, the Treaty has been signed or acceded to by fifty-one states plus the 
European Communities (the total number of its Signatories is therefore fifty-twO).5 It is 
worth noting, however, that some nations, having signed the ECT, have not yet ratified it. 
Among these nations is the Russian Federation. Despite this, the investment provisions of 
the  ECT must  nevertheless  be  studied  by the  present  and  potential  investors  in the 
2 Zhiguo, Gao, Environmental Regulation of  Oil and Gas (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 
20.  See also Bamberger, C, 'The Energy Charter Treaty in 2000: In a New Phase' in Roggenkamp (ed), 
Energy Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
3 Zhiguo, Gao, Environmental Regulation of  Oil and Gas (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 
20 
4 Bamberger, C, 'The Energy Charter Treaty in 2000: In a New Phase' in Roggenkamp (ed), Energy Law in 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
5 The Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat <http://www.encharter.orglindex.php?id=7> (31  July 2007) 
134 Russian energy industry. This is because the provisions of  the ECT are likely to be found 
binding upon the Russian Federation (as a party to an investment contract) due to the fact 
that the Russian Federation has ratified the document upon which the ECT was drawn up, 
and which represents a declaration of  political intent to promote energy co-operation. The 
document  in  question  is  the  1991  Energy  Charter  Declaration,  a  rightful  and  sole 
predecessor of  the 1994 ECT. 
Having outlined the fundamental significance and relevance of  the ECT provisions to this 
thesis,  I  shall  now continue  with the  discussion  on the  major  investment protection 
mechanisms available to foreign investors under the auspices of  this treaty. 
C. National treatment: Article 10(7) ECT 
As  I  highlighted  in  chapter  5,  the  concept  of the  "National  treatment"  (or  "non-
discrimination") means that a foreign investor should be treated in a similar manner as is 
treated the "best" domestic investor, in "like" circumstances. In other words, pursuant to 
this principle the Host State cannot discriminate between investors and their activities 
based solely upon the investor's nationality. 
This principle was subsequently embodied in Article 10(7) ECT, and also confirmed by a 
number of arbitral decisions including Pope-Talbot v Canada,6  Myers  v Canada,7  and 
Feldman Karpa v Mexico,
8 to name just a few. 
In order to be precise, Article 10(7)9 ECT states as follows: 
6 Pope & Talbot, Inc.  v The Government a/Canada, unreported; UNCITRAL; Award on Damages, 31  May 
2002 
7 S.D. Myers, Inc.  v.  Canada, unreported; Partial Award on the Merits; City of  Toronto, Ontario, Canada 13 
November 2000, 252 
<http://www.nafiaclaims.comiDisputes/CanadalSDMyers/SDMyersMeritsA  ward.pdf> (1  September 2008) 
8 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1 
9 'The Energy Charter Treaty' Energy Charter Secretariat <http://www.ena.lt/pdfai/Treaty.pdf> (31  July 
2007) 
135 Each Contracting  Party  shall  accord  to  Investments  in  its  Area of Investors  of other 
Contracting Parties,  and their related activities including management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment  or  disposal,  treatment  no  less  favourable  than  that  which  it  accords  to 
Investments of its own Investors or of the Investors of any other Contracting Party or any 
third state and their related activities including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment 
or disposal, whichever is the most favourable. 
Generally, "National treatment" protection applies to investments on two different levels. 
First, it applies to the already established investment, and second, it applies to the future 
investment.  With regards to the already established investment, the language of Article 
10(7)  ECT obliges  Host  States to accord  to  foreign  investors  and  their  investments 
(including  related  activities  such  as  management,  maintenance,  use,  enjoyment  and 
disposal) treatment at least as favourable as that accorded to the domestic investor. For 
example,  an  export licence  may not  be  granted  exclusively  to  domestic  investors if 
foreign investors are in similar circumstances.lo 
There are, however, three major exceptions to this rule. In particular, the principle of so-
called "Non-discrimination" does not apply, or if  the principle applies, it requires further 
clarification with regards to the following matters. First - taxation, where the principles 
of the taxation in question are already covered in other international investment treaties 
(Article 21  ECT). Second - grants and other financial assistance for technology R&D, 
where these issues are already dealt with in a "Supplementary treaty"ll  (Article  10(8) 
ECT).12 And finally - intellectual property rights, that should initially be governed by the 
relevant international agreements (Article 10(10) ECT).13 
10 'The Energy Charter Treaty: The Readers Guide' Secretariat o/the ECT 
<http://www  .encharter.orgluploadl9/2038809502208514677380487897316925863021421737824  f886v 1.p 
df#search=%22article%20 13%20EnergyllIo20Charter%20TrearyoIo20commentary%22> (5 September 2006) 
11  Supplementary Treaty is an international instrument (yet unfmished) which was established to 
supplement the ECT. The purpose ofthis instrument is to provide more detailed rules for issues for non-
discriminatory free access to the Host State and its resources, and issues regarding privatisation. 
Negotiations on this Supplementary Treaty started in 1996, and have not been concluded. In autumn 2002, 
member states decided to put negotiations on hold pending the outcome of  discussions in the WTO on a 
multilateral framework for foreign direct investment. The draft of  the Supplementary Treaty is available on 
the Energy Charter website < http://www.encharter.orglindex.php?id=33> (7 February 2009) 
12 This limitation on the NationaV MFN treatment principle was sought by the United States, and is 
indicated by paragraph (8) of  Article 10 ECT. It notes that the "modalities of  application" of  paragraph (7) 
in relation to programs of  grants, financial assistance or contract for energy technology research and 
136 There is one other exception that applies only to cases to which the Russian Federation is 
a party. That is, as explained in Decision No.2 of  the EeT Secretariat concerning Article 
10(7), the right of  the Russian Federation to require foreign investors, or companies with 
foreign participation, to  obtain legislative approval for the leasing of federal  property, 
including land. 14 However, in having this right, the Russian Federation must nevertheless 
comply with the requirement not to discriminate between different foreign investors (or 
in other words, the MFN principle ought still to be observed). 
The situation regarding the duty of a Host State to afford the "National treatment" to the 
future foreign investment, under the EeT, appears to be somewhat different. As noted by 
the EeT Secretariat,15 a possibility to create a legally binding obligation whereby foreign 
investors would have been on equal legal footing with their domestic competitors in the 
Host State, was too ambitious to ever eventuate. As a result, the situation regarding the 
treatment of  future foreign investment appears to be as follows. First, under Article 10(2) 
EeT, the Host States have a non-legally binding obligation to provide their "best effort" 
in making sure that prospective foreign investors are afforded similar protection to that of 
domestic  ones.  Second,  under  Article  10(5)  EeT,  the  Host  States  should  preclude 
themselves  from  introducing  any  new  restrictions  for  foreign  investors  that  could 
potentially affect their investments, and to endeavour to reduce progressively the existing 
restrictions. Third, under Article  10(6) EeT, the Host States can make legally binding 
voluntary  commitment  to  grant  foreign  investors  non-discriminatory  treatment  with 
regards to the making of an investment. And finally, under Article lO( 4), the parties to a 
State  contract  can  negotiate  the  extension  of the  non-discrimination  principle  to 
"potential investments". 
development are resolved for the second phase Supplementary Treaty. Up to date reporting on such 
programs is required by paragraph (9) of  Article 10 ECT. 
13 Pursuant to Article 10(10) ECT the treatment to be accorded with regards to intellectual property "shall 
be as specified in corresponding provisions of  the applicable international agreements for the protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights to which the respective Contracting Parties are parties". This allows the 
'Contracting Parties' to maintain their existing exceptions to NationaV MFN treatment under the relevant 
intellectual property rights agreements. 
14 Law of  the Russian Federation No. 2395-1 "On Subsoil" (21  February 1992), Russian Federation 
15  'The Energy Charter Treaty: The Readers Guide' Secretariat of  the ECT 
<http://www  .encharter.org/uploadl9/20388095022085146773 8048789731692586302142173 7824  f886v l.p 
df#search=%22article%20 13%20Energy%20Charter%20TreatyoIo20commentar-yOIo22> (5 September 2006) 
137 For the purpose of convenience, reproduced below are the relevant provisions of Article 
10 ECT. 
Article 10: Promotion, protection and treatment of  investment 
(1) ... 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall  endeavour to accord to Investors of other Contracting 
Parties,  as  regards  the  making of Investments  in  its  Area,  the  Treatment  described  in 
paragraph (3). 
(3)  For  the  purposes  of this  Article,  "Treatment"  means  treatment  accorded  by  a 
Contracting  Party  which  is  no  less  favourable  than  that  which  it  accords  to  its  own 
Investors or to Investors of  any other Contracting Party or any thirds state, whichever is the 
most favourable. 
(4) A supplementary treaty shall, subject to conditions to be laid down therein, oblige each 
party thereto to accord to Investors of other parties, as regards the Making of Investments 
in its Area, the Treatment described in paragraph (3). That treaty shall be open for signature 
by the  states  and  Regional  Economic  Integration  Organizations  which  have  signed  or 
acceded to this Treaty. Negotiations towards the supplementary treaty shall commence not 
later than 1 January 1995, with a view to concluding it by 1 January 1998. 
(5)  Each  Contracting  Party  shall,  as  regards  the  Making  of Investments  in  its  Area, 
endeavour to: 
(a) limit to the minimum the exceptions to the Treatment described in paragraph (3); 
(b)  progressively  remove  existing  restrictions  affecting  Investors  of other  Contracting 
Parties. 
(6)(a) A Contracting Party may, as regards the making of Investment in tis Area, at any 
time declare voluntary to the Charter Conference, through the Secretariat, its intention not 
to introduce new exceptions to the Treatment described in paragraph (3). 
(b) A Contracting Party may, furthermore, at any time make a voluntary commitment to 
accord to Investors of other Contracting Parties, as regards the Making of Investments is 
some or all Economic Activities in the Energy Sector it its Area, the Treatment described in 
paragraph (3). Such commitment shall be notified to the Secretariat and listed in Annex VC 
and shall be binding under this Treaty. 
It is also noteworthy that there currently exists a number of  challenges brought about by 
the  ECT's  concept  of "National  treatment".  First,  it  remains  unclear  whether  the 
obligation not to  discriminate against foreign investors is a "negative duty" prohibiting 
the Host State from actual discrimination or a "positive duty" forcing the Host States to 
138 equalise  the  playing  field  and  grant  foreign  investors  additional  benefits  available  to 
domestic businesses.  Second, it also remains unclear as to how far the duty to provide 
"National treatment" should extend where on the one hand, there is  a foreign investor 
who exploits the resources and privileges of the Host State, and on the other, a domestic 
investor who potentially assumes greater social obligations of such investments relating 
to higher historical costs and environmental clean-up.16 Finally, the meaning of the ECT 
concept  of "treatment"  of investors,  and  how to  measure  discrimination,  taking  into 
account its various forms and shapes, remains a point of  debate. It is hoped that these and 
any other uncertainties posed by the concept of "National treatment" would be resolved 
by the future decisions of  courts and arbitral tribunals. 
In summary, while the  principle of "National treatment" (or "non-discrimination") of 
foreign investment under the ECT provides a number of open-ended and not well tested 
solutions, it also provides advantages in terms of  judicial and litigation measures. Under 
this principle, if two compared businesses are treated differently, to the detriment of the 
foreign investor, then the government of the Host State has the burden of proof to show 
that  the  discriminatory  treatment  is justified.  If the  government  does  not  or cannot 
provide such proof, the claimant is deemed to have proven discrimination, enabling him 
or her to gain access to  the  remedies for the  breach of the  fundamental  principles of 
intemationallaw. 
D.  Most-favoured-nation  (MFN)  treatment:  Articles  10(1)  and 
10(7) ECT 
There are two parts to the Host State's most-favoured-nation (MFN) obligations under 
the ECT.  The first part is  specified in Article  10(7), stating that the Host State should 
treat investors or investment from one foreign country no less favourably than that of  any 
16 Waelde, T, 'Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of  Selected Key 
Issues based on Recent Litigation Experience' in Horn N (ed), Arbitration and the Protection of  Foreign 
Investment: Concepts and  Means,  in Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and  Substantive 
Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law International, 2004) Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Vol 19, 204-205 
139 other.
17 The second part is provided in Article 1O( 1  )(  fourth sentence) which refers to the 
State's obligations under international law and other treaties
18  that require the Host State 
to treat all investors according to the principles of international law, and in line with the 
standards provided by international treaties. 
By and large, the obligations imposed upon a State by these two parts of Article 10 ECT 
are substantially similar in that they both focus on treatment accorded to investors from 
different countries. In other words both these parts lead to the following conclusion: if a 
BIT concluded by the Host State with country "A" provides a better treatment than that 
stipulated in a BIT between the Host State and country "B", the provisions of  the former, 
as suggested by Professor Waelde,19 can be "imported" into the ECT with regards to the 
latter. 
This principle of  law was discussed by the arbitral tribunal in the MafJezini case,20 where 
the tribunal came to the conclusion that comparable dispute resolution clauses of  various 
BITs could be "transported" from one international instrument into another, or that their 
provisions may be used by implication. 
This mechanism,  as  noted  by Professor Waelde,  allowed  investors  "to  look at other 
investment treaties  and "cut-and-paste"  selective items  from  one treaty  into another" 
thereby engaging in a self-selection of  the most favourable (to them) investment climate. 
While the possibility "to pick-and-choose" the most suitable clauses provided investors 
with additional  security  regarding their investment,  it also,  arguably,  placed an extra 
burden upon the Host State requiring the State to honour the obligations which it did not 
consent to, or could not have consented to for various policy reasons.21 
17 ECT, Article 10(7) 
18 ECT, Article 10(1) 
19 Waelde, T, 'Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of  Selected Key 
Issues based on Recent Litigation Experience' in Horn N (ed), Arbitration and the Protection 0/  Foreign 
Investment: Concepts and  Means,  in Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and  Substantive 
Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law International, 2004) Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Vol 19, 221 
20 Emilio Augustin MajJezini v The Kingdom o/Spain, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7; Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000; unreported; ICSID; Award, 13 November 2000; unreported, ICSID; 
Rectification of  Award, 31 January 2001 (Argentina! Spain BIT) 
21  Waelde, T, above n 19,221 
140 A possible solution to this problem was proposed by Professor Waelde who argued that 
an option to "pick-and-choose" does not impose any extra burden upon the Host State, in 
addition to its existing obligations under international law.  In support of this argument 
Professor Waelde wrote that: 
[O]ne  needs not to  look  at individual  items  in the  other [investment]  treaty,  but at the 
overall package. "Treatment" does not mean a particular component of  the treatment, but it 
means the overall treatment provided in a particular treaty, constituted and assessed on the 
basis of material equivalency.  22 (Emphasis added). 
In summary, the MFN treatment under the ECT operates in the following manner: if  one 
treaty provides an overall better treatment than that provided in another,  then such an 
overall treatment package should be made easily importable into the latter and any other 
similar  instruments.  If,  however,  an  overall  treatment  provided  by  the  treaties  is 
substantially equal, despite the differences of  certain provisions, an investor should not be 
allowed to "cut-and-paste" more favourable clauses, fundamentally changing the overall 
effect of the State's obligations under these treaties. This conclusion supports the main 
effect of the MFN clause - to provide for a more secure and stable investment climate 
and encourage and facilitate the growth of  international investment and trade. 
E.  Fair and Equitable treatment: Article 10(1) ECT 
"Fair and equitable" treatment is becoming one of the most important, if not the most 
important, of the  substantive obligations owed by the  Host State  to  foreign  investors. 
Nearly every investor-State arbitration these days includes a "fair and equitable" claim. 
Recent years have witnessed a string of  major awards for investors premised in whole or 
in part on a breach of  this standard. 
"Fair and  equitable"  treatment,  as  discussed  in chapter  5,  is an  absolute  standard of 
treatment to which foreign investors are entitled regardless of how a State treats its own 
22 Waelde, T, above n 19, 222 
141 nationals.  In some sense,  it is  a "gap-filling" provision that is designed to guarantee 
foreign investors an internationally-required level of protection, even when other more-
specific standards are not implicated. 
In the past, tribunals have been reluctant to reduce "fair and equitable" treatment to a 
single legal standard or formula.  To date, opinion seems to be that "this standard is to 
some extent a flexible one which must be adapted to the circumstances of each case.,,23 
This  opinion  was  presented  in,  inter  alia,  the  Waste  Management  case,24  where  the 
tribunal attempted to summarise the "fair and equitable" concept as follows: 
[T]he  minimum  standard  of fair  and  equitable  treatment  is  infringed  by  conduct 
attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if  the conduct: 
(a)  is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic; 
(b)  is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to [various] prejudice; or 
(c)  involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial 
propriety-as might be the case with a manifest failure  of natural justice in 
judicial  proceedings  or  a  complete  lack  of  transparency  ...  in  an 
administrative process. (Emphasis added). 
The decision makers in Waste  Management have taken the  position that the "fair and 
equitable" standard is implied by customary intemationallaw.  Some tribunals, however, 
have disagreed with this view.  Most recently, for example, in Saluka Investments BV  v. 
The Czech Republic, the tribunal held that "the fair and equitable treatment standard ... is 
an autonomous Treaty standard," and as such it "must be interpreted in light of  the object 
and  purpose  of the  Treaty.,,25  Construing the Netherlands-Czech Republic  BIT, the 
tribunal in Saluka offered its own interpretation of what "fair and equitable" treatment 
means. Thus it had decided that: 
23 Waste Management, Inc.  v United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID; Final Award, Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/3; 30 Apr 2004, para 99 
24 Ibid. 
25 Saluka Investments BV  (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, unreported, UNCITRAL, Partial 
Award, 17 March 2006,309 
142 [W]ithout undermining its legitimate right to take measures for the protection of  the 
public interest, [the Contracting State has]  assumed an obligation to treat a foreign 
investor's  investment  in  a  way  that  does  not  frustrate  the  investor's  underlying 
legitimate  and  reasonable  expectations.  A  foreign  investor  whose  interests  are 
protected under the Treaty is entitled to expect that the [Contracting State] will not 
act in a way that is: 
(a)  manifestly inconsistent with the applicable law; 
(b)  non-transparent; 
(c)  unreasonable (i.e. unrelated to some rational policy); or 
(d)  discriminatory (i.e. based on unjustifiable distinctions). (Emphasis added). 
The  content  of the  "fair  and  equitable"  standard  is  too  complex,  and  it  would  be 
inappropriate  at  this  stage  to  establish  its  definitive  interpretation.  The  cases  which 
discuss this principle are relatively recent and are not uniform, and therefore, they do not 
allow for a firm  and conclusive meaning. Despite this, recent developments offer three 
important lessons for investors and corporate counsel. 
First,  the "fair and  equitable" treatment analysis  may point out different elements  in 
different circumstances, depending upon the nature of the dispute.  In a challenge to a 
judicial  measure,  for  example,  the  central  question  may  be  due  process.  When  an 
administrative  proceeding  is  at  issue,  the  key  factor  may  be  transparency.  In other 
situations,  the  issue  may  be whether  government  officials  acted  in  a  fundamentally 
arbitrary fashion.  The  absence of a single uniform standard can make  it difficult for 
investors and corporate counsel to determine whether they have a viable claim.  On the 
other hand, the "fair and equitable" treatment standard provides enormous flexibility in 
ensuring protection for investors in a wide variety of  circumstances. 
Second, the "fair and equitable" treatment obligation may provide a remedy even where 
no expropriation has occurred.  For example, in the eMS case, the tribunal rejected the 
expropriation  claim  because  the  impugned  measures  did  not  result  in  a  "substantial 
deprivation of the fundamental rights of ownership nor have these rights been rendered 
143 useless.,,26  As  the  tribunal  explained  further,  however,  the  absence  of a  "substantial 
deprivation" is  no obstacle to  finding a violation of "fair and equitable" treatment.  A 
central element of that obligation, the tribunal held, is the duty to maintain a stable and 
predictable legal  and business framework upon which foreign  investors can rely.  In 
finding a breach of that duty, it noted that the government had "entirely transform[ed] 
and alter[ed]  the legal  and business environment under which [CMS'] investment was 
decided and made"  (emphasis  added).27  Notably,  the tribunal reached this conclusion 
without regard as to whether there was "any deliberate intention and bad faith in adopting 
the  measures  in  question,"  explaining  that "such intention  and  bad  faith  ...  are  not 
essential elements of  the standard.,,28 
Third,  as  illustrated by the  existing case  law,29  one of the most significant principles 
emerging from  recent case law is the increased focus on the investor's "legitimate and 
reasonable expectations" at the time of the investment, and whether those expectations 
have been frustrated unreasonably by actions attributable to the State.30 As explained by 
the tribunal in the Teemed case,3! for example, "fair and equitable" treatment includes the 
obligation not to "affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign 
investor to make the investment.,,32 In light of  this trend in the case law investors may be 
well advised to document any government representations upon which they reasonably 
rely in making their investment decision. 
With regards to the ECT, the situation is by no means clearer. The ECT provides that the 
parties to an investment agreement should, "at all times", provide each other with "fair 
and equitable" treatment. One of  the key ECT Articles, namely Article 10(1) begins with 
26 CMS Gas Transmission Co.  v The Argentine Republic, unreported; ICSID; Award, Case No. ARB/Oll08, 
12 May 2005, para 259 
27 Id  at para. 275 
28 Id  at para. 280 
29 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v.  The Czech Republic, unreported; UNCITRAL; Partial 
Award, 17 March 2006; CMS Gas Transmission Co.  v The Argentine Republic, unreported; ICSID; Award, 
Case No. ARB/Oll08, 12 May 2005 
30 Saluka Investments BV  (The Netherlands) v.  The Czech Republic, unreported; UNCITRAL; Partial 
Award, 17 March 2006, para. 302 
31  Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A.  v United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID; Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003 (Spain! Mexico BIT), para 154 
32 Ibid 
144 general statements concerning the favourable  conditions that Contracting Parties must 
maintain for investments by investors of other Contracting Parties. These provisions are 
intended to assure an absolute minimum standard of treatment such as that which has 
been established in BIT practices, based to a considerable extent upon developments in 
international law. Article 10(1) consists of  five sentences, the first two of  which explicitly 
refer to the making of investments. The first sentence obliges each Contracting Party "to 
encourage and  create  stable,  favourable  and transparent conditions  for  the making of 
investments" in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. The second sentence adds 
that such conditions "shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of 
Investors ... fair and equitable treatment.,,33 
In order to be accurate, Article 10(1) ECT reads as follows: 
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage 
and crate stable,  equitable,  favourable  and transparent conditions for  Investors of other 
Contracting  Parties  to  make  Investments  in  its  Area.  Such  conditions  shall  include  a 
commitment to accord at all time to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties 
fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection 
and  security  and  no  Contracting  Party  shall  in  any  way  impair  by  unreasonable  or 
discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no 
case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less  favourable than that required by 
international  law,  including treaty obligations.  Each Contracting Party shall observe any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of  an Investor of  any other 
Contracting party.34 
It is however,  important to  appreciate that the  application of the "fair and equitable" 
standard of treatment requires a balancing process. Investment treaties, as international 
law disciplines, often interfere with domestic regulatory and administrative sovereignty. 
While they are meant to do so in order to upgrade the quality of governance, Professor 
33 Bamberger, C, 'The Energy Charter Treaty in 2000: In a New Phase' in Roggenkamp, Energy Law in 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
34 Energy Charter Treaty (1994) <http://www.ena.ItlpdfaiiTreaty.pdi> (20 August 2007) (1994 ECT 
treaty), Article 10(1) 
145 Waelde  argues that they must not be  operated as the instruments of intervention.
35  In 
other words, a simple breach of a rule is not enough to constitute a violation of the "fair 
and equitable" treatment. This standard will only be deemed to have been breached if  the 
aggrieved party shows that there was an accumulation of breaches of relevant standards 
of sufficient  severity,  weight  and  impact  to  justify the  intervention  of the  treaty  In 
domestic governance.
36 
In summary, an obligation to provide investors with "fair and equitable" treatment, as 
stipulated by the  provisions of Article 10(1) ECT, requires Host States to treat foreign 
investors  in  accordance  with the  standards  and  practice  established  by  the  norms  of 
public  international  law,  regardless  of whether  the  Host  States  treat  their  domestic 
investors in a similar fashion?7  Despite this, however, the ECT (as  well as any other 
investment treaty) does not provide a precise definition of  "fair and equitable", leaving its 
interpretation to the discretion of the decision makers. Hence, the protection afforded to 
the foreign investor by this principle is generally determined on a case-by-case basis/
8 
and despite the above-mentioned uncertainties it represents a powerful tool for investors 
in their actions against the Host States. 
F. Most constant protection and security: Article 10(1) ECT 
As discussed in chapter 5, this protection mechanism generally comes into effect during 
the times of military and economic unrest whereby the Host State is obliged to provide 
foreigners with police protection.
39 In light of  the ECT, however, this mechanism has not 
yet  been  well-explored  and  as  an  outcome  could  result  in  various  inconsistent 
35 Waelde, T, above n 19,210 
36 Waelde, T, above n 19,211 
37 Fatouros, A A, Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors (Columbia University Press, 1962), 135-
141,214-215 
38 'Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law' Organisation/or Economic 
Co-operation and  Development (OECD) , Working Papers on International Investment, Number 2004/3 
(September 2004),2 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd!21137/33773085.pdf> (1  September 2008) 
39Wena Hotel Ltd v Arab Republic o/Egypt, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4; Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 29 June 1999; unreported; ICSID; Award on Merits, 8 December 2000; unreported; ICSID; 
Decision on Annulment, 5 February 2002 (United Kingdom of  Great Brittan and Northern Ireland! Arab 
Republic of  Egypt BIT) 
146 interpretations. Within the EeT, this protection provision is incorporated in Article 1  O( 1  ) 
(third sentence), in which relevant parts it is stated that: 
[Foreign]  Investments shall also enjoy the  most constant protection and security and no 
Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. (Emphasis added). 
One  of the  substantive  interpretations  of this  provlSlon  In existence  to-date,  is  that 
proposed by Professor Waelde. He argues that the "powers of  police", for the purposes of 
the EeT interpretation, should be read to include "economic police".4o In other words, 
"the  obligation of the  Host  State  to  provide  investors  with "constant protection and 
security"  could  be  read  to  stand for  an  obligation of the  State  to  use  its  police  and 
economic regulatory powers  in a  wider sense  to  ensure  that the foreign  investor can 
operate its business in a context free not only from direct physical harassment, but also 
from  harassment  by  administrative  powers  and  abusively  used  dominant  economic 
powers  derived  from  control  over  natural  monopolies,  essential  facilities  and  other 
sources of dominant economic power".41  This view may be inconclusive; however, it is 
as yet the only view regarding the interpretation of this protection standard. It is hoped 
that the development of the EeT law in the next few years will shed more light on this 
Issue. 
In summary, under the EeT, an obligation of a State to provide investors with "constant 
protection and security" would be breached if at least one of the following occurs. First, 
the Host State fails to provide an investor with the protection of  its police powers in times 
of military unrest. Second, the Host State exercises its powers towards an investor in an 
active and abusive manner. And finally, the Host State fails to intervene where it had the 
power and duty to intervene to protect the normal ability of the investor's business to 
function generally.  Following the breach, the Host State will be held liable (under the 
auspices of  public international law) in damages, which the investor would be entitled to 
recover. 
40 Waelde, T, above n 19,213 
41 Ibid 
147 G.  Observance of contractual and  international law obligations: 
umbrella clauses 
Multilateral and Bilateral investment protection treaties commonly contain a  so-called 
"umbrella clause" whereby the State signatories (to the treaty) make a promise to honour 
their obligations or commitments towards investments made by investors from the other 
signatory State.42  An example of such a clause can be found, inter alia, in Article XI of 
the Australia - China BIT,43 which provides that: 
A Contracting Party shall, subject to its law, adhere to any written undertaking given by a 
competent  authority  to  a  national  of the  other  Contracting  Party  with  regard  to  an 
investment in accordance with its  law and the provisions of this Agreement. (Emphasis 
added). 
Another similar example can be found in Article 11  of  the Australia - PNG BIT,44 which 
includes  a  provision  almost  identical  to  that  in the  Australia - China BIT.  Similar 
umbrella clauses are also  found  in the majority of European BITs,45  which generally 
provide that each Contracting State shall observe any other obligations it has assumed 
with regard to investments in its territory by investors or the other Contracting State. 
The interpretation debate over the meaning of  this potentially powerful clause is intense 
because it involves a determination of the applicable law as well as the forum of the 
dispute (national versus international). On an extensive reading, such clauses open up the 
possibility for contracting parties to sue under international law whenever a contractual 
commitment has been breached. In that interpretation, the clause subsumes all contractual 
42 Foster, D, 'Umbrella Clauses - A Retreat from the Philippines?' (2006) Int'l A.L.R. 100 
43 Agreement between the government of  Australia and the government of  the People's Republic of  China 
on Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection ofInvestments (Beijing, 11 July 1988). Electronic 
<http://www.unctadxi.orgltemplateslDocSearch.aspx?id=779> (10 February 2009) 
44 Agreement between the government of  Australia and the government of  the Independent States of  Papua 
New Guinea for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestments (port Moresby, 3 September 1990). 
Electronic <http://www.unctadxLorgltemplateslDocSearch.aspx?id=779> (10 February 2009) 
45 For example, see BIT between United Kingdom and S1. Lucia, which article 2(2)(last paragraph) states 
that: "Each Contracting Party shall observe any other obligations it may have entered into with regard to 
investments of  nationals or companies of  the other Contracting Party" (emphasis added) 
148 breaches under the umbrella of the treaty.46 Nevertheless, tribunals have openly clashed 
over the meaning to be ascribed to such treaty clauses, and the extent to which they may 
permit foreign investors to dispense with the dispute settlement provisions spelled out in 
contracts in favour of  pursuing international arbitration under a treaty.47 
Umbrella clauses are  frequently  the  basis for  a  substantive  claim in any legal  dispute 
between  an  investor and a  State  founded  on the  terms  of a  BIT.  Yet  until  relatively 
recently there were no  published decisions dealing directly with the interpretation and 
application of  such clauses in the context of  an international treaty dispute. 
The first time these issues were expressly addressed was in the ICSID arbitration SGS v 
Pakistan,48 in a decision on jurisdiction dated 6 August 2003. However, shortly after that 
decision was published, the position was made more uncertain as a result of  a conflicting 
decision issued by another ICSID tribunal in SGS v The Philippines.49 
Since the publication of these  two decisions there has been considerable debate  over 
which approach should be preferred. Not surprisingly, parties involved in investor-State 
arbitrations have argued in favour of the case which most supported their own position: 
i.e. investors relying on SGS v The Philippines; with States preferring SGS v Pakistan. 50 
In  each  case,  the  central  question  was  whether,  through  the  umbrella  clause  in  the 
applicable BIT, the investors' contractual claims against the Host State could be resolved 
under the  arbitration provisions  of the  BIT,  rather than  under  the  dispute  resolution 
provisions of  the contract in dispute. 
5 
I 
46 See 'Investment Treaty News' International Institute for Sustainable Development (15 June 2006) 
<http://www.iisd.orglpdf/2006/itn  junel5  2006.pdf> (10 February 2009) 
47 For example, see El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15 (US/ Argentina BIT) 
48 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of  Pakistan (2003) International 
Arbitration Report Vol. 18/9 
49 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A.  v Republic of  the Philippines, ICSID, Case No. ARB/02/6, 29 
January 2004 
50 Foster, D, above n 41 
51 UNCTAD, State Contracts, Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements (UNCTAD: United 
Nations, 2004) 20 
149 The  arbitral  tribunal  in SGS v  Pakistan  had to  interpret Article  11  of the  1995  BIT 
between Switzerland and Pakistan, which read as follows: 
Either  Contracting  Party  shall  constantly  guarantee  the  observance  of  the 
commitments it has entered into with respect to the  investments of the investors of 
the other Contracting Party. 
The tribunal held that, unless expressly stated, an umbrella clause does not derogate from 
the widely accepted international law principle that a contractual breach is not by itself an 
infringement  of international  law,  particularly  if such  a  contract  had  a  valid  forum 
selection  clause.  The  tribunal  added  that  the  umbrella  clause  was  not  a  paramount 
obligation; rather, it provided a general pledge on the part of  the Host State to ensure the 
effectiveness of  State contracts.  52 The tribunal noted that:
53 
There would be no real need to  demonstrate a violation of those substantive treaty 
standards if a simple breach of contract,  or of municipal  statute or regulation,  by 
itself,  would suffice to constitute  a treaty violation on the part of the  Contracting 
Party and engage the international responsibility of  the Party. 
Moreover,  the  structure  of the  relevant  treaty  and  the  place  in which  the  umbrella 
provision appeared within that treaty also led the tribunal to conclude that the umbrella 
provision did  not elevate the  contract into  the protection regime  of the  treaty.  54  The 
precise interpretation which must be given to such an umbrella clause was, however, left 
unclear. 
The arbitral tribunal in SOS v The Philippines returned to the question of the effect of  an 
umbrella clause.  While the  contract between the parties in this case provided that the 
courts  of the  Philippines  would  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  disputes  under  the 
contract,  SGS  commenced  an  ICSID  arbitration  proceeding  on  the  ground  that  its 
52 SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A.  v Islamic Republic of  Pakistan (2003) International 
Arbitration Report Vol.  18/9, paras. 165-170 
53 Id  para 168 
54 UNCTAD, above n 50, 21-22 
150 contract claim would be elevated to a treaty claim under the umbrella clause in the BIT 
between the Philippines and Switzerland. 
In this case, the tribunal interpreted the umbrella clause in a way which is totally opposite 
to that of the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan. It held that the umbrella clause did, in practice, 
have the effect of  conferring jurisdiction on an arbitral tribunal constituted under the BIT 
to  determine  purely  contractual  claims  between an investor and  the  Host  State.  The 
tribunal  disagreed  that  the  umbrella clause  was  merely  a  "second order"  protection, 
instead adopting the view that the clause "meant what it said". 
From the prospective of  an investor, the approach taken by the Philippines tribunal would 
offer greater protection, as it makes it clear that a breach of  a State contract amounts to a 
breach of a primary obligation in the BIT to  observe contractual commitments.55  The 
interpretation taken in the Pakistan case, on the other hand, is more favourable to  the 
position generally taken by the Host States - that breaches of contractual obligations do 
not amount to a violation of any relevant treaty provisions (as the treaty requirements 
have  a  more  difficult  standard  of proof).  Hence,  the  protection  offered  to  foreign 
investors by the treaty applies only where an investor meets that standard. Therefore, the 
required standard of  proof will not be met by reference to the breach of  the State contract 
alone. 
Arguably,56  this  approach  could  be  seen  as  depriving  the  umbrella  clause  of any 
independent meaning, in that it would annul any possibility of viewing a  breach of an 
obligation entered into by the Host State under a State contract as amounting to a breach 
of  the BIT by reason of  an infringement of  the umbrella clause.  57 
55  Schreuer, C, 'Traveling the BIT route: of  Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road' 
(2004) Journal o/World  Investment and Trade, Vol. 5, No.2, 255 
56 A decision by the ICSID tribunal in El Paso Energy International Co Ltd v The Argentine Republic has 
revisited some of  the issues raised by umbrella clauses, and may have helped to clarify the position by 
decisively rejecting the approach taken in SGS v The Philippines 
57 Schreuer, above n 55 
151 With regard to the interpretation of the "umbrella clause" provisions within the ambit of 
the ECT,  it is  argued that Article  1O(1)(last sentence), as  opposed to,  for instance, the 
language  in the  SGS Awards,  makes  it  clear that  the  Host  State  must  "observe  any 
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any 
other Contracting Party".  58  This is, as suggested by Professor Waelde,59  not to say that 
the provision of customary international  law or those  specified in various  investment 
treaties are not applicable, or are redundant to the extent of inconsistency. The general 
consensus in relation to this matter60  is  that States have to respect contracts that they 
freely enter into with a foreign party, under the condition, namely, that it is proven that 
such contracts are of  governmental (or sovereign) character.61 
Generally speaking, for a breach of contract to amount to a breach of international law, 
the following elements must be established. First, the Host State government must enter 
into a State contract (or any other similar instrument) with a foreign investor. Second, the 
State contract has to be breached. Finally, the government's commitment specified in the 
State contract has to have more than merely commercial character. 
The  text  of Article  lO(1)(last  sentence)  ECT,  however,  has  no  such  limitations. 
According to this Article, each party to a State contract shall observe "any obligations it 
has  entered  into  with  an  Investor  or  Investment  of any  other  Contracting  Party" 
(emphasis added).62 The plain interpretation of  the words "any obligations", as argued by 
58 Waelde, T, above n 19,214 
59 Waelde, T, above n 19,215 
60 Such consensus emerged from the interpretation of  the historical Calvo doctrine (legal principle, 
applicable in international disputes, that aliens have no more rights than the citizens of  a sovereign state. 
Therefore, such disputes lie within the purview of  the domestic laws and only the courts in the host country 
have the jurisdiction to hear the case. Named after the Argentine diplomat and historian Carlos Calvo 
(1824-1906) who propounded it in his 1868 book 'Derecho internacional te6rico y pnictico de Europa y 
America} 
61  Schwebel, S, Essays in Honour of  Roberto Ago (Milano Guiffre, 1987), 401 "Breach of  State contract 
with an alien is a breach of  international law, [unless the special powers of  government are at least 
somewhere significantly at play]" 
62 This provision covers any contract that a Host State has concluded with a subsidiary of  the foreign 
investor in the Host State, or a contract between the Host State and the parent company of  the subsidiary 
152 Schwebel,63  suggests  that  such  obligations  may  be  of both  governmental  and  non-
governmental (i.e. commercial) character. 
Notably, there exists an argument to the contrary. In particular, in Azinian v Mexico
64  it 
was argued that merely commercial contracts are not covered by the treaty law and as a 
result,  breaches  of investment  contracts  where  States  exercise  a  purely  commercial 
function, were not considered to amount to the breaches of  their international obligations. 
This case is often cited as authority for the proposition that commercial contracts do not 
fall  under the ambit of Article  10(1) ECT.  However, one should note that the Azinian 
case, unlike the ECT, does not have any mention of the breadth of obligations which are 
meant  to  be  covered  by  the  applicable  investment  treaty  (which  in  that  case  was 
NAFT  A).  Moreover,  the main idea behind the  Azinian case was to  make it clear that 
foreign  contractors,  who  have  chosen to  go to domestic tribunals,  can no  longer start 
litigation  or arbitration  before  an  international tribunal.  65  As  a  result,  the  findings  in 
Azinian should not be applicable with reference to the scope of  the ECT, and even less so, 
it should be allowed to determine the breadth of obligations that the ECT imposes on the 
contracting parties. 
Another argument in favour of  the distinction between "commercial" and "governmental" 
(or  sovereign)  acts of the  contracting  States  can be  built on the  assumption that the 
purpose of investment treaties is to regulate a possible misuse of governmental powers 
and balance the bargaining powers of the  States with those of private investors. Thus, 
purely  commercial  undertakings  entered  into  by the  governments of Host States  fall, 
arguably, beyond the scope and function of international investment treaties, including 
the ECT.  The only possible solution to  this issue  to  date appears to be hidden in the 
interpretation of the  last sentence of Article  10(1) ECT.  In this  regard,  in one of his 
studies Professor Waelde purports that:66 
63  Schwebel, above n 61 
64 Azinian and ors v United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 1 November 
2000; (2000) 39 ILM 537 
65  Waelde, T, above n 19,216-217 
66 Waelde, T, above n 19,217 
153 To solve [the]  dilemma between the "plain meaning" and the purpose and target of  the 
EeT, [it is appropriate] to imply into Article 10(1, last sentence), a qualification that the 
contractual relationship must have  at least in one significant aspect  .,. something that 
involves governmental powers and prerogatives; such a qualification would then have to 
be read widely to satisfY the explicitly wide and unqualified "plain meaning" of Article 
10(1). (Emphasis added). 
In other words, the governmental conduct of a purely commercial nature does not fall 
under the umbrella of the international treaty law unless such conduct can be qualified as 
involving the usage of governmental powers. For example, if at the time of entering into 
the  State  contract,  the  State  uses  special  State-derived  privileges,  such  as  exclusive 
licenses, or if  the State retains a duty to regulate and intervene, then such conduct is more 
likely  to  be  considered  as  that  where  governmental  (sovereign)  powers  were  used. 
Another example where the governmental entity may be seen as  engaging in not only 
commercial activity, is one where the government elects to exercise, exercises or has an 
option to exercise its right to sovereign immunity (or any other privileges associated with 
its sovereign nature). 
The author of  this thesis suggests that in terms of the investment contracts in the energy 
and resources sector, the States, in effect, had already exercised their sovereign privilege 
by declaring their "sovereignty over natural resources".  As a result, any type of  contract 
that States enter into with the private investor (within the energy sector) cannot be seen as 
purely  commercial  from  the  outset.  Moreover,  most Host  States,  by  means  of their 
domestic legislation, regulate the activities of foreign  investors.  These regulations (i.e. 
issuing of exclusive exploration licenses, mining permits etc.) can also, arguably, fall 
under the  umbrella of State-derived special privileges as  acts limiting the activities of 
foreign  investors.  Hence, the  breach of any type of State contract, irrespective of the 
alleged nature,  will  (in the  opinion of the author)  result  in a  violation of the  State's 
international obligations under the treaty law, thus invoking international remedies. This 
approach is also consistent with the express language of  Article 10(1)(last sentence) ECT. 
154 In summary, Article IO(I)(last sentence) ECT has the important effect that a breach of  an 
individual investment contract by the Host State becomes a violation of the ECT.
67 As a 
result, the foreign investor can invoke the entire investment protection provision of the 
ECT, as well as make a good use of  the dispute settlement mechanism68 provided by the 
Treaty. 
H.  Expropriation  and  measures  having  an  equivalent  effect to 
expropriation: Article 13 ECT 
Protection of  foreign investment in cases of  expropriation is a core element of  investment 
agreements. The ECT is not an exception. The provisions relating to the protection of 
investors against expropriation within the ECT are discussed in Article 13. According to 
that Article, foreign investment may only be expropriated if  at least one of  the following 
conditions is fulfilled: 
(a)  the expropriation was in the public interest; 
(b)  the expropriation was not discriminatory; 
(c)  the expropriation was carried out under due process of  law; and 
(d)  the expropriation was accompanied by payment of  prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation (which shall amount to the fair market value of the investment at 
the time immediately before the expropriation, or impending the expropriation).69 
The availability of protection afforded to  investors under the ECT in cases of indirect 
expropriation is less clear. It is now recognised that governmental actions, which limit the 
ability of  investors to manage their property (or their proprietary rights), undermining the 
67 It  must be noted, however, that Article 26(3)(c) ECT grants States (Members of  the ECT) the right to 
exclude international arbitration in such cases. Four countries, namely Australia, Canada, Hungary and 
Norway have opted for this solution (see ECT, Annex IA) 
68 This mechanism and its operations are discussed in the next Chapter 
69 'The Energy Charter Treaty: The Readers Guide' Secretariat a/the ECT 
<http://www  .encharter.org/uploadl9/203880950220851467738048789731692586302142173  7824  f886v l.p 
df#search=%22article%20 13%20Energy%20Charter%20Treaty%20commentary%22> (5 September 2006) 
Furthermore, the investor has the right to prompt review of  the valuation of  the investment and the amount 
of  compensation under the law of  the Host State by a judicial or other competent and independent authority 
of  the Host State: Article 13(2) ECT 
155 business'  ability  to  function  in  the  expected  manner/o  constitute  a  compensable 
expropriation. This view is confirmed by the US-Iran claims tribunal cases that reiterate 
the fact that "a formal taking is not necessary [for]  the government's interference in the 
ability of the  owner to  manage  their property,  or its  omission to  protect the property 
against disruption, [to amount] to expropriation".71 
The issue arises as to when the otherwise legal governmental activity will indeed amount 
to an act of indirect expropriation.  In this respect, the findings  in the case of Pope & 
Talbot suggest that "a mere reduction in value [of the investment] due to the government 
regulation is not [sufficient to establish expropriation]". What seems to be required is that 
the deprivation of  the investor's rights is "significant and intensive".72 
The list of factors that should be taken into account in determining whether or not the act 
of expropriation  took  place  is  conveniently  presented  in,  for  example,  the  Chile-US 
FT  A.  73 These factors include: 
(a)  the character of  the government action; 
(b)  the intensity of  the deprivation of  ownership rights; 
(c)  the economic impact of  governmental action; 
(d)  discrimination; 
(e)  the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct and reasonable 
investment expectations; 
(t)  excessive taxation; and 
(g)  serious  underpayment  by,  for  example,  an  energy  monopoly  to  an  energy 
producer who is dependent on the uptake of  electricity. 
70 Waelde, T, Koko, A, 'Environmental Regulations, Investment Protection and Regulatory Taking in 
International Law' (2001) 50 ICLQ 811, 848 
71  Waelde, above n 19,223 
72 Pope & Talbot, Inc.  v The Government o/Canada, unreported; UNCITRAL; Award on Damages, 31 
May 2002 
73  Chile Free Trade Agreement (1 January 2004), Annex lO-D, Article 10.9(1) 
<http://tcc.export.gov/Trade  Agreements/All  Trade  Agreements/exp  000984.asp> (11  February 2009) 
156 This list is not inclusive. However, it appears to  be capable of serving the purpose of 
preventing  investors  from  bringing  forward  far-fetched  expropriation  claims  thereby 
causing great inconvenience, unwanted delays and accelerated costs to the transition. 
The  next  issue  with  regard  to  expropriation  under  Article  13  is  the  calculation  of 
compensation payable  to  the  investor  by  the  expropriating  State.  Traditionally,  such 
compensation  was  calculated  according  to  the  following  formula:  the  payable 
compensation equals to investment expenditure plus lost profit.
74 This formula, however, 
fails to address the issue of a possible double recovery if applied to calculate lost profits 
of a  medium  to  long  term  investment  project  as  such  future  incomes  may  be  too 
speculative to be taken into account.  75 
One of the possible solutions to this issue was discussed in the case of Santa Elena v. 
Costa Rica where another formula for  the calculation of compensation was proposed. 
According to this new formula, the amount of compensation payable to investors should 
be equal to ''the likely market value of  the investment at the time of  expropriation, [taking 
into account] the investment expenditures, on the one hand, and the discounted net future 
cash flow on the other, as well as additional factors such as indications of market based 
valuations and other equitable considerations" (emphasis added).  76 
In summary,  the language  and context of Article  13  ECT very much  resembles  that 
specified  in  similar  provisions  of most  modem  BITs,  and  constitutes  yet  another 
confirmation of the principle of full compensation following expropriation or measures 
with an equivalent effect. 
74 Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 (United Nations), article 36 (Text 
adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53
rd session, in 2001, and submitted to the General 
Assembly as part of  the Commission's report covering the work of  that session. The report appears in the 
Yearbook of  the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part 2. Text is also reproduced in the Annex 
to General Assembly Resolution 56/83  of 12 December 2001, and corrected by the document 
A/56/49(VoU)/CorrA.) 
75 Stauffer, T, 'Valuation of  Assets in International Takings' (1996) 17 ELJ  459-288 
76 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A.  v.  Republic of  Costa Rica, ICSID, Case No. ARB/96/l 
157 I. Transfer of funds: Article 14 ECT 
One  of the  major disincentives  for  foreign  investors  is  the risk of not being  able  to 
transfer capital connected to  their investment to  another country.  These risks exist,  in 
particular,  in  countries  with  high  inflation,  long  delays  in  transfer  systems,  widely 
fluctuating exchange rates or poor foreign exchange services.
77 Pursuant to Article 14 of 
the ECT,  each contracting party is  obliged to  guarantee the free transfer of funds  with 
respect to investments, both in and out of  the area in question, without delay and in freely 
convertible currency. Article  14 provides a non-exclusive list of transactions which fall 
within  the  "freedom  to  transfer"  provisions.  They  include  payments  under  contract, 
unspent earnings and other forms  of remuneration of personnel, proceeds from sale or 
liquidation, compensation for expropriation and other losses. 
Article  14,  however, contains three exceptions.  First,  a contracting party may protect 
creditors'  rights,  ensure compliance with securities laws and ensure the  satisfaction of 
judgements. Second, any of the former Soviet republics may opt-out of the requirements 
of Article  14  when dealing with another former  Soviet republic.  Third, the Host State 
may  restrict  the  "retums-in-kind,,78  in circumstances  where  the GATT  allows  export 
restrictions.79 
In  addition  to  this,  Article  14  also  provides  for  two  extra  exceptions  for  Russian 
investors. According to these exceptions, the Host State is allowed to impose restrictions 
upon movement of capital by its own investors (subject to  several conditions aimed at 
protecting the rights of investors). In particular, the purpose of  allowing such exceptions 
was  to  exclude  the  right  of domestic  investors  to  request  certain  transfers  without 
foreclosing the right of  the foreign investor himself to make the same request.80 
77 'The Energy Charter Treaty: The Readers Guide' Secretariat of  the ECT 
<http://www.encharter.org!uploadl9/2038809502208514677380487897316925863021421737824  f886v l.p 
df#search=%22article%20 13%20Energy%20Charter%20Treaty%20commentary%22> (5 September 2006) 
78 E.g. export of  crude oil pursuant to a production sharing agreement (PSA). 
79 Except that such returns must be allowed in accordance with the provisions of  any written agreement that 
the foreign investor or its domestic subsidiary had with the Host State. 
80 Bamberger, C, 'The Energy Charter Treaty in 2000: In a New Phase' in Roggenkamp, Energy Law in 
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
158 J. Conclusion 
The main investment obligations of  the ECT Member States are set forth in Part III of  the 
ECT - "Investment Promotion and Protection". This Part represents a cornerstone of the 
Treaty.  The  provisions  in  Part  III  aim  to  promote  and  protect  foreign  investment  in 
member countries. Hence, the Treaty grants a number of fundamental rights to foreign 
investors  with regard  to  their  investment  in the  Host  State.  Under the  ECT,  foreign 
investors are protected against the most important political risks, such as discrimination, 
expropriation, nationalisation, breaches of individual investment contracts and, inter alia, 
unjust restrictions on the transfer of  funds. 81 
81  'The Energy Charter Treaty: The Readers Guide' Secretariat of  the ECT 
<http://www.encharter.org/uploadl9/2038809502208514677380487897316925863021421737824f886vl.p 
df#search=%22artic1e%20 13%20Energy'1020Charter%20TreatynIo20commentary%22> (5 September 2006) 
159 Chapter Eight 
Dispute settlement remedies of the Energy Charter Treaty 
A. I  ntrod uction 
The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) creates a number of  enforceable rights for foreign 
investors who invest their capital in any of the ECT Member States. 
1  These rights carry 
great significance to  investors in the energy industry because such investments tend to 
require large amounts of capital (which may take many years to recover),2  and are often 
made in politically, economically and legally unstable environments. 
Due to  investors' uncertainties about the neutrality or competence of some of the ECT 
Member States' local courts, a significant number of  energy disputes are now referred to 
international  arbitration.  International  arbitration  is  a  powerful  tool  for  investors  to 
encourage  States  to  abide  by their  treaty  obligations  and,  if they  do  not,  to  resolve 
disputes in a neutral forum.  A binding commitment to arbitrate disputes is particularly 
significant in the energy sector where, under national laws, it is sometimes the case that 
disputes can not be referred to arbitration or that States are reluctant to submit an energy 
related dispute to an independent third party. 
1 Waelde, T, 'Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty in the Light of  New NAFTA 
Precedents: Towards a Global Code of  Conduct for Economic Regulation' (February 2004) Transnational 
Dispute Management, Volume I, Issue 01 
2 Professor Waelde argues that "[  w  ]hile there is undoubtedly a convergence of  international trade and 
investment law, there remains still a significant distinction. Trading is mainly a much more short-term 
interaction between a foreign trader and a national economy; whereas investment implies a much more 
long-term exposure of  capital and efforts to on-going risks of  government regulation and political, 
regulatory and administrative volatility". See Waelde, T, above n 1 
160 In this Chapter I will discuss the dispute resolution mechanisms under the ECT, and also 
the mechanisms of recognition and enforcement of  the ECT awards. First, I will outline 
the dispute resolution options provided by the Treaty.  Second,  I shall  discuss  general 
mechanisms  of the  recognition  and  enforcement  of the  ECT  awards.  Finally  I  will 
highlight some of the methods of  recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
rendered against the Russian Federation, which will tighten my discussion to the nature 
and purpose of  this thesis. 
B. Dispute resolution options of the Energy Charter Treaty 
The  dispute  resolution  options  of the  ECT  are  specified  in  Article  26,  which  in its 
relevant parts states:3 
(4) In the  event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for  resolution  [ ...  ],  the 
Investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the dispute to be submitted to: 
(a)(i) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established pursuant 
to the Convention of  the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of  other States [ ...  ] if  the Contracting party of  the Investor and the Contracting party to the 
dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention; or 
(a)(ii) The International Centre for Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, [ ...  ], under the rules 
governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat 
of  the Centre, [ ...  ], if the Contracting Party of  the Investor or the Contracting Party to the 
dispute, but not both, is a party to ICSID Convention. 
(b) a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of 
the United National Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"); or 
(c) an arbitral proceedings under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce. (Emphasis added). 
3 Energy Charter Treaty (1994) <http://www.ena.ltlpdfaiiTreaty.pdt> (20 August 2007) (1994 ECT treaty), 
Article 26 
161 In other words, Article 26(4) of the ECT offers the parties 3 options ..  First, an investor 
can initiate institutional arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of  the International Centre 
for the Settlement of  Investment Disputes (ICSID). This option is available if  both parties 
have consented to this option, and if both the home State of the investor and the Host 
State  are  parties  to  the  1965  ICSID  Convention  (also  known  as  the  Washington 
Convention).4  If both parties have consented to ICSID Arbitration, but either the home 
State of the investor or the Host State, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention, 
the  ICSID Additional Facility Rules for the Administration of Proceedings  will  apply 
instead. 
The  second  option  permits  the  investor  to  initiate  institutional arbitration  under  the 
Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC). The last option, provides the investor with the opportunity to  commence an ad 
hoc  arbitration  under  the  Arbitration  Rules  of the  United  Nations  Commission  on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
Each of  these options will now be discussed. 
I.  Option one: arbitration under the ICSID system 
The ICSID system of dispute resolution is presented in three parts:  ICSID Arbitration, 
ICSID Conciliation and ICSID arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules. There are 
substantial  differences  between  these  three  instruments  and  thus  it  is  important  to 
consider each of  them separately. 
4 'Convention on the Settlement ofIntemational Disputes between States and Nationals of  Other States 
1965 (Washington Convention)' World Bank <http://icsid.worldbank.orglICSIDIICSlDlRulesMain.jsp> 
(18 February 2009) 
162 1.  ICSID Arbitration 
In 1965 the Washington Convention established the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID or Centre). The purpose of establishing this institution 
was to provide facilities
5 for dispute settlements of  investment disputes.
6 
The membership of the Washington Convention does not result in the ICSID arbitration 
being  a  compulsory  means  of  solving  investor-State  investment  disputes.  ICSID 
Arbitration becomes binding only upon the written consent of  the parties contained either 
in an investment agreement or in any of the relevant investment treaties. This is evident 
from the last paragraph of  the Preamble to the ICSID Convention, where it is stated that: 
[Declaring that] no Contracting State shall by the mere fact of  its ratification, acceptance of 
approval of  this Convention and without its consent, be deemed to be under any obligation 
to submit any particular dispute to conciliation or arbitration. (Emphasis added). 
Once the Contracting Parties have provided a written consent to the ICSID Arbitration, 
the  following  consequences  take  immediate  effect:  the  Contracting  Parties  may  not, 
unilaterally, withdraw their consent to arbitrate/ and the arbitral tribunal (appointed by 
the parties) is then able to decide on its own jurisdiction.s Furthermore, once an ICSID 
5 These "facilities" include: keeping  lists of  possible arbitrators (Article l2 ICSID), screening and 
registering arbitration requests (Article 36(para 3) ICSID), assisting in the constitution of  arbitral tribunals 
and the conduct of  proceedings (Article 38 ICSID), adopting rules and regulations (Article 6, para I, 
ICSID), and drafting model clauses for investment agreements. 
6 'Convention of  Settlement of  Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of  Other States 1965' 
World Bank <http://www.worldbank.orglicsidibasicdoc-archivef9.htrn> (20 August 2007) (Washington 
Convention or ICSID Convention) (entered into force on 14 October 1966), Article 1 
7 'Convention of  Settlement of  Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of  Other States 1965' 
World Bank  <http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlbasicdoc-archive/9.htrn> (20 August 2007) (Washington 
Convention or ICSID Convention) (entered into force on 14 October 1966), Article 25, para 1 
8 'Convention of  Settlement ofInvestment Disputes between States and Nationals of  Other States 1965' 
World Bank <http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlbasicdoc-archive/9.htm> (20 August 2007) (Washington 
Convention or ICSID Convention) (entered into force on 14 October 1966), Article 41, para 1. See also 
Attorney-General v Mobil Oil NZ Ltd., unreported; High Court, Wellington; 1 July 1987; (1987) 4 ICSID 
Reports 117. In this case the New Zealand government instituted parallel proceedings before its own 
domestic court in order to obtain an interim injunction seeking to restrain Mobil Oil from continuing the 
proceedings before ICSID. Basing its decision, inter alia, on Article 26 ofthe ICSID Convention, the New 
Zealand High Court, however, stayed the proceedings until the ICSID tribunal had determined its 
jurisdiction in this case. 
163 Award  is  rendered,  pursuant  to  Articles  53  and  54  ICSID,  it  becomes  binding  and 
enforceable. As  such, these awards may not be challenged in any other way except as 
provided by the annulment procedure specified in Article 52 of  the ICSID Convention. 
Not all investment disputes, however, may be brought before ICSID arbitration panels. 
Rather,  access  to  ICSID  arbitration  depends  upon  the  fulfilment  of jurisdictional 
requirements  provided  for  in  Article  25  of the  Convention.  These  requirements  are 
confined to  the  nature  of the  dispute  and  to  the  status of the parties to  the dispute. 
According to Article 25  ICSID the nature of the disputes is  limited to "legal disputes" 
arising "directly" out of an "investment".  The jurisdiction regarding the status of the 
parties to the dispute extends over "Contracting States" on the one hand, and "nationals 
of another  Contracting  State",  on  the  other.  In  other  words,  even  if parties  to  an 
investment agreement expressly  gave  their consent to  ICSID  arbitration,  any tribunal 
would have to satisfy itself of  the fact that the dispute arose directly from an investment, 
was of a legal nature and that both the Host State and the investor's home  State both 
party to the ICSID Convention. 
In the interests of  clarity, the provisions of  Article 25 ICSID are reproduced below: 
Article 25 
(l) The jurisdiction of  the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment,  between a Contracting State (or any  constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting  State  designated  to  the  Centre  by  that  State)  and  a  national  of another 
Contracting  State,  which  the  parties to  the  dispute  consent in  writing to  submit to the 
Centre.  When the parties  have  given their  consent, no  party  may  withdraw  its  consent 
unilaterally. 
(2) "National of  another Contracting State" means: 
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State 
party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such a dispute to 
conciliation  or  arbitration  as  well  as  on  the  date  on  which  the  request  was  registered 
pursuant to paragraph (3) of  Article 28 or paragraph (3) of  Article 36, but does not include 
164 any person who on either date also had the nationality of  the Contracting State party to the 
dispute; and 
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of  a Contracting State other than the State 
party to the dispute on  the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to 
conciliation  or  arbitration  and  any  juridical  person  which  had  the  nationality  of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, 
the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the 
purposes of  this Convention. 
(3) Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of  a Contracting State shall require the 
approval of  that State unless that State notifies the Centre that no such approval is required. 
(4) Any Contracting State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this 
Convention or at any time thereafter, notifY the Centre of the class or classes of disputes 
which it would or would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the  Centre.  The 
Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notification to all Contracting States. Such 
notification shall not constitute the consent required by paragraph (I). 
Another special feature of ICSID arbitration is  that it allows for only minimal (if any) 
interference with its  arbitral process by way of review.  According to  Article  54  (first 
paragraph) of the Convention, the ICSID awards are  final  and binding and have to be 
recognised in all Contracting States, parties to the Convention, in a similar manner as the 
Host States recognise the judgments of their own domestic courts. By virtue of Article 
54, the parties are prevented from failing to recognise the rendered arbitral award and to 
exercise the supervisory powers of their national courts under the provisions of the New 
York  Convention.
9  Instead,  the  ICSID  Convention  offers  its  own  awards-annulment 
procedure. The details of  this procedure are specified in Article 52 of  the Convention, and 
are as follows:
lO 
9 'Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958' 
<http://www.uncitral.orglpdf!englishitexts/arbitrationINY  -convlXXII  _I_e.  pdt> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention) 
10 The rather broad scope of  review exercised by the first two ad hoc committees (in Klockner v Kameroon, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/8112, Ad hoc Committee decision, 3 May 1985, 3 ICSID Reports 95 and Amco Asia 
v Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/811l, Ad hoc committee decision, 16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 509; 
25ILM 1441 (1986)) provoked substantial criticism. See Reisman, The Breakdown of  the Control 
Mechanism in ICSID Arbitrations, 4 Duke Law Journal 739 (1989); Caron, Reputation and Reality in the 
165 Article 52 
(1) Either party may request annulment of  the award by an application in writing addressed 
to the Secretary-General on one or more ofthe following grounds: 
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of  a member ofthe Tribunal; 
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of  procedure; or 
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. 
In  summary,  ICSID  arbitration  offers  a  number of advantages  to  both parties  of an 
investment agreement. On the one hand, it provides investors with direct access to a form 
of settlement of a dispute; it offers an opportunity to extend the possibility of a dispute 
settlement  beyond  the  realm  of the  Host  State's  national  courts,  and  provides  an 
assurance of fully effective and enforceable awards.  On the other hand,  it benefits the 
Host  States  by  promoting  that  State  as  favourable  for  investment  climate,  and  by 
releasing  it  from  the  burden  of  diplomatic  negotiations  (often  politically  and 
commercially sensitive). However, once this method of dispute resolution is chosen (i.e. 
it is duly consented to by  the Contracting Parties), the parties lose their rights to avail 
themselves  of any other dispute  settlement instruments  available  both  nationally  and 
internationally. 
2.  ICSID Conciliation 
The second method of  dispute settlement provided for under the ICSID auspices is ICSID 
Conciliation. ICSID Conciliation is known as a highly flexible and informal method of 
dispute settlement involving a third party that assists the Contracting Parties in reaching 
an agreed settlement. As opposed to arbitration, ICSID conciliation does not lead to a 
ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID Review 
21  (1991). Such broad scope of  review of  an ad hoc committee has since been substantially narrowed down 
(see, for example, MINE v Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/8414, Ad hoc committee decision, 22 December 
1989, 4 ICSID Reports 79; and Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of  Egypt, unreported; ICSID Case 
No. ARB/98/4; Ad hoc committee decision, 5 February 2002; (2002) 41  ILM 933). 
166 binding decision, but rather to a recommended "suggestion"ll allowing the parties "[to] 
bring  about  agreement  between  them  upon  mutually  acceptable  terms".12  Such 
informality is twofold. First, it renders the proceedings less expensive. Second, it requires 
a  higher degree  of cooperation between the  parties,  who theoretically,  could reject  a 
proposed solution at any given moment. 
One other point that ought to  be noted  in this  regard  is that the  "jurisdiction of the 
Centre", as specified in Article 25 ICSID, does not differentiate between arbitration and 
conciliation as  separate dispute  settlement techniques.  This could potentially lead to a 
serious problem since an unspecified submission regarding the Centre's jurisdiction may 
result  in  differences  between  the  parties  as  to  the  appropriate  method  of dispute 
settlement and lead, at the very least, to inevitable procedural delays. One of  the possible 
solutions to this problem was proposed by the ICSID Tribunal in  SPP v Egypt,13 where it 
was held that: 
Once  consent has been  given to  the jurisdiction of the  Centre,  the  Convention and its 
implementing regulations afford the means for making the choice between the two methods 
of dispute  settlement.  The  Convention  leaves  that  choice  to  the  party  instituting  the 
proceedings. 
It is  hoped  that  future  practice  will  not prove  contentious  in  this  respect,  and  it is 
advisable for the parties to specify in advance whether their consent refers to arbitration 
or conciliation. Finally, it should be noted that while this method of dispute resolution is 
significant, it is not expressly included in the list of  options available to investors under 
Article 26 ECT. Instead, the reference is made exclusively to ICSID Arbitration or ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, which I shall proceed to discuss. 
11  'Convention of  Settlement ofInvestment Disputes between States and Nationals of  Other States 1965' 
World Bank <http://www.worldbank.orglicsidlbasicdoc-archive/9.htm> (20 August 2007) (Washington 
Convention or ICSID Convention) (entered into force on 14 October 1966),Article 34, para 1 
12 Ibid 
!3 Spp v Egypt (14 April 1988) 3 ICSID Reports 156 (Decision on jurisdiction II) 
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As mentioned above, the jurisdiction of the ICSID  Centre rests on two pillars. First, it 
requires that both the Host State and the home State of an investor are Members of the 
ICSID  (Washington)  Convention.  Second,  it entails  both Contracting  Parties  to  have 
consented to ICSID arbitration in writing. Generally, if  one of  these pillars is missing, the 
Centre would be held to have no jurisdiction. This legal position is acceptable where the 
parties did not consent to  the applicability of the ICSID rules to the potential dispute. 
However, the situation is  somewhat different where both parties are willing to  submit 
their dispute to ICSID arbitration, but one of these parties is not a Member to the ICSID 
Convention. 
This situation was remedied in 1978, by the Centre's adoption of the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules.
14  By virtue of Article 2, Additional Facility Rules extended the Centre's 
jurisdiction to the following three situations:  first,  where at least one side to a dispute 
(either  the  Host  State  or  the  home  State  of an  investor)  is  a  party  to  the  ICSID 
Convention; second, where the legal dispute does not directly arise out of  an investment
15 
and finally, where arbitration or conciliation involves fact-fmding between a State and a 
national of  another State. 
An illustration of how the  Additional Facility Rules operate is  best described with the 
reference  to  the  relevant  provisions  of the  North  America  Free  Trade  Agreement 
(NAFTA).  Pursuant  to  Article  1120
16  NAFTA,  an  investor  may  submit  his  claim to 
14 'ICSID Additional Facility Rules 1978' World Bank 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsidlfacility/facility.htm> (20 February 2009) 
15 Article 2(b) ofthe Additional Facility Rules extends the ICSID Convention's jurisdiction over investment 
disputes to "disputes not directly arising our of  an investment". This provision must be read in conjunction 
with Article 4(3) of  Additional Facility Rules which makes Additional Facility dispute settlement 
conditional on the fact that "the underlying transaction has features which distinguish it from an ordinary 
commercial transaction". If  one reads Article 2(b) as requiring the disputes to, at least, "indirectly" arise out 
of  an investment, then this implies that a certain "investment nexus" remains a precondition for Additional 
Facility dispute settlement mechanism. 
16 Article 1120 NAFT  A provides: 
1.  Except as provided in Annex 1120.1, [ ...  1, a disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration 
under: 
168 ICSID arbitration only if  his home State or the Host State (or both) are party to the ICSID 
Convention. The three parties to NAFTA are: the United States, Canada and Mexico. Out 
of these  three  parties,  only  the  United States  is  a party to  the ICSID  Convention.  It 
therefore  follows  that  as  long  as  Canada  and  Mexico  are  not  party  to  the  ICSID 
Convention,  the NAFT  A will not operate to  confer jurisdiction under the Convention 
except where either the United States or its national (as investor) is involved. Since the 
US  is  a  party  to  the  Convention,  ICSID  Additional  Facility  arbitration  is  available 
between the US  investors and Canada and Mexico and between Canadian and Mexican 
investors and the  US  (though  it is also  possible to  opt for  UNCITRAL  arbitration)Y 
Consequently, for the disputes between Canadian investors versus Mexico and Mexican 
investors  versus  Canada - only UNCITRAL  arbitration  (as  another option of dispute 
resolution provided by NAFTA) is available. 
In must be noted that since dispute settlement under the Additional Facility is neither 
ICSID arbitration nor ICSID conciliation, it falls by definition outside the jurisdiction of 
the  Centre.  This  means  that  although  such proceedings  may be  administered  by the 
Secretariat of the  Centre and thus  benefit from  the institutional  support and expertise 
provided  by  the  Centre,  the  ICSID  Convention  does  not  apply  to  proceedings, 
recommendations, awards or reports under the Additional Facility.Is This means,  inter 
alia,  that  the  ICSID  Convention's  rules  on  recognition  and  enforcement  of arbitral 
awards are not applicable to awards rendered under the Additional Facility. In order to 
secure  the  effectiveness of such  awards,  Article  20  of the  Additional  Facility  Rules 
(a)  the ICSID Convention, provided that both the disputing Party and the Party ofthe investor are 
parties to the Convention; 
(b)  the Additional Facility Rules ofICSID, provided that either the disputing Party or the Party fo the 
investor, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention, or 
(c)  the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
17 See Azinian and ors v United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 1 November 
2000, (2000) 39 ILM 537; Mondev International Ltd. v United States of  America, unreported; ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11  October 2002 (NAFTA), (2003) 42 ILM 85; Waste Management, Inc.  v 
United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, 2 June 2000, (2002) 15 ICSID Review 
214; (2001) 40 ILM 56 
18 ICSID Additional Facility Rules, above n 13, Article 3 
169 provides that arbitral proceedings must be held only in States that are party to the 1958 
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards.19 
11.  Option  two:  institutional arbitration  under the  rules  of the  Stockholm 
Chamber of  Commerce 
The second dispute resolution option offered by Article 26 ECT is arbitration pursuant to 
the Rules of International Arbitration of  the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).20 
The  SCC  focuses  on  international  commercial  arbitration,  and  in  particular,  the 
settlement of  business disputes between private parties and private parties and sovereign 
States, with an interest in the Russian Federation. 
Similarly to ICSID and other institutional arbitration, the personnel of the SCC do not 
arbitrate the disputes itself, but supervise and monitor the arbitral procedures conducted 
within the facilities of an Institution. In practice, this is done through the rendering of 
various administrative services, such as providing a list of arbitrators or participating in 
the  process  of their  appointment,  calculating  fees  and  offering  other  administrative 
services. The advantages of choosing this mechanism of  dispute resolution are similar to 
those of  any other institutional arbitration. In particular, the SCC offers: 
(a)  (automatic incorporation ofa book ofmles (i.e. Rules of  the Arbitral Institute 
of  the Stockholm Chambers of  Commerce  );21 
(b)  trained staff  to administer arbitrators;22 and 
(c)  various  administrative  services  (i.e.  providing  a  list  of arbitrators,  well-
equipped arbitral facilities, calculating fees, etcetera). 
19 In Meta/clad Corporation v The United Mexican States (30 August 2000, Case No. ARB(AF)/ 9711,  16 
ICSID Review 1 (2001); 40 ILM 36 (2001»  the Additional Facility arbitral tribunal determined the place of 
arbitration to be Vancouver, Canada, which is a member of  the New York Convention. 
20 'Rules of  the Arbitration Institute of  the Stockholm Chamber of  Commerce' SCC 
<www.sccinstitute.coml_  upload/shared  _files/regier/web  _ A4  _ vanliga  _2004_  eng. pdf> (21 February 2009) 
21  Redfern, A, Hooter, M, Law and Practice of  International Commercial Arbitration, 3
rd ed (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 10 
22 These personnel are normally responsible for monitoring the appointment ofthe arbitral tribooal, 
controlling time frames allocated for each arbitration and, inter alia, collecting the advanced payments and 
fees. 
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Institution is, perhaps, the locality of the Centre and hence its physical proximity to the 
former blocs of  the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Another important factor is 
the familiarity of the SCC's personnel with the Russian language and the Russian legal 
system - bearing in mind that one of the initial objectives of the ECT was to create co-
operation  within  the  energy  sector  with  the  countries  of Eastern  Europe  including, 
primarily, the blocs of  the former Soviet Union including the Russian Federation. 
III. Option three: ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
The final dispute resolution option stipulated in Article 26 ECT is an ad hoc
23 arbitration 
pursuant  to  the  rules  of United  Nations  Commission  on  International  Trade  Law 
(UNCITRAL).24  For the purposes  of Article  26  ECT,  ad hoc arbitration represents  a 
potential  plan  "B" option  if ICSID  or  Additional  Facility  dispute  settlement  is  not 
available,zs  Generally, however, ad hoc arbitration is  desirable when claimants do not 
wish to resort to institutional arbitration and apply a fixed set of  rules, but prefer to adopt 
procedural rules tailored to their specific needs. 
Ad hoc arbitration has the  advantage of offering a certain procedural flexibility - the 
parties may adopt the existing rules (i.e. the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) or, they may 
23 Ad  hoc is a Latin phrase which means "for this [purpose]." It  generally signifies a solution that has been 
tailored to a specific purpose. It can also refer to an improvised and often impromptu event or solution "on 
an ad-hoc basis", as opposed to well-prepared ones. It  comes from the Latin phrase meaning "to the thing". 
With regard to arbitration, ad  hoc arbitration generally refers to a non-institutional arbitration where the 
process can be tailored to the needs of  the parties (via amending the proposed "Model Clauses" of, for 
example, UNCITRAL Model Law on international arbitration). 
24 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established by the 
General Assembly in 1966 (Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 December 1966). In establishing the Commission, 
the General Assembly recognised that disparities in national laws governing international trade created 
obstacles to the flow of  trade, and it regarded the Commission as the vehicle by which the United Nations 
could playa more active role in reducing or removing these obstacles. Electronic 
<http://www.uncitral.org/> (16 August 2007) 
25 See, for example, Azinian and ors v United Mexican States, unreported; ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 
1 November 2000, (2000) 39 ILM 537; Mondev International Ltd.  v United States of  America, unreported; 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, II October 2002 (NAFTA), (2003) 42 ILM 85; Waste 
Management, Inc. v United Mexican States, 2 Jun 2000, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2, 15 ICSID Review 214 
(2000); 40 ILM 56 (2001) 
171 agree  to  develop  their  own  tailor-made  set  of rules,26  or indeed,  such  rules  may  be 
established by the arbitral tribunal in consultation with the parties, as was the case in the 
Aminoil arbitration.27  In Aminoil the  arbitral  tribunal  adopted  its  own  set of rules  of 
procedure  "on  the  basis  of natural  justice  and  of such  principles  of trans-national 
arbitration procedure as  it  found applicable".28 A further advantage of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration  Rules  is  that,  since  they  have  been  drafted  by  the  United  Nations 
Commission, they arguably provide better protection against any possible unconscionable 
bias of  the drafters in favour of a given continent or industry.29 However, this point may 
well be disputed. 
Since the parties under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are able to choose the rules that 
would  govern  their  potential  dispute,  they  may  choose  the  arbitration  rules  of any 
institution  or centre  including,  for  example,  those  of the  ICSID.  Although  in  such 
situations where the Convention and, in particular, its provisions governing enforcement 
of arbitral awards do not apply, the actual arbitral process would largely resemble ICSID 
arbitration?O 
In  contrast  to  institutional  arbitration,  ad hoc  arbitration  lacks  the  support  of an 
administrative organisation and is equally deprived of a strong enforcement mechanism 
(generally offered by the Rules of an arbitral Institution). Nevertheless, enforcement of 
arbitral  awards  rendered  by  ad hoc  arbitration  tribunals  will  be  facilitated  by  the 
26 See CME Czech Republic B. V.  v The Czech Republic, unreported; UNCITRAL; Partial Award, 13 
September 2001; (2002) 14 World Trade and Arbitration Materials, No.3, 109; CME Czech Republic B. V. 
v The Czech Republic, unreported; UNCITRAL; Final Award, 14 March 2003. Electronic 
<http://www.ita.law.uvic.caJdocuments/CME-2003-Final_  002.pdf> (17 August 2007); Ronald  S. Lauder v 
The Czech Republic (Final award), unreported; UNCITRAL, 3 September 2001; (2002) 14 World Trade 
and Arbitration Materials 35 
27 Kuwait v the American Independent Oil Company (Aminol!) (1982) 21  ILM 976 (Aminoil case) 
28 Ibid. 
29 Rubino-Sammartano, M, International Arbitration: Law and  Practice, 2
nd ed (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001), 823 
30 Schreuer, C, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (London: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Art. 
25, para 140 
172 application of  the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign 
Arbitral Awards  .31 
A number of major investment disputes were settled through ad hoc arbitration in the 
past, amongst which are the Libyan expropriation cases such as BP v Libya,32 Liamc0
33 
and  TexacolCalasiatic?4  Also,  some  of the  older  mixed  arbitrations  were  conducted 
according to  arbitral rules  set up ad hoc.  To  illustrate, one may cite cases such as the 
Lena Goldjields
35 arbitration, Saudi Arabia v Aramco/
6 and the Sapphire case.
37 
In summary, arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules represents the last (in 
the chronological order) of the three dispute resolution options provided for in Article 26 
ECT.  If the parties select this option, by way of incorporating it into  their arbitration 
agreement (or otherwise putting it in writing),  they automatically waive their right to 
select  any  other of the  two  available  options,  namely,  arbitration pursuant to  ICSID 
Convention or arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the  Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce.  The  choice  of the  UNCITRAL  Rules of Arbitration allows the parties to 
tailor  the  applicable  procedural  rules  to  their  unique  commercial  and  legal  needs. 
However,  it  ought  to  be  noted  that  these  Rules  do  not  provide  an  internal  award-
enforcement mechanism?8  These  and  many  other peculiarities of ad hoc arbitrations 
ought to be taken into account by the Contracting Parties before they make their selection 
of  a dispute resolution mechanism, pursuant to Article 26 ECT. 
31  Moens, Gabriel &  Gillies, Peter, International Trade & Business: Law, Policy and  Ethics, 2
nd ed 
(London: Routledge Cavendish, 2006), 591 
32 British Petroleum v Libya (1979) 53 ILR 297-388 
33 Libyan American Oil Company (Liamco) v Libya (1981) 20 ILM 1-87 (Liamco case) 
34  Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company! California Asiatic (Calasiatic) Oil Company v Libya (1978) 17 
ILM 1-37 
35 Lena Goldfields Company Ltd. v Soviet Union (1930) 5 Ann. Dig. 11426; (1959) 36 CornellLQ 42 
36 Saudi Arabia v Aramco (1958) 27 ILR 117 (Aramco case) 
37 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v National Iranian Oil Company (1963) 35 ILR 136 
38 The enforcement ofUNCITRAL awards can only be done through the application of  the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 
173 IV. Exceptions to arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty 
The ECT Member States (or their nationals) are automatically entitled to utilise one of 
the  three  arbitration  options  specified  in  Article  26(4)  ECT.  As  a  result,  no  further 
arbitration agreement, such as a dispute resolution clause within the parties' investment 
agreement,  is  necessary.  The  States'  consent  to  arbitrate  is  contained  within  the 
provisions of the ECT, and is unconditional and irrevocable.
39 In other words, the ECT 
Member States are deemed to have given their unconditional and irrevocable consent to 
submit to arbitral proceedings in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 26(3)(a) 
ECT.  Member  States  are  only able to  withdraw from  their investment obligations in 
limited  circumstances,  none  of which allow them to  escape from  existing liability for 
breaches of  the treaty that took place before their withdrawal, or for a period of 20 years 
thereafter  (Article  47(3)  ECT).  There  are  some  limited  exceptions  to  this  general 
principle. 
Article 26(3)(b) ECT provides that the States listed in Annex ID have not unconditionally 
consented to  international  arbitration  when  the  investor has  previously  submitted the 
dispute in question to the Host State's courts or administrative tribunals or to a previously 
agreed dispute settlement procedure.  Twenty four (24) Member States (almost half the 
signatories to the ECT) are listed in Annex ID, including the Russian Federation, Japan 
and the European Union. 
Furthermore, Article 26(3)(  c) ECT provides that the States listed in Annex IA have not 
unconditionally  consented  to  international  arbitration  when  the  dispute  involves  an 
alleged breach of the contractual obligations referred to  in the last sentence of Article 
10(1). This is a far-reaching exception.  However it will have a limited effect in practice 
as only Australia, Canada, Hungary and Norway have chosen this option. Hence, while 
the ECT offers foreign investors a wide spectrum of dispute resolution mechanisms, one 
should remain mindful of  its exceptions. 
39 It  must be noted that State's consent to arbitrate does not extend to the commercial activities of  the State, 
but only the alleged breaches of  specific standards refered to in part III of  the ECT. 
174 C. Recognition and enforcement of the ECT awards 
I. Introduction 
Depending  upon  the  parties'  choice  of  the  dispute  resolution  mechanism,  and 
consequently  the  applicable  Arbitration  Rules,  there  exists  at  least  two  possible 
procedures for the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards rendered pursuant 
to Article 26 ECT. Assuming that the parties had (successfully) submitted their dispute to 
ICSID Centre, the recognition and enforcement of an award would be subjected to the 
procedures specified in the  Washington (ICSID)  Convention 1965. For all other awards, 
i.e.  those rendered  under the Rules of SCC,  UNCITRAL  Arbitration Rules or ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, the appropriate recognition and enforcement procedure is that 
specified in the  New  York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 1958. I shall now discuss each of  these mechanisms separately. 
II.  Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards under the  Washington 
Convention 
1.  General 
The  general  obligation to  recognise and enforce  ICSID  awards  is  specified in Article 
54(1) ICSID Convention. Article 54(1) reads as follows: 
Each Contracting State shall recognise an award rendered pursuant to  this Convention as 
binding, and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories 
as  if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal 
constitution may enforce such an award in  or through its  federal courts and may provide 
that such courts treat the award as if  it were a final judgment of  the courts of  the constituent 
[S]tate. (Emphasis added). 
175 In  other  words,  under  Article  54  all  States,  party  to  the  ICSID  Convention,  shall 
recognise  and  enforce  an  ICSID  award  as  if it  were  a  final  judgement of their own 
domestic courts.
40 
Recognition and enforcement of an award may be sought in any State that is a party to 
the ICSID Convention, and not just in the States of  the parties to the arbitral proceedings 
in question. Therefore, the party, seeking recognition and enforcement of an award has 
the possibility to select the forum most favourable for its purpose.
41  Failure of a State, 
party to the Convention, to recognise and enforce an award would amount to a breach of 
a  treaty  obligation  and  would  carry  the  usual  consequences  of State  responsibility, 
including diplomatic protection. 
The  obligation to  recognise  and  enforce  ICSID  awards  only  applies  to  final  awards. 
Decisions preliminary to awards, such as decisions on jurisdiction (Article 41  ICSID) or 
decisions regarding procedural orders (Articles 43  and 44 ICSID) or, indeed, decisions 
regarding interim protection measures (Article 47 ICSID), are not, therefore, subject to 
recognition and enforcement pursuant to the rules specified under the Convention.
42 
Under  Article  53(2)  ICSID,  "award"  (for  purposes  of Article  54  ICSID)  includes 
decisions under Articles 50,  51  and 52 ICSID, on interpretation, revision and annulment 
respectively. This means that the ICSID awards are to be recognised and enforced subject 
to  any  interpretation,  revision  or  annulment.  Subsequently,  a  decision  annulling  the 
award, for example, removes the obligation to recognise or enforce it.
43 
40 It should, however, be noted that Article 54 ICSID does not distinguish between the recognition and 
enforcement of  awards against investors on one side, and against Host States, on the other. 
41  This selection is determined primarily by the availability of  suitable assets. 
42 It is, however, possible to make these interim awards enforceable. This can be done by way of 
incorporation them into the final award. 
43  In case of  a partial annulment, the obligation to recognise and enforce the award is limited to the portion 
of  the award that has not been annulled. 
176 Furthermore, recognition and enforcement are  subject to the condition that there is no 
"stay" of enforcement.
44  In other words, the duty to  recognise and enforce an ICSID 
award is suspended while a stay of  enforcement is in force. A stay of  enforcement may be 
granted  under  Articles  50(2),  51(4)  and  52(5)  ICSID,  while  proceedings  for 
interpretation, annulment or revision are pending. 
ICSID  awards  may  not  be  made  subject  to  conditions  for  their  recognition  and 
enforcement which are not provided for by the ICSID Convention.
45  In the process of 
recognition and enforcement, the authority of  domestic courts is confined to verifying the 
authenticity ofthe ICSID award. In one of  the reports prepared by the UNCTAD in 2003 
it is stated that:
46 
[The domestic courts]  may not re-examine the  ICSID tribunal's jurisdiction.  [They]  may 
not re-examine the  award on the  merits. Nor may [the courts]  examine the  fairness  and 
propriety of the proceedings before the ICSID tribunal. Not even the public order of the 
State,  where  recognition  and  enforcement  is  sought,  is  a  valid  ground  for  a  refusal  to 
recognise and enforce. (Emphasis added). 
Such a stringent recognition and enforcement mechanism is unique to the ICSID awards 
alone. In contrast, the non-ICSID awards, including Additional Facility awards, may be 
reviewed  by the domestic  courts in accordance with the  domestic  law and applicable 
treaties on the occasion of  their recognition and enforcement. 
In summary, if the ICSID award is final and is not subject to interpretation, revision or 
annulment procedures, the court in which the recognition is sought must recognise this 
award as authentic. Once recognised as authentic, an award becomes final and binding. In 
addition  to  this,  recognition  of an  award  is  also  a  preliminary  step  leading  to  its 
enforcement or execution. 
44 "Stay" is an order made by a court suspending all or part of  an action either before of  after a 
determination by a court in respect of  the action (Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary, 3
rd ed 
(LexixNexis Butterworths, 2004), 411). 
45 Enforcement under ICSID Convention is independent of  the New York Convention and other 
international and domestic rules dealing with the enforcement of  foreign arbitral awards. 
46 'Series on Dispute Settlement' UNCTAD,  United Nations (2003) 
<http://www.unctad.orgiTemplates/webflyer.asp?docid=3497&intItemID=2322&lang=l> (9 March 2009) 
177 2.  ICSID procedure for recognition and enforcement of  awards 
The procedure for recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards is covered by Articles 
54(2) and 54(3) ICSID in the following terms: 
54(2) A party seeking recognition of enforcement in the territories of  the Contracting State 
shall furnish to a competent court or other authority, which such a State has designated for 
this purpose,  a copy of the  award certified by the  Secretary-General. Each Contracting 
State shall notify the Secretary-General of the designation of  the competent court or other 
authority for this purpose and of  any subsequent change in such designation. 
54(3) Execution of the award shall be  governed by the laws concerning the execution of 
judgments in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought. 
In  other words,  a party must provide a copy of the  award  certified by the  Secretary-
General of the Centre in order to  obtain recognition or enforcement by the competent 
court or authority. Under Article  11  ICSID, the Secretary-General authenticates arbitral 
awards  and  certified  copies  thereof,  which  are  generally  promptly  dispatched  to  the 
parties. 
A proceeding for the recognition and enforcement of  the award may only be initiated by 
the party to the original ICSID arbitration. An interested third party is not entitled to do 
so.  This would exclude action by a State acting on behalf of its constituent that was a 
party to the ICSID proceedings. A State exercising diplomatic protection is also barred 
from acting under Article 54(2) of  the ICSID Convention. 
It should be noted that the Convention provides no provisions prohibiting a party seeking 
the  recognition  and  enforcement of an  arbitral  award to  initiate  such  proceedings  in 
several States simultaneously. The obvious drawback of this option is that the courts, in 
which enforcement is sought, need to bear an extra burden by having to ensure that the 
sought payment is not made more than once.
47 The question as to what procedures the 
47 This is necessary to prevent double recovery. 
178 courts should undertake to comply with its "obligations to ensure" that there is no double 
recovery remains unclear. 
The  execution  of the  ICSID  award  is  subject  to  the  law  of the  country  where  the 
execution takes place. Therefore, only procedures and remedies that are available under 
the local law will be applied to ICSID awards. Obstacles to the enforcement of  the ICSID 
award under the law where  execution is sought in  no  way affect the  obligation of the 
party to the ICSID arbitration to abide by and comply with the award in accordance with 
Article 53(1). A State that successfully relies upon the law concerning State immunity 
from  execution will  still be deemed to  have  breached  its  obligation under the  ICSID 
Convention. The  logical consequence of this appears to be the investor's revival of his 
right to diplomatic protection under Article 27(1) of  the Convention. 
III.  Recognition  and enforcement of arbitral awards  under the  New  York 
Convention 
1.  General 
Arbitral awards issued pursuant to Article 26  ECT (other than those that fall  under the 
ICSID  enforcement  procedure)  should  be  enforceable  in  all  countries  which  are 
signatories  to  the  1958  New  York  Convention  on  Recognition  and Enforcement  of 
Foreign  Arbitral Awards  (the  New  York  Convention).  The  New  York  Convention 
requires States which are a party to it to enforce foreign arbitral awards in their domestic 
courts,  in the same manner that it enforces its domestic  awards  or judgements of its 
domestic courts. Under Article 26(5)(b) ECT, the parties to the arbitration may request 
that the arbitration takes place in a State which is a party to the New York Convention, 
thereby ensuring the enforceability of  the future award.  The parties' enforcement rights 
are further protected by the  last sentence of Article 26(  5)(b) ECT which confirms that 
179 disputes submitted to arbitration under Article 26 fall within the scope of  transactions set 
out in Article I New York Convention.
48 Namely, Article 26(5)(b) ECT states that: 
Any arbitration under this Article shall at the request of  any party to the dispute be held in a 
state that is a party to the New York Convention. Claims submitted to arbitration hereunder 
shall be considered to arise out of  a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes 
of  article I of  that Convention. (Emphasis added). 
Article  I  of the  New York  Convention specifies that the  Convention applies  "to the 
recognition and enforcement of  arbitral awards made on the territory of  a State other than 
a State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought",  49 and that the 
Convention "shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered [as]  domestic awards in 
the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought".  50 
Hence, the recognition and enforcement of  arbitral awards under the ECT is performed in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of  the New York Convention. 
Generally  speaking,  the  obligation  to  recognise  and  enforce  international  arbitration 
award is incumbent upon all States party to the New York Convention.
51  The New York 
48 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdfJenglish/texts/arbitrationlNY  -convIXXII_I_  e.pdf> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention). Article I of  the New York Convention reads as follows: 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
(1)  This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of  arbitral awards made in the 
territory of  a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of  such awards 
are sought, and arising out of  differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall 
also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought. 
(2)  [ ... J 
(3)  When signing, ratifYing or acceding to this Convention, or notifYing extension under article X 
hereof, any State may on the basis of  reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to 
the recognition and enforcement of  awards made only in the territory of  another Contracting 
State. It  may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of 
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the 
national law ofthe State making such declaration. 
5! Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdfJenglish/texts/arbitration/NY-convIXXIC  1_  e.pdf> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention) 
180 Convention contains the rules on validity of  arbitration clauses
52 and rules on recognition 
and  enforceability  (as  opposed  to  actual  enforcement)  of arbitral  awards.  The  issues 
regarding the validity of  arbitral agreements will not be discussed within this thesis. The 
discussion on the recognition and enforceability of foreign arbitral awards is provided 
below. 
2.  General rules of  the New York Convention 
The  system  of recognition  and  enforcement  of arbitral  awards  under  the  New  York 
Convention is laid down in Articles III to V ofthe Convention. According to Article III: 
Each  Contracting  State  shall  recognise  arbitral  awards  as  binding and enforce them  in 
accordance with the rules of  procedure laid down in the following articles. 
Article  IV  then  determines  the  formal  requirements  that  have  to  be  fulfilled  by  an 
application  for  the  enforcement  of foreign  arbitral  awards.  Those  requirements  (the 
submission  of the  arbitral  award  and  of the  arbitral  agreement  in  the  original  or in 
certified copies  as  well  as  a  certified translation of those  documents  into  the  official 
language  of the  country  where  enforcement  is  sought)  usually  do  not  constitute  an 
obstacle for the enforcement of  the award. Of greater practical importance, therefore, are 
the grounds of refusal of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award, which are 
exclusively  enumerated  in  Article  V  of the  New  York  Convention.  In  particular, the 
provisions of  Article V read as follows: 
1.  Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is  invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where 
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proofthat: 
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to 
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the 
52 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglishitexts/arbitrationlNY-convIXXII  _1_  e.pdt> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention), Article II 
181 parties have subjected it or,  failing any indication thereon,  under the law of the country 
where the award was made; or 
(b)  The  party  against  whom  the  award  is  invoked  was  not given  proper notice  of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of  the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to 
present his case; or 
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of 
the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration 
can be  separated  from  those  not  so  submitted,  that  part  of the  award  which  contains 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or 
(d) The composition of  the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with 
the law of  the country where the arbitration took place; or 
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended 
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award 
was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if  the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of  the difference is not capable of  settlement by arbitration under the 
law of  that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of  the award would be contrary to the public policy of 
that country. 
These  grounds  deal,  however,  with  exceptional  circumstances  only.  As  a  result,  the 
provisions  on  recognition  and  enforcement  of the  New  York  Convention  can  be 
summarised  ill  the  rule  that  foreign  arbitral  awards  are  generally  recognised  and 
enforceable  ill  a  Member  State  of the  New  York  Convention,  unless  exceptional 
circumstances occur. 
In order to evaluate whether a creditor can seek enforcement of an arbitral award under 
the  principles of the  New  York  Convention,  it is  important  to  ascertain  whether that 
creditor could rely on this Convention. The discussion on this point is provided in the 
next paragraph. 
182 3.  Scope of  the application of  the New York Convention 
An investor can generally rely on the provisions of the New York Convention when the 
arbitral award was rendered and is being enforced in one of  the Member States. The New 
York Convention has been ratified by more than 130 countries, including all of  the major 
trading nations.  53  The list of Member States covers all  major economic centres of the 
world and is constantly increasing.  54 Additionally, the person or entity in whose favour 
an award  is  rendered can, pursuant to  the New  York Convention, seek enforcement of 
such an award almost anywhere in the world.  Having said that, it is  important to note, 
however, that a considerable number of  Member States  55 made use of  the first reservation 
under Article 1(3)56 ofthe New York Convention and declared that they will not apply the 
Convention to awards of  non-Member States on the basis of  reciprocity only. 
Due  to  the  constantly  decreasing  number  of  non-Member  States,  however,  the 
reservations provided in Article 1(3) lost most of its practical importance. What is more 
notable is that even if a Member State refuses  to apply the New  York Convention to 
arbitral awards of  non-Member States, the Member State is still free to grant recognition 
of such awards on the basis of its local laws. The New York Convention does not exclude 
the  application of local  laws  if those  laws  are  more  favourable  to  enforcement of a 
53 Moens, Gabriel & Gillies, Peter, International Trade & Business: Law, Policy and  Ethics, 2
nd ed 
(London: Routledge Cavendish, 2006), 591 
54 Countries that have not (yet) ratified the New York Convention are located mostly in Africa and Pacific 
Islands. The most notable non-Member States include Afghanistan, Andorra, Bahamas, Iraq, Liechtenstein, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Taiwan and Turkmenistan. 
55 According to the list published on the website ofUNCITRAL, 68 out of 133 Member States of  the New 
York Convention have filed a reservation not to recognise awards made in a non-Member State. Some of 
these countries include Argentina, China, France, USA, United Kingdom and others. 
56 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.orglpdflenglishltexts/arbitrationlNY  -convlXXII  _I_e.  pdt> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention), Article I: 
(3) When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article X 
hereof, any State may on the basis of  reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the 
recognition and enforcement of  awards made only in the territory of  another Contracting 
State.[ ...  ]. 
183 foreign arbitral award, which is also supported by the provisions of  Article VII( 1) of  the 
New York Convention.  57 
4.  Recognition of an arbitral award rendered in a non-Member Sate to  the New 
York Convention 
In cases where an award is rendered in a non-Member State to the New York Convention, 
such an award may nevertheless be enforceable. According to one of the judgements of 
the French Cour de  Cassation,58 even if the assets of the debtor are  located in a State, 
which  is  non-party  to  the  New  York  Convention,  the  creditor may  nevertheless  have 
access to these assets. This is due to the following set of  circumstances. First, an arbitral 
award might be enforceable on the basis of  the local laws of  the non-Member State. More 
specifically,  the  fact  that  a  country  has  not  become  a  Member  of the  New  York 
Convention does not mean that that country will not grant enforcement of  foreign arbitral 
awards. 
Second, there are situations when enforcement against assets located in a non-Member 
State might be carried out from a Member State. This situation was discussed in the Cour 
de Cassation case,59  where  it was  argued  that if a judgement creditor knows that his 
debtor has assets in another State, he can apply for a garnishment order by which all 
claims of the judgement debtor against the third party debtor are seized in favour of the 
creditor. The exact process of  how the garnishment orders operate is provided at the end 
of  this chapter. 
57 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.orglpdf/english/texts/arbitrationINY-convIXXII  _1_  e.pdf> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention), Article VII: 
(1) The provisions of  the present Convention shall not affect the validity of  multilateral or bilateral 
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of  arbitral awards entered into by the 
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of  any right he may have to avail himself of  an 
arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of  the country 
where such award is sought to be relied upon. 
58 The Judgment of  the Cour de Cassation (chamber commerciale), France, 30 May 1985; (1986) Reviue 
Critiquie 329 
59 Ibid. 
184 5.  Subject matter of  the New York Convention: restrictions on the application 
While the geographical scope of the New  York Convention is  practically unlimited, its 
restrictions with regards to its subject matter are of  greater relevance. 
First, the New  York Convention  applies to "foreign" as opposed to  "domestic" arbitral 
awards.  If,  for example, an Australian investor seeks to  enforce an Australian arbitral 
award against certain assets of the Russian Federation that are located in Australia (i.e 
mining equipment), the Australian investor is unable to rely upon the provisions of the 
New  York Convention, but has to rely purely on the relevant provisions of the domestic 
law. 
Second, some Member States60 made use of  the second reservation under Article 1(3)61 of 
the  New  York  Convention  and  declared  that  they  will  only  apply  the  Convention  to 
"commercial"  disputes.  As  a  result,  these  States  may  refuse  enforcement  of arbitral 
awards in matters like matrimonial  and  other domestic relations or in disputes on the 
exercise of  sovereign or State powers (acta iure imperii). 
The most important restriction on the application of  the New York Convention, however, 
lies in the  fact  that  it only  deals  with the conditions  for  enforceability of an arbitral 
award. This means that the rules of  procedure on how an award becomes an enforceable 
title in a Member State are  subject to the local laws of that State where enforcement is 
sought.
62 The New York Convention does not specify that a court has to issue a so-called 
judgement of enforcement in order to  render a foreign  arbitral award enforceable, nor 
does  the  New  York  Convention  contain provisions on which court has  jurisdiction to 
60 According to the list published on the website ofUNCITRAL, 43 out of 133 Member States of  the New 
York Convention have filed that reservation. Some of  these countries include Argentina, China, India, 
USA, Poland, Turkey and others. 
61  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards,  1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pd£'english/texts/arbitration/NY  -conv/XXII_l_  e.pdt> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention), Article I: 
(3) [  ...  ]. It  may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of 
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the 
national law of  the State making such declaration. 
62 Except for the formalities of  the application laid down in Article IV of  the New York Convention. 
185 decide on the enforceability of a foreign  award.  The  local  laws of the country where 
enforcement is sought can thus set up additional requirements for jurisdiction of  the local 
courts in such cases. A good example of such "additional requirements" may be found in 
the case of Transatlantic Bulk Shipping Ltd v Saudi Charterinl
3 where the US District 
court  for  the  Southern  District  of New  York  dismissed  the  claimant's  petition  for 
confirmation of the  London's arbitral award for  lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
respondent. The court ruled that personal jurisdiction would have required "some basis 
[ ...  ],  whether  arising  from  the  respondent's  residence,  his  conduct,  his  consent,  the 
location of  his property or otherwise" (emphasis added). 
Despite  the  ruling  in  the  Transatlantic  Bulk Shipping  case,  a  sufficient  connection 
between the debtor and the State where enforcement is sought can usually  be established. 
This is because the enforcement of  an arbitral award is normally only pursued in a State if 
the debtor has assets in that State and there certainly exists a clear and direct connection 
between an entity and its assets. 
There exists, however, one other issue where the restrictions of  the New York Convention 
as to its subject matter are of significant practical relevance. That is, since the New York 
Convention  only  deals  with  the  enforceability  of foreign  arbitral  awards,  it  fails  to 
provide for uniform law in the subsequent enforcement proceedings. As a result, among 
the New York Convention's Member States there are at least 130 different legal systems 
on how to  execute  an  enforceable  award  against the debtor's  assets.  For example,  a 
judgement creditor who wants to know whether he can seek enforcement of an arbitral 
award against certain assets of  his debtor in foreign State 'X' should not only be satisfied 
with  the  answer  that  'X'  is  a  Member of the  New  York  Convention,  but must  also 
investigate whether and under what conditions he can actually seize certain assets located 
in country 'X' (which will depend upon the local laws of 'X'). 
63  Transatlantic Bulk Shipping Ltd.  v Saudi Chartering (1985) 622 F. Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y.). This was an 
action for confirmation of  a London arbitral award rendered between a Liberian claimant and a Panamanian 
respondent with its principal place of  business in Greece. 
186 Following the objectives of this thesis,  it is  now convenient to  discuss  the  issues of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards rendered against Russian energy 
entities or the State of  the Russian Federation. 
D.  Recognition  and  enforcement  of  foreign  arbitral  awards 
against the Russian Federation 
I.  General 
Generally speaking, an arbitral award to which the Russian Federation is a party may be 
dealt with in two different ways. First, a foreign investor may take an arbitral award for 
the  purposes  of recognition  and  enforcement to  one  of the  Russian  domestic  courts. 
Second, an investor may take an award to a court of  any other State if his debtor (i.e. the 
State or a private company) holds sufficient assets in that State. I shall now discuss each 
of  these options in turn. 
II.  Recognition  and  enforcement  of foreign  arbitral  awards  in  Russian 
courts 
The  obligation to  recognise and enforce  international arbitration  awards  is incumbent 
upon  all  States  parties  to  the  1958  New  York  Convention  on  Recognition  and 
Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards.
64  The Soviet Union acceded to the New York 
Convention  in  1960.  After  the  collapse  of the  Soviet Union,  the  Russian  Federation 
declared itself its successor. Thus Russia's official declarations that it would continue to 
exercise rights and honour obligations arising from  international treaties signed by the 
Soviet Union mean that Russia is now bound by all international acts that were signed by 
the Soviet Union, including the New York Convention.
65 
64 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglish/texts/arbitrationINY-convIXXII  _1_  e.pdt> (20 August 2007) (New 
York Convention) 
65 In addition to that, on 16 June 1992, Russia signed the ICSID Convention, but has not yet ratified it. 
187 The New York Convention, as mentioned above, does not provide any procedure for the 
execution of foreign arbitral awards. Thus far,  when a foreign arbitral award against a 
Russian party is brought before one of  the Russian domestic courts, the court must follow 
the execution procedure of  its own domestic laws. 
Presently, there are two Russian laws which serve as the basis of enforcement of foreign 
arbitral  awards.  These  are  the Law on  International  Commercial Arbitration of 1993 
(LICA) and the Procedural Code of  the Commercial Court of  2002 (CCPC). The LICA 
is broadly based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law (Model Law). The preamble to LICA 
declares that the Law is based upon the recognition of the usefulness of arbitration as a 
widely applied method of  settling disputes emerging in the area of  international trade. 
Article 5 LICA, which mirrors Article 5 of the Mode Law, provides that: "[i]n matters 
governed  by [this]  Law,  no  court  shall  intervene  except  where  so  provided  in  [this] 
Law,,66  (emphasis  added).  The  court's intervention,  as  further  provided  by Article  6 
LICA, is authorised in limited circumstances, among which is the procedure for setting 
aside the arbitral awards (the grounds for which are listed in Article 34 LICA and Article 
34 Model Law, respectively). 
The  issues  regarding  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of foreign  arbitral  awards  in 
Russian courts are addressed in Chapter 8 LICA, in which Article 35(1) it is provided 
that: 
Arbitral awards, regardless of where they were granted, are recognised as  binding and by 
submission  of application  to  a  competent  court,  shall  be  enforced  by  taking  into 
consideration the rules of  the present provision and of  Article 36. 
Article 36 LICA sets out the grounds for the refusal of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Paragraph one of Article 36 is almost identical to the provisions 
66 Law o/the Russian Federation on International Commercial Arbitration 1993 (Russian Federation), 
Article 5 <http://www.jus.uio.no/lmlrussia.intemational.commercial.arbitration.1993/doc.html> (8 July 
2009) 
188 of Article V of the New York Convention, i.e. it lists the grounds for refusal of arbitral 
awards  by the  Russian  courts.  Accordingly,  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of an 
arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be refused only 
when: 
(a)  the arbitration agreement is void; 
(b)  one of  the parties to arbitration did not have the capacity to act; 
(c)  the subject matter of  an award was not covered in the arbitration agreement; 
(d)  the party to arbitration was not duly informed of  the appointment of  arbitrators, or 
of  arbitral proceedings, or was unable to present his case; 
(e)  the arbitral procedure or the composition of an arbitral agreement did not coincide 
with the agreement or law; 
(f)  the award is not final,  was revoked or its enforcement was suspended under other 
grounds; 
(g)  the subject matter of  the arbitration cannot be dealt with by an arbitration according 
to Russian law; and 
(h)  the recognition and enforcement of  an award would be against the public policy of 
the Russian Federation. 
The second law which is  relevant in this respect  is  the 2002 Procedural  Code of the 
Commercial Court (CCPC). Article 32 CCPC provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of 
commercial courts in the enforcement of  foreign judgements and arbitral awards. 
The  CCPC  covers  the  procedural  aspects  of  enforcement.  Section  31  CCPC 
accommodates provisions on the enforcement of  foreign judgements and arbitral awards. 
Article 241  CCPC allows for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on 
the basis of either an international treaty or a federal law. The New  York Convention is 
one of those treaties. The procedure for the application for enforcement is set out in a 
detailed manner. 
189 Article 244  CCPC  lists the  grounds upon which enforcement and recognition may be 
refused.  This  provision  covers  both  foreign  judgements  and  arbitral  awards.  A 
commentary to the CCPC
67  points out that these grounds correspond to  the grounds as 
provided in the LICA, and as such also mirrors the provisions of  the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and New York Convention. 
A  novel  approach  introduced  by  the  2002  CCPC  concerns  jurisdiction  over  the 
application for  enforcement of foreign  arbitral  awards.  Before the  introduction of the 
Commercial  Courts  (Treteiskie  Sudi)  in  the  Russian  Federation,  the jurisdiction over 
international  awards  was  assumed  by  the  ordinary  courts.  Commercial  courts  were 
established  in  1992.  However,  there  were  no  explicit  provisions  in  any  laws  or 
regulations regarding their jurisdiction. LICA, a predecessor of CCPC, merely referred to 
a  competent court,  avoiding  this  issue.  While  there  was  no  explicit provision  which 
denied the jurisdiction of commercial  courts,  a majority  of foreign  cases  went to the 
ordinary  courts,  most prominent  of which  were  the  Russian  Supreme  Court  and  the 
Supreme Commercial COurt.
68 
The  struggle  for jurisdiction between the  ordinary courts  and  commercial  courts  was 
resolved by the introduction ofthe 2002 CCPC, in which Article 32 "the jurisdiction over 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements and arbitral awards" was finally 
and permanently granted to the commercial courts. 
This had a significant impact upon the enforcement of arbitral awards. On the one hand, 
it successfully eliminated any confusion over which Russian court held jurisdiction over 
the  matter.  Conversely,  the  newly appointed commercial  court judges appeared to  be 
hostile  to  commercial  arbitration.  One  of the  commentators  observed  that "while the 
67 Zhilin, G A, 'Kommentarii k arbitraznomu processual 'nomu kodeksu RF' (Commentary on the Russian 
Commercial Procedural Code) (Unpublished paper, Moscow, 2003) 598 (translated by the author ofthis 
thesis) 
68 The Supreme Commercial Court should not be mixed with "Treteiskii" Court. The Supreme Commercial 
Court of  the Russian Federation is the court of  ordinary jurisdiction and deals with various disputes of 
general commercial character; whereas the "Treteiskii" Court only came into existence in 1992 and is now 
known to deal with the matters concerning international judgments and awards. 
190 [commercial  court judges]  were  ready  to  enforce  foreign judgments,  there  was  some 
general reluctance to enforce arbitral awards" (emphasis added).69 
Such hostility, which is evident from the outcome of some of the recent cases,70 appears 
to be  the primary reason as to  why foreign investors hesitate to seek enforcement and 
execution of arbitral awards in Russia. Therefore, the second option, namely to  take an 
award to  a court of any other State where the Russian party holds sufficient assets and, 
subsequently, enforce that award there, presents as the more attractive option. This option 
is discussed below. 
III.  Recognition  and enforcement of foreign  arbitral awards  (involving  a 
Russian party) outside of  Russia 
1. General 
Due to  the fact  that enforcement proceedings are  generally ruled by local laws of the 
country where such enforcement is sought, a full  evaluation of the chances and risks in 
seeking enforcement abroad ought to be performed (by way of  due diligence). There are 
at least three  common components that feature  in the  States'  enforcement laws.  First, 
prohibition of  further argument on the merits of  the case; second, the rule of  territoriality, 
and third, enforcement against debtor rule.71 
With regard to the prohibition of re-arguing the merits of the case, proceedings for the 
enforcement of an arbitral award are supplementary and are based upon the arbitration 
proceedings that have resulted in the award.
72 The debtor, against whom an arbitral award 
69 Muranov, A, 'Nekotorie Problemi Privedenija v Ispolnenie v RF Inostrannix Rechenii po 
Economicheskim Sporam' (problems of  Implementing Foreign Commercial Judgments in the Russian 
Federation) (Unpublished paper, Moscow, 1999) 35 (translated by the author of  this thesis) 
70 Decision of  the Federal Commercial Court of  the Moscow District, Russia, 18 November, 2002; Decision 
of  the Federal Commercial Court of  the North-West District, Russia, 20 March 2003; Decision of  the 
Federal Commercial Court of  the Moscow District, Russia, 19 February 2004; Decision of  the Presidium of 
the V  AS ("Vischii Arbitraznii Sud"), Russia, 26 October 2004 
71 Stankewitsch, P, 'Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards against Russian Companies outside Russia' (June 
2005) volume 2 issue 3 TDM, 1 
72 Ibid. 
191 was rendered, is deemed to have utilised his chance at raising defences in terms of the 
merits of the case in the arbitral proceedings.
73  This is because most arbitral agreements 
stipulate that the award, once rendered, is final and binding. Hence, any re-opening of  the 
case  would  breach  the  parties'  contractual  obligations  and  potentially,  the  State's 
obligations under the treaty law.
74 
With regard to the rule of territoriality, it can be stated that it is a recognised principle of 
international law that States are  only able to  grant enforcement against assets that are 
located  within their  territorial  borders.
75  For  example,  an  Australian  investor  cannot 
obtain an enforcement of an arbitral award in Australia if the  party against whom an 
award is rendered does not have any assets in Australia, or if  such assets are insufficient. 
Finally, pursuant to the enforcement against the debtor rule, enforcement may only be 
validly carried out against the assets of the award debtor, and not any other third party. 
The  issue  as  to  whether  certain  assets  belong  to  the  award  debtor  is  determined  III 
accordance with the relevant property law. 
These three common features of local enforcement laws may considerably influence the 
success of enforcement proceedings abroad. This shall be illustrated in the remainder of 
this chapter. 
2. Attachment of  assets located outside of  jurisdiction 
General 
Based upon the rule of  territoriality a State in which an enforcement of  an award is sough 
cannot make  any  decisions  regarding  the  assets  of the judgement debtor  where  such 
assets are located outside of that State's territorial borders. In other words, the domestic 
73  If, for example, the debtor was not given the possibility to defend its case during the arbitral proceedings, 
under Article V(l)(b) of  the New York Convention, an award would not be enforceable. 
74 Stankewitsch, P, 'Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards against Russian Companies outside Russia' (June 
2005) volume 2 issue 3 TDM, 1 
75 Geimer, Reinhold, Internationales Zivilprozessrecht, 4th ed (Cologne, 2001) note 3200 
192 court of the State of  enforcement cannot attach the assets of  the award debtor (located in 
another country) to its decision pursuant to its own domestic law on enforcement. 
Tangible property 
The  location of tangible property may generally  be determined  with  little  difficulty. 
Relevant  information  can  usually  be  obtained  by  way  of due  diligence.  Once  it  is 
established that the judgement debtor holds sufficient assets within the jurisdiction of  the 
State of  enforcement, the local courts of  that State are generally empowered to attach the 
assets of  the judgement debtor to his decision. 
Property in shares 
The determination of  the location of  shares is more difficult to ascertain than the location 
of tangible property.  In this regard, it is appropriate to evaluate whether the company 
shares can be classified as tangible assets (the location of which would then be associated 
with  the  location  of share  certificates),  or  whether  shares  should  be  classified  as 
intangible property (the  location of which is then associated with the domicile of the 
company).  There is  no  general  answer to  this  question and therefore,  the  location of 
shares often depends upon the applicable law of  the State of  enforcement. 
Foreign shareholders (and potential foreign shareholders) of Russian entities should be 
aware that the shares of a company which are transferred by way of share certificates are 
generally considered to be located at the location of their certificates.?6 By contrast, the 
shares not presented by certificates, are usually assigned by way of intangible accounts 
receivable,  meaning  that the judgement creditor  is  required  to  obtain  a  garnishment 
order?? before he can seize the shares.?8 
76 Stankewitsch, P, 'Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards against Russian Companies outside Russia' (June 
2005) volume 2 issue 3 TDM, 1 
77 The term "garnishment" describes the attachment of  a claim that a judgment debtor has against its debtor 
(the so-called garnishee). In order to attach such claim of  the judgment debtor, the creditor usually has to 
obtain, according to the local laws, a so-called "garnishment order" from the competent court (or other 
State authority). By that order, which has to be served upon the garnishee, the garnishee is notified of  the 
193 Foreign investors should also note that whilst the shares of the debtor's subsidiaries are 
also considered to be the debtor's property, an arbitral award cannot be executed against 
the  subsidiary (provided that it is  a  separate  legal  entity)  because  a  subsidiary is not 
identical to the judgement debtor, and hence is generally treated as a third party.  79 
The final important consideration is the issue of  the retention of  title. Judgement creditors 
should always bear in mind that if the goods of the Russian judgement debtor have left 
the jurisdiction on the  basis that they were sold to  third parties,  the property in these 
goods  may  nevertheless  be  returned  to  the  judgement creditor  if the  buyer  has  not 
acquired a good title in those goods (i.e. has not paid full purchase price etc.), and thus 
has not yet acquired property in the goods. 
3.  Attachment of  securities 
Similar to the situation of the enforcement against shares, there is no generally accepted 
rule on how the location of securities should be determined.  80  According to the law of 
one State, securities might be located at the place where the security certificate is located, 
whereas  according  to  the  law  of another  State,  securities  might  be  located  at  the 
registered office of the issuer of  these securities. In addition, different enforcement laws 
may  provide  for  different  rules  depending  on  the  nature  of the  security  and  on the 
conditions for the transfer of  title. 
As a result, if a judgement creditor wants to  enforce the arbitral award against certain 
foreign  securities  held  by  a  Russian  debtor,  the  judgement creditor  has  to  find  out 
attachment by the judgment creditor. After service of  the garnishment order, the garnishee can usually no 
longer validly fulfil the garnished claims towards the judgment debtor, but has to disclose the details of  the 
garnished claim to the court and can only validly fulfil garnished claim as the court shall direct. 
78 StOber, Kurt, Forderungspfandung, 12th ed (Verlag: Gieseking, 1999) notes 1605 and 1612 
79 There are a number of  exceptions to this rule. First exception can be derived from the doctrine of 
"piercing the corporate veil". Another exception would be the situation that the judgment debtor transferred 
property to its subsidiary, thus impairing the chances of  the judgment creditor to obtain enforceable 
property of  the debtor. In such a case, the judgment creditor might, according to the applicable local laws, 
be entitled to challenge that property transfer. 
80 In this contents the "securities" are referred to as instruments evidencing an obligation of  the issuer 
towards the security holder. 
194 whether the local enforcement laws provide for different rules depending upon the nature 
of  the security pursuant to the chosen law.
81  If, for example, according to the chosen law 
the foreign  securities can be traded by simple transfer of certificates, the creditor may 
attempt  to  obtain  such  securities  from  within  the  territory  of another  State.  This  is 
because another State's law on enforcement may allow the seizure of  such securities by a 
simple attachment of  the certificates by a bailiff.  82 
4.  Attachment of  accounts receivable 
The  most  obvious  example  of a  situation  where  the  rule  of territoriality  cannot  be 
properly  applied  is  the  attachment  on  accounts  receivable.  The  location  of accounts 
receivable  is, due  to  their intangible nature,  a question of law and not of fact.  Local 
enforcement  laws  can  thus  provide  different  kinds  of solutions  to  locate  accounts 
receivable. Among these are: the creditor's domicile, the debtor's domicile, or the place 
where payment must be carried out.  To date,  there is no accepted general rule in this 
regard. 
Moreover, the  local  rules  on jurisdiction differ broadly with regard to garnishment of 
accounts receivable in international cases. A local court may assume jurisdiction to issue 
a garnishment order, by which accounts receivable are attached. It is thus not unusual that 
a creditor has the choice to apply for a garnishment order with different courts, i.e. the 
courts  where the debtor is  located  and  the  courts  where  the  garnishee  (the  debtor's 
debtor) is  located.  For example, an Australian investor who obtained an arbitral award 
against the Russian Federation may apply for a garnishment order in one of the Russian 
courts  (assuming  that  the  judgment  debtor  also  had  debtors  in  that  country),  or 
alternatively, he may apply for  such an order in,  for instance France,  where a French 
company, that owes a debt to a Russian company in question, is located. 
81  Stankewitsch, P, 'Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards against Russian Companies outside Russia' (June 
2005) volume 2 issue 3 TDM,  1 
82 StOber, above n 73, notes 2092 and 2096 
195 Generally  speaking,  the  creditor is  said to  be  in a  better position if he applies  for  a 
garnishment order directly with the court that has a jurisdiction over a garnishee, i.e.  in 
the garnishee's country of domicile.83  If  the creditor chooses the court of the garnishee's 
domicile, the creditor might be entitled to seek an enforcement of the garnishee's assets 
directly  (provided  that  the  garnishee  does  not  bring  forward  a  defence  against  the 
garnishment claim).84 
5.  Parent companies' liabilities against the subsidiaries' debts 
According to the enforcement against the debtor rule, an arbitral award obtained against a 
subsidiary, generally, cannot be enforced against the assets of the parent company since 
the parent company was not a party to the arbitral proceedings and could not defend its 
case.85  However, there are  situations when, under local laws, a parent company can be 
held liable for its subsidiary's debts, e.g. if the parent company unduly interferes with 
the subsidiary's business or if  the two companies' assets are combined in a way that they 
can no longer be attributed to one company or the other. In such a situation, some local 
laws allow for the so-called piercing of  the corporate veil, with the result that the parent 
company can no longer raise the defence that it is a separate legal entity, not responsible 
for the debts of  its subsidiary.  86 
It is  doubtful,  however,  whether  this  concept  can  also  be  applied  to  enforcement 
proceedings. A parent company's liability for its subsidiaries' debts allows the creditors 
83  Stankewitsch, P, 'Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards against Russian Companies outside Russia' (June 
2005) volume 2 issue 3 TDM,  I 
84 The garnishment of  accounts receivable by court order is the country of  the garnishee's domicile can, 
however, result in a serious dilemma for the garnishee. Namely, if  the debtor is entitled to pursue the 
garnished claims before the courts of  another country, the garnishee cannot be sure whether those courts 
will recognise the foreign garnishment order. Since there exists no international convention on the 
recognition of  foreign garnishment orders, the courts of  another State might well refuse to recognise 
garnishment order and might confIrm the garnishee's obligation towards the debtor. As a result, the 
garnishee could be faced to carry out his obligations twice - once towards the creditor pursuant to the 
garnishment order, and second time towards the debtor who turned to a court not recognizing the 
garnishment order. See Stankewitsch, P, 'Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards against Russian Companies 
outside Russia' (June 2005) volume 2 issue 3 TDM,  I 
85 Stankewitsch, P, 'Enforcement of  Arbitral Awards against Russian Companies outside Russia' (June 
2005) volume 2 issue 3 TDM,  I 
86 Popova, 'Liabilities of  Parent Companies' (2002) Khozyaystvo i Pravo 62 
196 of  a subsidiary to sue both the parent and the subsidiary. However, it does not necessarily 
imply  that  the creditor  can  enforce  a judgement  against  the parent  company  without 
having sued the parent company before. In Flip Side Productions,87 however, a decision 
of the Illinois District Court, the judges allowed an affiliate company of the judgement 
debtor to be  subjected to enforcement proceedings. Notably, this decision has not been 
followed since. 
In  summary,  due  to  the almost  worldwide  application  of the New  York  Convention, 
foreign  arbitral awards  are  generally recognised and enforceable throughout the world, 
unless exceptional circumstances occur. However, since the New  York Convention deals 
only  with  the enforceability  of a foreign  arbitral  award,  the subsequent  enforcement 
proceedings are subject to  the local laws on enforcement. Despite the diversity of these 
laws,  enforcement laws  in general have at least three common features:  the judgement 
debtor is strictly prevented from re-arguing the merits of the case; a State can only grant 
enforcement against assets that are  located within its  territorial borders in accordance 
with its property and corporation laws. 
E. Conclusion 
The ECT, as  it has been shown throughout this chapter, is one of the most significant 
international instruments for the promotion and cooperation in the energy sector. It is also 
said to be one of  the most significant multilateral treaties providing for the promotion and 
protection of investments.  By the large, the ECT provides protection that is  similar to 
most bilateral investment treaties. It provides for binding international dispute settlement, 
with particular respect to investment disputes. In short, under Article 26 ECT, disputes 
87 In Flip Side Productions, Inc.  v.  Jam Productions, Ltd, unreported, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15411 N.D. Ill, 8 
November 1990, the US District Court for the Northern District of  Illinois, Eastern Division, held that even 
an affiliate company ofthe judgment debtor can be subject to enforcement proceedings under the doctrine 
of  piercing the corporate veil. Since the affiliate company had treated the debtor's assets as though they 
were its own, the District Court considered the affiliate company as alter ego of  the debtor and therefore 
did not grant it the right to a full new trial on the merits of  the case. However, the judgment of  the District 
Court has not been confirmed by Illinois State Courts later, and since the legal issues at stake are subject to 
State law, Illinois case law does not give clear guidance so far. Cf. the judgment of  the US District Court 
for the Northern District of  Illinois, Eastern Division, in Harris Custom Builders, Inc.  v.  Richard 
Hoffmeyer, umeported; U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10032 N.D. Ill, 17 July 2001 
197 relating to the investment of  an investor can be referred to international arbitration if  they 
are not settled amicably between the disputing parties.
88 Under the provisions of  the same 
article,  the  investor  is  given  an  option  to  choose  between  ICSID  arbitration,  the 
arbitration under the auspices of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or the ad hoc 
arbitration  pursuant  to  the  Arbitration  Rules  of the  United  Nations  Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
With regard to the recognition and enforcement of the ECT awards, there are primarily 
two mechanisms that can be relied upon by the aggrieved party. First, an aggrieved party 
(usually the private investor) can rely upon the relevant provisions of the  Washington 
Convention, which stipulate that awards rendered under the auspices of this Convention 
are  final  and  binding,  and  are  not  subject  to  interpretation,  revision  or  annulment. 
Furthermore,  the  Washington  Convention  also  provides  for  a  procedure  for  the 
recognition and enforcement of awards.  Second, an aggrieved party can rely upon the 
relevant provisions of the New York Convention that also provide certain procedures for 
the  recognition  and  enforcement  of foreign  arbitral  awards.  The  provisions  of this 
Convention may be relied upon when the arbitral award is rendered and is being enforced 
in one of  its Member States.
89 
Finally, the issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards against the 
Russian Federation has also been discussed in this chapter. The conclusions that may be 
drawn from this discussion can be summarised as follows: an aggrieved investor has, in 
essence, two options of  enforcing foreign awards against the Russian Federation. First, an 
investor can take  an award  (for the purposes of enforcement) to  one  of the Russia's 
domestic courts. Second, an investor can take an award to a court of  any other State (that 
is a Member of the New  York Convention), provided that such a State holds sufficient 
assets belonging to either the debtor of  the judgement award or the garnishee (debtor of 
88 Gaillard, E, 'Energy Charter Treaty: International Centre for Settlement Decisions' (2005) volume 
233:66 New York Law Journal Electronic <http://www.shearman.comlfileslPublicationlfe26c229-008d-
42af-a322-0 15d45e3 5713IPresentationlPub  licationAttachmentil ee7  da5 5-96b9-4dcb-a96d-
0607855de025IIA  _ 040705.pdt> (17 August 2007) 
89 Moens, Gabriel & Gillies, Peter, International Trade & Business: Law, Policy and Ethics, 2
nd ed 
(London: Routledge Cavendish, 2006),591 
198 the debtor). In each case an award should be recognised and enforced in a manner such 
that it reflects the judgement of  that State's own domestic court. 
199 Part III 
Summaries and Conclusions Chapter Nine 
Summaries and Conclusions 
In the new era of doing business in Russia,  a foreign  investor needs to be mindful of 
certain peculiarities of the  Russian culture  and more  so  of certain specificities of the 
Russian legal system. In this thesis I have outlined a number of  crucial areas that ought to 
be studied by the potential investor in the Russian oil and gas industry. In particular, in 
chapter one of this  thesis  I highlighted  some  of the  issues  relating to  global  energy 
demand,  and  also  discussed the  role  that  the  Russian  Federation,  as  a  State  and  the 
ultimate  owner  of its  immense  subsoil  resources,  plays  in the  global  energy market. 
Having outlined certain statistical data about the distribution and demand of oil and gas 
resources  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Russian  oil  and  gas  sector  represents 
potentially  one  of the  core  investment  opportunities  for  energy  investors,  and  that 
Russian subsoil resources cannot and should not be overlooked by global energy traders. 
In the second chapter, I indicated some of the major obstacles for foreign investors in 
securing their contracts with the government of  the Russian Federation or its subsidiaries. 
In  short,  these  obstacles comprised some  of the  alleged  inefficiencies  of the  Russian 
internal legal system, the prospect of  expropriation or nationalisation of foreign property, 
the issue of State sovereign immunity and lastly, the problem of enforced exposure of 
foreign investors to the Russian domestic courts.  In this chapter I have  brought to the 
reader's attention some of the potential inefficiencies of Russia's internal legal regime 
much feared by investors. I have also indicated, however, that the legislative drawbacks 
highlighted in this chapter are largely academic. Hence, it is still arguable as to whether 
201 these  inefficiencies  leave  any  impact  on  the  investor  who  engaged  himself in  the 
investment activities connected to the Russian territorial borders and its subsoil wealth. 
The remainder of my thesis provides a detailed discussion regarding various investment 
protection  mechanisms  available  to  foreign  investors  in  cases  where  the  internal 
legislative environment of the Host State lacks efficiency. Thus, in chapter three I have 
acknowledged  the  importance  of carefully  drafted  contracts  as  the  first  and  most 
important mechanism  for  the  protection of investment.  In  chapter three  the  reader  is 
presented with a discussion concerning various contractual clauses that could effectively 
shield a more  vulnerable  party to  the  contract from  certain risks  associated with that 
contract. In particular, I have identified a number of contractual clauses that ought not to 
be overlooked by the corporate counsel and their clients-investors. These clauses include 
stabilisation, renegotiation and arbitration, as well as choice-of-Iaw and choice-of-forum 
clauses. In the same chapter I have addressed issues relating to the sanctity of  contract, on 
the  one  hand,  and  State  sovereignty,  on  the  other.  I  have  concluded  this  chapter by 
drawing  upon  the  often  underestimated  importance  of drafting  the  key  contractual 
promises, suggesting that carefully drafted contracts may assist investors in overcoming 
certain fundamental issues associated with their investments located within the territory 
of  another State. 
In chapter four I have highlighted another major mechanism of investment protection 
available  to  foreign  participants  within  the  territory  of the  Russian  Federation.  This 
second investment protection tool is known as the remedy of  diplomatic protection. This 
type of investment protection originates in customary intemationallaw and is generally 
available  to  every  investor  as  a  remedy  of last  resort.  This  remedy  involves  the 
negotiations between the Host State and the member of the diplomatic  mission of the 
investor's home State regarding the poor treatment of the said investor in alien territory. 
If such negotiations  prove to  be pointless, the power of this  remedy  may potentially 
extend to  the  initiation  of judicial  and  arbitral  proceedings,  severance  of diplomatic 
relations (including trade relations), and as a last resort - the use of  force. Nowadays, the 
202 remedy of  diplomatic protection is rarely relied upon, and if  ever it is, it rarely extends to 
the use of  force. 
Before  introducing  the  remedy  of diplomatic  protection,  however,  I  have  raised  the 
argument regarding the Host States' permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. 
The  reason  for  this  was  to  outline  the  scope  and  nature  of this  concept,  but most 
importantly - to indicate the implications attached to it. In particular, I have stressed that 
the concept of State sovereignty, which also originates in customary international law, 
brings  with it certain rights  and obligations towards the  State.  Notably,  among these 
rights, is the Host State's authority and power to expropriate or nationalise alien property 
under certain conditions (of legality). Among the Host State's obligations is the duty to 
respect the right of  other States and to adhere to its international undertakings spelled out 
in relevant international treaties and conventions. 
The discussion of  the State's obligations to honour its international undertakings resulted 
in the debate regarding Russia's obligations under public international law. Hence, in 
chapter five  I  have  identified  another  international  protection mechanism  offered to 
foreign investors under the auspices of pubic international law. I have suggested that the 
investment protection tools offered by these instruments are in themselves (i.e. regardless 
of  the collateral contractual undertakings) sufficient to safeguard the interests of  foreign 
investors with respect to their financial engagements with the government of the Host 
State. In this chapter I have discussed a number of  key investment protection provisions 
common to  both the treaty law and the customary international law.  These provisions 
include the Host State's obligations to provide foreign investors with non-discriminatoryl 
and fair and equitable treatment. I have also stressed the importance placed upon the Host 
State's  obligation  to  provide  foreign  investment  with  most  constant  protection  and 
security, and lastly, I have discussed the possibility for investors to initiate international 
arbitral proceedings directly (or without recourse to the diplomatic protection). 
I In this context, non-discriminatory treatment includes "National" treatment and "Most-favoured-nation" 
treatment. 
203 Chapter  six  deals  exclusively  with  expropriation  and  nationalisation  of  foreign 
investment by  the  government  of the  Host  State.  In this  chapter I have  outlined the 
meaning and the origin of the concept of expropriation. Furthermore I have highlighted 
the  various  forms  of expropriation,  and  finally  presented  a  discussion  regarding  the 
conditions  of legality  associated  with  the  aforementioned rights  concerning  the  Host 
State.  One  such  condition,  is  an  obligation  to  remedy  the  aggrieved  investor  by 
compensating him for his  loss.  I concluded this chapter by  suggesting that the State's 
obligation to pay compensation is one of the most effective means of international legal 
protection available to investors, and that a failure to comply with such an obligation may 
result in severe  damages imposed upon the  State by the relevant provisions of public 
international law. 
In chapters seven and eight I have discussed the investment protection provisions and the 
dispute  settlement  remedies  of the  1994  Energy  Charter  Treaty  (ECT)  - the  only 
multilateral investment treaty that deals exclusively with investment in the energy sector. 
My  decision  to  include  this  discussion  was  based  upon  the  finding  that the  ECT  is 
specifically  relevant  to  the  energy  sector,  and  also  because  this  Treaty  was  created 
specifically to integrate the countries of the former Soviet Union (including the Russian 
Federation)  into  the  broader  European and world market.  Among other things  I have 
brought to the reader's attention the fact that while the ECT has not yet been formally 
ratified by the Russian Federation, its provisions are nevertheless semi-binding upon the 
State due to the fact that the Russian Federation has ratified the document upon which the 
ECT was based. 
I have highlighted the fact that the ECT cornmits its Member States to provide, at least, 
minimum guarantees to investors, to increase confidence and minimise the risk of  making 
substantial investments in their territories.  The most important guarantees, as discussed 
in previous chapters, can be  summarised as follows. First, Member States must provide 
protection for foreign investors against the expropriation of their investment.  Any act of 
expropriation  conducted  by  the  State  must  be  lawful,  non-discriminatory  and  in the 
public  interest.  It must then  be  followed  by  the  payment  of prompt  and  effective 
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investment immediately before the expropriation. Second, Member States must provide 
protection from  discrimination. Under Article  10(7) ECT, the treatment accorded to an 
investor by a Member State must be as favourable as that to which they give their own 
investors  or investors from  other  States (subject to  a  limited number of exceptions).2 
Third,  and  most  importantly,  Member  States  undertake  to  abide  by  the  terms  of 
investment contracts that they enter into with foreign investors.  The investor is therefore 
given the right to sue a Member State under the ECT in respect of any breach of the 
investment contract.  This mechanism can be used by the investor even if the investment 
contract specifies other methods of  dispute resolution. 
Subsequently, I have noted that the ECT also provides investors with a powerful selection 
of dispute  resolution remedies providing a choice of methods  as  to  how,  or rather in 
which manner, the dispute should be resolved. Hence, I made reference to the provision 
of  Article 26 ECT, which stipulates that the parties are obliged to submit to international 
arbitration  under  either  the  ICSID  Rules  of Arbitration,  the  SCC  Rules  or  the 
UNCITRAL Rules. 
Finally, I have highlighted the two mechanisms provided by the ECT for the recognition 
and  enforcement  of international  arbitral  awards,  namely  those  provided  for  by  the 
Washington Convention (also referred to  as the ICSID Convention), and the New  York 
Convention respectively.  I have concluded my thesis  by pointing, in particular, to  the 
peculiarities of the  recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards  against the 
Russian Federation. 
An overall  conclusion that is  hinted  at  throughout this thesis  may  be  summarised as 
follows:  despite  the  alleged  inefficiencies  of the  Russian  internal  legal  environment, 
foreign investors can and should expand their participation in the Russian energy sector. 
This is largely due to the fact that investors' uncertainties and concerns associated with 
2 This protection is only afforded to investors after they have made an investment and not during the pre-
investment stage (such as during a tender). 
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by the provision of  public international law, and in addition to that, any such uncertainties 
can be discretely disposed of by the thorough preparation of the contractual documents 
and careful drafting of  the contractual clauses. 
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